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Abstract 
This dissertation presents three projects within the fields of behavioural and 
experimental economics. The first consists of a meta-analysis of lab experiments 
measuring economic discrimination. Most importantly, I find that the strength of 
discrimination in economics experiments varies depending on the dimension of 
identity across which discrimination is measured, and depending on the type of game 
used to measure it. The second project investigates the relationship between 
discriminatory behaviour and social norms. A lab experiments finds that 
discrimination is stronger when it is perceived to be more socially appropriate. In the 
third project, a field experiment investigates the effect of different nudges on voter 
registration rates. In particular, emphasising the possibility of being fined for failing 
to register is successful in raising registration rates, but offering the possibility of 
financial gain for registering is not. An online experiment in the same project 
suggests the conflicting normative effects of the two nudges may help explain these 
differences.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
This dissertation presents three research projects. All three projects fall within the 
fields of behavioural and experimental economics, although each uses a different 
methodology, the first being a meta-analysis, the second a lab experiment and the 
third a combination of field and online experiments. The research questions addressed 
also vary, but the two main themes of the dissertation are discrimination and social 
norms. The project presented in Chapter 2 focuses on discrimination. The project 
presented in Chapter 4 focuses on social norms. And the project in Chapter 3 focuses 
on norms of discrimination and how they vary across contexts. 
Chapter 2 consists of a meta-analysis of lab experiments measuring economic 
discrimination. The chapter, entitled ‘Discrimination in the laboratory: a meta-
analysis of economics experiments’, was published as a paper in the European 
Economic Review in 2016. Discrimination has long been regarded as an important 
economic matter (at least since Becker, 1957), and experimental research in 
economics measuring discrimination has proliferated in the last 15 years or so, since 
the emergence of such ground-breaking studies as Fershtman and Gneezy (2001). 
However, the results of this experimental literature have often been contradictory, and 
a clear consensus has been lacking regarding the types of experimental circumstances 
under which particularly strong or weak discrimination should be expected to appear. 
Given the now-large available sample of studies, a meta-analysis is an appropriate 
tool for addressing this issue, particularly as it is more objective than qualitative 
literature review. 
The database of experimental results that I harvested was sufficiently large and 
diverse to address various questions. In particular, I investigated whether the strength 
of discrimination systematically differs according to the type of identity it is based 
upon, the type of game-setting in which it is elicited, and the characteristics of the 
subjects participating in the experiment.  I also investigated whether the experimental 
literature provided more support for taste-based or statistical discrimination, and 
made male-female comparisons of behaviour in experiments studying gender 
discrimination. To maximise the likelihood of yielding unbiased answers to these 
questions, two crucial design aspects of the meta-analysis were: 1) ensuring a 
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sufficiently thorough and rigorous literature search was conducted; and 2) deciding 
upon and consistently applying a set of criteria to determine which of these identified 
studies were included in the final database. Section 2 of the paper addresses these 
issues in depth. 
A key finding of the meta-analysis was that the strength of discrimination in 
economics experiments varies depending on the dimension of identity across which 
discrimination is measured. Strikingly, discrimination has tended to be stronger in 
experiments with minimal groups (that is, groups whose identities are artificially 
induced during the experiment, using procedures similar to those first developed by 
Tajfel et al, 1971) than in experiments with groups based on ethnicity, nationality or 
religion. The identity type upon which the weakest discrimination has tended to be 
found is gender – with, in fact, a slight tendency towards subjects favouring members 
of the opposite gender. The strongest levels of discrimination have been found 
between groups with identities based on social or geographical characteristics. 
Regarding game-setting, I found discrimination tends to be particularly strong in the 
‘third-party allocator game’ (where decision-makers are required to allocate payoffs 
between passive in-group and out-group members). I found evidence throughout the 
literature for the existence of both taste-based and statistical discrimination, but that 
taste-based discrimination has tended to play the dominant role. I also found that 
levels of discrimination are not significantly affected by whether subjects are students 
or non-students and that, in gender experiments, the strength of male-to-female 
discrimination has not tended to significantly differ from that of female-to-male 
discrimination. 
The relative strength of discrimination between groups with artificially-induced 
identities may seem counterintuitive: why would ‘minimal’ groups not yield minimal 
levels of discrimination? I designate some discussion to this question in Chapter 2, 
before attempting to address it empirically in Chapter 3. Chapter 3, entitled ‘On the 
social inappropriateness of discrimination’, reports the results of a lab experiment 
investigating the relationship between discriminatory behaviour and social norms. 
Social norms are increasingly being presented as important determinants of economic 
behaviour, particularly within the experimental literature instigated by Krupka and 
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Weber (2013), which attempts to directly measure social norms. We hypothesised 
that they might help explain why discrimination is more pronounced in some contexts 
than others.    
In this experiment, we replicate under controlled conditions the finding from the 
meta-analysis that discrimination is stronger across minimal groups than across 
groups based on nationality. We did this by measuring discrimination in two 
treatments which differed only in the type of group identity primed amongst subjects. 
In one treatment subjects were split into groups based upon whether they were British 
or Chinese; in the other, they were split into groups on the basis of which colour of 
ball they randomly drew from a bag. Consistent with the result of the meta-analysis, 
discrimination was found to be significantly stronger in the treatment with minimal 
groups. 
The experiment also measured the social norms pertaining to discrimination in each 
treatment. Following the methodology of Krupka and Weber (2013), we asked 
subjects to evaluate the social appropriateness of each action decision-makers in the 
experiment could take. This task was incentivised such that subjects whose 
evaluations matched those of others would receive money; thus, evaluators were 
encouraged to coordinate on the social norms. As we hypothesised, discrimination 
was perceived to be more socially inappropriate in the treatment with national groups. 
Our results suggest that social norms may affect discrimination and that cross-
contextual variations in the social appropriateness of discriminatory behaviour may 
help explain cross-contextual variations in the strength of observed discrimination. In 
particular, the relatively strong discrimination observed in minimal group 
experiments may be the result of relatively weak social norms against discrimination 
in such settings. In the chapter, we discuss how the findings of our experiment are 
consistent with a theoretical framework based closely upon that of Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000, 2005). 
Chapter 4, entitled ‘Nudging the electorate: a field experiment on raising voter 
registration for the UK General Election’, reports a field experiment ran in 
conjunction with Oxford City Council on the effect of various behavioural 
interventions on voter registration rates amongst the UK electorate. The paper is 
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impact-focused, contributing to the literature on nudging (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) 
in public policy. There is also a conceptual focus, as we explore social norms as a 
possible mechanism for the success or failure of particular nudges. 
In the study, Oxford City Council sent postcards to unregistered student voters, 
encouraging them to register to vote ahead of a General Election. The postcards were 
designed such that only the wording of the messages on them varied between 
treatments, allowing us to isolate the effects on registration of particular persuasion 
strategies. Specifically, we tested the effects of emphasising to recipients the 
possibility that they could be fined for not registering; of offering potential monetary 
rewards, in the form of entry into a lottery to win cash prizes, for recipients who 
registered early; and of attempting to nudge recipients towards registering through the 
purely psychological means of a foot-in-the-door effect (Freedman and Fraser, 1966). 
We found that emphasising the possibility of being fined raised registration rates 
substantially. However, offering entry into the lottery had no overall effect on 
registration and, once the deadline for the lottery had passed, subjects exposed to this 
intervention were in fact significantly less likely to register than those in a control 
treatment. Our attempts to invoke the foot-in-the-door effect were also unsuccessful. 
Therefore, our study offers clear advice to policymakers on how they should and 
should not attempt to raise registration rates. 
As we discuss in the paper, there are multiple possible explanations for why 
emphasising the fine works well while offering monetary incentives for registering 
does not. We empirically explore one of these: the effect of each intervention on 
social norms. In a follow-up study, we investigated the effects of being exposed to 
each intervention on the perceived social appropriateness of registration behaviour, 
again using the incentivised norm-elicitation method of Krupka and Weber (2013). 
Exposure to the postcard emphasising the possibility of a fine strengthened the 
perceived social norm that one should register to vote, while exposure to the postcard 
offering entry into the lottery weakened it. We suggest that this strengthening of the 
norm may have contributed to the success of the fine treatment, while the weakening 
of the norm may help explain why, as in some previous economic research (e.g. Frey 
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and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997), the offer of monetary rewards may crowd out people’s 
intrinsic motivation to engage in a socially beneficial act. 
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Chapter Two: Discrimination in the 
laboratory: a meta-analysis of 
economics experiments 
Abstract 
 
Economists are increasingly using experiments to study and measure discrimination 
between groups. In a meta-analysis containing 441 results from 77 studies, we find 
groups significantly discriminate against each other in roughly a third of cases. 
Discrimination varies depending upon the type of group identity being studied: it is 
stronger when identity is artificially induced in the laboratory than when the subject 
pool is divided by ethnicity or nationality, and higher still when participants are split 
into socially or geographically distinct groups. In gender discrimination experiments, 
there is significant favouritism towards the opposite gender. There is evidence for 
both taste-based and statistical discrimination; tastes drive the general pattern of 
discrimination against out-groups, but statistical beliefs are found to affect 
discrimination in specific instances. Relative to all other decision-making contexts, 
discrimination is much stronger when participants are asked to allocate payoffs 
between passive in-group and out-group members. Students and non-students appear 
to discriminate equally. We discuss possible interpretations and implications of our 
findings.  
 
JEL classifications: C92 – Laboratory Experiments (Group Behaviour); D03 – 
Behavioural Microeconomics: Underlying Principles 
 
Keywords: Discrimination; Meta-analysis  
9 
 
1. Introduction 
Meta-analysis – a commonplace technique in medical science, psychology and, to a 
growing extent, economics – holds advantages over literature review in terms of 
objectivity and analytical rigour. In recent years, the experimental economics 
literature appears to have reached a critical mass at which researchers are finding 
meta-analyses useful.1 The benefit of these works is that, by aggregating data across a 
large number of experiments and exploiting natural between-study design variation, 
they pinpoint behavioural regularities and the variables that modify them more 
precisely than could be done through qualitative review.  
We run a meta-analysis on the body of studies investigating discrimination in 
lab and lab-in-the-field experiments, a sub-literature which has certainly reached the 
necessary critical mass for such a venture. Economists’ interest in discrimination has 
been strong ever since Becker (1957), and with the growth of experimental 
economics in the last two decades, experiments have emerged as a popular 
complement to survey-based econometric studies. 
 These experiments create a controlled environment and therefore allow much 
cleaner measurements of discrimination than the analysis of naturally-occurring data, 
avoiding such problems as omitted variable bias and reverse causality. Furthermore, 
by testing for a very fundamental and general form of discrimination – simply, 
whether subjects treat others differently depending on which group those others 
belong to – experimental economists can produce findings of interest not only to their 
own discipline but also across the social sciences. Also, through the use of incentives, 
experiments hold a key advantage over questionnaire-based measures of 
discrimination, in that they elicit revealed rather than reported discrimination. 
                                                          
1  Several meta-analyses of economics experiments have been released in recent years, including: 
Engel (2007) – oligopoly experiments; Prante et al. (2007) – Coasean bargaining; Jones (2008) – 
group cooperation in prisoners’ dilemmas; Hopfensitz (2009) – the effects of reference 
dependence and the gambler’s fallacy on investment; Percoco and Nijkamp (2009) – time 
discounting; Weiszäcker (2010) – social learning; Engel (2011) – dictator games; Johnson and 
Mislin (2011) – trust games. 
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 Psychologists had already been studying discrimination in the lab for decades, 
and experimental economists have drawn on their knowledge, particularly regarding 
the minimal group paradigm. This technique was first introduced by Tajfel et al 
(1971) and has spawned a huge body of experiments wherein group identity is 
artificially induced in the laboratory. This is often done by, in a preliminary phase of 
an experiment, asking subjects to state their preference for one artist over another, or 
to randomly draw a colour. The experimenter then splits the subject pool into groups 
according to their art preference, or the colour they have drawn, and makes it known 
to participants that the division is based on these differences. Subsequent stages of 
such experiments involve interaction tasks between the groups and find 
discrimination surprisingly (at least to the early researchers) often.  
To study discrimination, experimental economists set up games such as the 
dictator game, the trust game or the prisoner’s dilemma, and invite a subject pool 
segregated along the lines of a particular identity-based characteristic (or else 
generate this segregation with artificial groups). They make subjects aware of the 
group affiliation of those they interact with, and then measure how their behaviour 
varies according to whether individuals they are interacting with share their identity 
(are in-group) or do not (are out-group).  
The number of economics experiments of this type has grown rapidly since 
the turn of the century and now encompasses substantial diversity across several 
dimensions. Even after omitting many papers which investigate discrimination but do 
not meet our inclusion criteria devised to ensure a consistent approach (see Section 
2), we are left with a dataset consisting of 441 experimental results (significant and 
null) from 77 studies – more data than most of the other experimental economics 
meta-analyses have had. In order to aid the progression of this literature, it is worth 
taking stock of what has been found to date, particularly as casual inspection reveals 
non-uniformity in the results; the strength of discrimination found against out-groups 
varies considerably, and some experiments even find discrimination in the opposite 
direction, i.e. against the in-group. 
 The aim of this meta-analysis is both to yield broad insights on discrimination 
and to inform the designers of future experiments testing for it. We first investigate 
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the average strength of discrimination across the literature. We then inquire how it 
tends to vary according to specific experimental characteristics. 
In particular, we are interested in whether the strength of discrimination 
depends on the type of identity being investigated. Comparing the level of 
discrimination between artificial (i.e. minimal) groups and various types of natural 
groups (such as those based on ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender and 
social/geographical affiliation) is particularly interesting. One might expect ‘minimal’ 
groups to yield minimal levels of discrimination. However, it is also conceivable that 
artificial identity inducement confers an experimenter demand effect in favour of 
discrimination, or that the experimental priming of sensitive natural identities reduces 
subjects’ desire to discriminate owing to a preference not to engage in socially 
unacceptable behaviour. Evidence for these possibilities, in the form of relatively 
strong discrimination in artificial group experiments, could have implications for the 
external validity of certain experiments. 
A further interesting question is whether the strength of discrimination varies 
according to the type of decision subjects are asked to make. This has implications in 
terms of the real-world circumstances in which discrimination can be most expected 
to appear and for the generalisability of findings. 
We further ask whether experiments with students reveal greater or lesser 
discrimination than those with non-students. This is also important for the external 
validity of findings, and is a question worth pursuing as some studies (e.g. Bellemare 
and Kroger, 2007; Anderson et al, 2013) have found students are not entirely 
representative of wider populations in economics experiments.   
This meta-analysis also aims to shed light on the motivations behind 
discrimination. Some experiments have been designed specifically to distinguish 
between taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination – the two models 
that continue to dominate the theoretical literature in economics. The taste-based 
model, proposed by Becker (1957), entails individuals gaining direct utility from the 
act of discriminating against out-groups. Meanwhile, according to theories of 
statistical discrimination – beginning with Arrow (1972) – individuals aim to 
maximise their own payoffs given their beliefs and expectations about others’ 
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characteristics and behaviour, and discrimination occurs when those beliefs and 
expectations vary depending on the group to which the others belong. Understanding 
the relative importance of these two motivations will improve the focus of future 
research and the design of policies aimed at combating discrimination.  
Finally, we include a subsection on experiments investigating gender 
discrimination. Gender is unique amongst the identity types in having the same two 
groups in each experiment. It is therefore simple to make a clean comparison between 
male-to-female discrimination and female-to-male discrimination. 
In summary, the meta-analysis presented below aims to address the following 
questions: (1) What is the general pattern of discrimination across the literature? (2) 
How does the level of discrimination vary according to the type of identity groups are 
based upon? (3) How does the level of discrimination depend upon the decision-
making context? (4) Do students discriminate any more or less than non-students? (5) 
Does the experimental literature provide more support for taste-based or statistical 
theories of discrimination? (6) In gender experiments, how does male-to-female 
discrimination compare with female-to-male discrimination? 
 Our main results, presented in Section 3, are as follows. (1) We find a 
moderate tendency towards discrimination against the out-group, with a majority of 
null results across the literature. (2) The strength of discrimination against the out-
group does vary according to the type of group identity subjects are divided by. It is 
greater when identity is artificially instilled in a subject pool than when it is divided 
by nationality or ethnicity – minimal groups, it seems, are not so minimal after all.  
Discrimination is even stronger, though, when participants are divided into socially or 
geographically distinct groups. (3) The extent of discrimination against the out-group 
also depends on the role participants are given in an experiment: when subjects are 
asked to allocate payoffs between inactive players belonging to the in-group and out-
group, it is stronger than in any other decision-making context. (4) Students do not 
appear to be differently inclined towards discrimination than non-students. (5) We 
find evidence in support of both taste-based and statistical discrimination. Tastes 
appear to drive the general tendency for discrimination against the out-group, but 
individual studies have found beliefs to affect discrimination. (6) In gender 
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discrimination experiments the tendency for discrimination against the out-group is 
reversed, as subjects demonstrate slight but significant favouritism towards the 
opposite gender. Discriminatory behaviour in these experiments does not differ 
significantly between males and females. We discuss possible interpretations of these 
results in depth in Section 4. 
 We are aware of only one other meta-study attempting to analyse the 
experimental discrimination literature – Balliet et al (2014)2, who take 214 estimates 
of discrimination from 78 studies. There is little overlap between our samples; Balliet 
et al take studies from across the social sciences but their search and inclusion criteria 
result in most of the experimental economics literature on discrimination not being 
included (26 of our studies – around a third – feature in Balliet et al’s sample). They 
exclude decision-making contexts which we consider, such as being the second mover 
in a sequential game or a third-party allocator. They also exclude interactions between 
gender groups. 
The present study and that of Balliet et al can be viewed as complements. 
Through focusing only on economic experiments, we enhance comparability and 
eliminate some studies using methodological elements that may not be acceptable to 
some social scientists. Our focus on the economic theories of taste-based and 
statistical discrimination differentiates our study from Balliet et al, who investigate 
                                                          
2  Although nothing approaching a full meta-analysis of the in-group-out-group literature had 
previously been conducted, several social psychology meta-studies have investigated specific 
phenomena within it. Saucier et al (2005) analysed research measuring the degrees to which 
subjects would help white and black people; while not finding statistically significant aggregate 
discrimination against black people, they showed it increased in emergency situations and cases 
where helping was more difficult or risky. Bettencourt et al (2001) found high-status groups 
exhibited more in-group bias than low-status groups. Fischer and Derham (2010) concluded 
discrimination in minimal group experiments was stronger in countries whose societies are 
considered more individualistic. Aberson et al (2000) found greater in-group bias amongst 
individuals with higher self-esteem. Robbins and Krueger (2005) found social projection, ‘the 
tendency to expect similarities between oneself and others’, to be stronger towards in-groups 
than out-groups, and that this effect was amplified with artificial groups relative to natural ones. 
Although interesting, many of the studies included in these meta-analyses are considerably 
different from those we consider – often they do not relate specifically to economic behaviour, 
and even if they do they may not be incentivised.  
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psychological theories of discrimination. Throughout our analysis we compare our 
results to theirs. Their paper finds a similar overall tendency for discrimination to 
what we do. They find the extent of discrimination not to differ significantly between 
settings of natural and artificial identity, but do not split natural identity into 
subcategories as we do. The clearest difference in results between the two studies is 
that Balliet et al find discrimination is stronger by decision-makers who move 
simultaneously than by first movers in sequential exchanges, while we do not find it 
significantly differs between these settings. 
 
2. Methodology and criteria for inclusion 
We chose to restrict our study to the experimental economics literature. Almost all of 
the economics experiments have been conducted in the last 15 years and can 
reasonably be expected to have followed comparable procedures, which is important 
in a meta-analysis. We define an economics paper as follows: it must either have been 
published in an economics journal or have as at least one of its authors a person 
trained in economics or a business-related discipline, or who has at least once held a 
position in an economics or business-related department. Furthermore, we exclude 
economics papers which, it is clear to the reader, exhibit a breach of standard 
experimental economics practice – most notably, deception. For inclusion, an 
experiment must involve interaction between individuals whose decisions determine 
real material payoffs for participating players. In other words, it must be incentivised. 
A serious pitfall meta-analyses can face is publication bias, also named the 
‘file drawer problem’. Because null results are less likely to be published than 
significant ones, a meta-analysis risks including a disproportionately low number of 
studies finding small or no effects (Rosenthal, 1979; Rothstein, 2006). This can lead 
to an overestimation of average effect sizes. It can also, if null results are particularly 
unlikely to be published when combined with certain other features of a study, result 
in the meta-analysis overestimating the relationship between strong effects and these 
features; in our case, for instance, if null results in trust games were never published 
but null results in other games sometimes were, we would be in danger of estimating 
a spuriously strong relationship between trust games and significant results. To 
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minimise such bias, a good meta-analysis should conduct the most thorough literature 
search possible in order to find all applicable studies, whether published or not. Our 
approach was threefold. In late 2013, we conducted RePEc searches for the 
keywords, ‘Discrimination experiment’, ‘Identity experiment’, ‘Ingroup experiment’ 
and ‘Outgroup experiment’, and carefully sifted through the output for candidate 
studies. We then followed the references and citations of all papers identified as 
relevant. Finally, we checked our list of included studies against that of Balliet et al 
(2014); this step added one study (Spiegelman, 2012).3 One feature of the literature 
we meta-analyse is that studies tend to include various different treatments, and 
therefore report multiple results. This may act as a further curb on publication bias – 
insignificant findings make their way into papers alongside more interesting 
significant results (indeed, it turns out the majority of results in our dataset are null).4  
Previous meta-analyses in experimental economics such as Engel (2011) and 
Johnson and Mislin (2011), which focus on a single game type, are able to use the 
average behaviour of subjects (amount sent in the dictator or trust game) as a 
continuous dependent variable, with one observation and an associated standard error 
for each treatment. In our case, we are pooling across different game types and 
therefore need a way of transforming the data to make meaningful comparisons 
between these settings. Our variable of interest is the difference between decision-
makers’ behaviour towards their in-group and their out-group, whilst all other aspects 
of the experimental design are held constant – in essence, the discrimination effect 
size. There is typically one observation per every two treatments (one in-group and 
one out-group treatment) for each type of player active in the given game. The 
exception is when a decision-maker interacts with both the in-group and the out-
group in the same treatment (either by making one decision which simultaneously 
                                                          
3 The Balliet et al project was not in the public domain when we embarked upon ours, and we were 
unaware of it. We designed our search and inclusion criteria independently of theirs. However, 
learning of their meta-analysis provided the perfect opportunity to test the thoroughness of our 
search for studies. That Balliet et al include only one study which fits our inclusion criteria but 
which we had not independently found suggests it is unlikely we have missed many applicable 
papers. 
4 The number of observations generated by a single paper varies from 1 to 24, with Chen et al 
(2014) providing the most. 
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affects both, or by playing in the same role twice), in which case a within-treatment 
measure of discrimination is available.5 The ideal approach would be to record an 
effect size for each comparison, and we attempt to do this. Consistent with Balliet et 
al (2014), the measure we use is Hedges’ unbiased d: the mean difference in 
behaviour towards the in-group and the out-group, divided by the pooled standard 
deviation, with a minor correction for sample size (Hedges and Olkin, 1985). 
However, a substantial number of studies do not report sufficient data for us to 
calculate effect sizes. This is particularly the case with null results, as when a 
difference is not significant authors are less likely to report the test statistic from 
which an effect size could be derived. We sent data requests to the authors of all 
papers for which we could not construct the measure using information provided in 
the paper. After receiving data from 22 of the 36 sets of contacted authors, we ended 
up with effect sizes on 364 of our 441 data-points. We therefore also employ a binary 
dependent variable, recording simply whether, for each comparison, behaviour 
significantly favours the in-group over the out-group at the 5% level.6 The effect size 
is the inferior dependent variable in that it restricts the sample and may lead to greater 
under-representation of null results; but the superior one in terms of information 
content. 
For simplicity, we define ‘discrimination’ as discrimination against the out-
group, and ‘out-group favouritism’ as discrimination against the in-group, and will 
use these terms hereafter. Unlike some, we make no distinction between nepotism and 
discrimination; any result of favouritism towards one group relative to a second can 
equivalently be interpreted as discrimination against the second group. We therefore 
conceptualise ‘discrimination’ (against the out-group) as something which can be 
                                                          
5    For a game to meaningfully measure discrimination, and therefore for us to include it, it must be 
possible to unambiguously rank the decision-maker’s available actions in terms of how favourable 
they are to the decision-maker’s partner. Certain coordination games cannot be included, since 
whether one action is more favourable depends upon the move a partner simultaneously makes. 
In Appendix A, Table A.2 we list all the game types included in our sample, and explain how they 
measure discrimination. 
6    We also do this for out-group favouritism, recording whether or not behaviour significantly favours 
the out-group over the in-group at the 5% level, and run separate regressions on this. These are 
reported in Appendix C, Table C.1. 
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measured on a continuum with positive and negative values. When discussing 
average effect sizes, we will describe a relatively low value as indicating ‘lower’ or 
‘weaker’ discrimination, even if it is driven by highly negative effect sizes (i.e. even 
if it is driven by instances of strong discrimination against the in-group). 
For an observation to meet our inclusion criteria, there must be an in-group 
and out-group, clearly defined on the basis of categorisation by a discrete identity-
relevant variable, such as ethnicity, gender or – as with artificial groups – the 
preference for a particular artist or the colour randomly drawn. There must be 
controlled interaction within and between the groups, and decision-makers must be 
aware that they are interacting with individuals belonging to their in-group or out-
group. We only consider an in-group to be appropriately defined as such if every one 
of its members shares the same categorisation as the decision-maker on the basis of 
the relevant variable. For an out-group to be appropriately so-defined, every member 
must take a different categorisation from the decision-maker. It is not required that all 
members of an out-group take the same categorisation as each other. For instance, 
Guillen and Ji (2011) use as their two groups Australian and non-Australian. In this 
case, for an Australian decision-maker the Australians are the in-group and the non-
Australians the out-group, but for a non-Australian the other non-Australians should 
not count as their in-group. We then only record the observed behaviour of the 
appropriately defined group, the Australians in this example. Occasionally, we are 
forced to make a subjective decision on what can reasonably be considered a group. 
For example, from Chen et al (2011), which splits its US-based sample into white and 
Asian students, we record the behaviour of the white ‘group’ but not that of the 
Asians, as we believe that in American society white people can appropriately be 
defined as comprising a shared ethnicity, whilst those of Asian descent comprise a 
mixture of ethnicities.7  Papers such as Falk and Zender (2007) which do not have 
clear groups but measure each subject’s position on a scale of social distance, based 
on a continuous variable, are not included. 
                                                          
7 There were four cases where we made such subjective decisions, all listed in Appendix A. Our 
main results still hold regardless of the decisions we come to in these cases. 
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If an experimental design splits the sample up into more than two separate 
groups, on the basis of a single identity-relevant variable, we record separately how 
each group treats each other group relative to its own. If such a paper reports that 
Group A does not significantly discriminate against Group B or Group C but does 
significantly discriminate against Groups B and C combined, we record two results of 
no discrimination rather than one result of discrimination; and in the main text of this 
paper we report our results using this approach. We do this because, although Groups 
B and C combined could represent a single out-group as defined above, the 
experiment was set up to treat them as separate out-groups. Similarly, we do not 
include the reported results of statistical tests run on data pooling two or more 
treatment pairs. These are grey areas but we have re-run our main regression results 
for the binary dependent variables in the case of treating every result reported in our 
sample as an observation: this adds 16 extra data-points and does not qualitatively 
change our findings.  
Sufficient data must be reported for it to be clear whether there is significant 
discrimination in each pair of treatments (or, when applicable, single treatment); if we 
cannot work out whether there is discrimination in one or more treatment pair, the 
whole paper is omitted from the study. This is because papers are less likely to report 
the results of statistical tests finding no discrimination, and if we failed to include a 
given study’s non-results our analysis would overestimate the likelihood of this 
particular design finding discrimination. For similar reasons, if an experiment 
employs a cross-cutting design, dividing its subject pool by multiple identity types, it 
must report whether there is discrimination on the basis of each category. For 
example, an experiment which segregates the subjects by both gender and ethnicity 
must report, for each applicable treatment pair, whether each ethnic group 
discriminates against each other ethnic group or not, and also whether each gender 
discriminates against the other or not. Otherwise, we omit the study. 
Experimenters using artificial groups generally conduct tests on pooled data; 
rather than reporting whether Group A discriminates against Group B and vice versa, 
they report whether individuals across the sample pool discriminate against out-group 
members. This makes sense because there is no obvious reason to doubt the 
relationship between two artificial groups is completely symmetrical. As such, we use 
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pooled discrimination observations for artificial group experiments. Using similar 
reasoning, we also admit pooled discrimination observations for experiments dividing 
subjects by their real-world social groups. The pooling of certain types of data might 
lead to an increased chance of finding discrimination in certain experiments, which is 
one reason why we use the size of the sample from which the result is derived as a 
control variable in our regression analysis.  
We limit our analysis to lab and lab-in-the-field experiments; we do not 
include pure field experiments, in which subjects do not know they are participants in 
a study. We therefore do not include the large body of field experiments in which 
applications are sent to employers, landlords or others to test for discrimination in 
markets (correspondence studies).  
 
2.1   Analytical methods 
Listed in the next subsection are descriptions of the independent variables we include 
in our regressions. Our basic model contains role and identity type dummies, and 
some controls. Because our samples are not large and most variables are dummies, we 
regard linear probability models (LPMs) with errors corrected for heteroskedasticity 
as the best specifications when employing the binary dependent variables. However, 
we also run as robustness checks logit models, which we report in Appendix C, Table 
C.2. In some cases the logits drop observations, which is a major disadvantage. Their 
results, however, are qualitatively similar to the LPMs. When using binary dependent 
variables, we treat each study within the meta-analysis as providing a cluster of 
observations. 
When analysing the continuous dependent variable, we first use standard 
random effects meta-analysis procedures to determine average effect sizes for our full 
sample and for the subsamples based on identity type. These are simply aggregate 
estimates for the level of discrimination in the relevant subsample; they do not control 
for independent variables. The procedure takes into account that each observation has 
an associated standard error. It weights each observation by the inverse of this 
standard error, thus attaching more importance to results from larger samples and 
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with smaller standard deviations. It then follows an unweighting process, the extent of 
which depends upon the heterogeneity in effect sizes. The more heterogeneity there is 
across effect sizes, the more equal will be the weights attached to observations with 
small or large standard errors (Harbord and Higgins, 2008).8  
We then apply random effects meta-regressions, which allow the inclusion of 
independent variables in the analysis. These models follow the same processes of 
weighting and unweighting observations as described in the previous paragraph, but 
are otherwise standard linear regressions. Whereas with the binary dependent variable 
we must approach discrimination and out-group favouritism separately, the meta-
regression analyses both simultaneously, since the effect sizes can be positive or 
negative. This can be one reason why the results of the meta-regressions may differ 
from those of the linear probability regressions. Another can be the reduction in 
sample – therefore, when the results of the meta-regressions do not match those of the 
LPM regressions on discrimination , we present the LPMs re-run on the reduced 
effect-size sample, in order to determine whether the disparity is due to the change in 
sample or the change in analytical approach. 
 
2.2   Independent variables 
Role type dummies: We include role type dummy variables to pursue the question of 
how different decision-making contexts affect the extent of discrimination. The 
games used in this literature feature either multilateral or unilateral decision-making. 
When decision-making is multilateral, the outcome of the game is determined by 
more than one player’s actions. From such situations, we identify three different role 
types: First Mover (140 observations), where one’s move does not finish the game; 
Second Mover (119 observations), where one determines the final payoffs in response 
                                                          
8 The random effects approach is more suitable for our purposes than the fixed effects alternative, 
which excludes the unweighting step; the fixed effects process assumes there to be one true effect 
size across all studies, while random effects allow it to vary – the latter seems more plausible in 
our case, as we do not assume discrimination to be a universal constant.  
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to the co-player(s)’ actions; and Simultaneous Mover (66 observations), where one 
makes the last move of the game at the same time as one’s co-player(s). 
When decision-making is unilateral, the final outcome of the game is 
determined by one player. From these situations, we identify a further three role 
types. First, there is the Dictator (67 observations), who allocates payoffs between 
another player and his- or herself. Next we have third-party allocators (Allocator, 30). 
These are players who must divide a pie between two or more passive players (who, 
in these experiments, are members of different groups), but whose own payoff does 
not depend on this decision. Finally, there are players tasked with selecting a partner 
(from a choice of in-group and out-group participants) with whom to play a 
subsequent game. We label this role Partner Chooser (19 observations).9 
 
Identity type dummies: A second set of dummy variables records which type of 
group identity a given experimental sample has been divided according to. We 
consider identity to have been artificially induced if researchers split subjects into 
groups that, prior to the experiment, did not exist – in the sense of group members 
sharing characteristics that are not also shared by members of other groups in the 
study – and the subjects are aware they have been split into these groups.10 49 studies 
in the meta-analysis investigate natural identity, 32 artificially generate it, while the 
remaining four contain both natural and artificial treatments. We have 272 
observations for natural identity types and 169 for artificial. We subdivide the natural 
observations into six specific categories of natural identity. 
 First, we have 82 observations from 13 studies in which subjects are divided 
by Nationality. Next, nine studies investigate Ethnicity-based identity, adding 63 
                                                          
9    We ran further regressions in which we categorised the role types differently. In these models, 
dummy variables were assigned to specific game settings, such as the trust game sender and the 
trust game returner. The results are reported in Appendix B. 
10 There is some inconsistency in the literature on the definition of 'minimal groups'; some authors 
(e.g. Chen and Chen, 2011) categorise certain artificial groups as ‘near minimal’. For our purposes, 
we use ‘minimal groups’ synonymously with 'artificially created groups.' In Appendix B, we explore 
the effects of inducing artificial identity using different methods, and show that it seems not to 
matter precisely how ‘minimal’ the groups are. 
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observations. A further seven studies generate 32 observations on Gender identity. 21 
more observations are provided by five studies in which the subjects are split by 
Religion. 13 studies use a rather different approach, dividing the subject pool into 
groups based on real-world social and/or geographical identity. This is done in a 
variety of ways: for instance, using villages (Dugar and Shahriar, 2009), colleges 
within universities (Banuri et al, 2012) or friendship groups (Brands and Sola, 2010). 
However, all such designs share the common feature that each decision-maker has a 
clearly distinct social and/or geographical in-group – group identity here is defined 
with reference to the relative frequency with which one interacts with in- and out-
group members in ordinary life. The 57 observations generated by these experiments 
are coded under the variable Soc/Geo Groupings. The remaining 17 results, from four 
papers, deal with other types of natural identity, which cannot appropriately be fitted 
into the above categories. These observations relate to political identity (Abbink and 
Harris, 2012), disability (Gneezy et al, 2012), caste (Hoff et al, 2011) and whether 
farmers are private or members of cooperatives (Hopfensitz and Miguel-Florensa, 
2013). We pool them under the composite variable Natural Other11.12  
 
Other variables: In our regressions we include as a dummy variable (Students) 
whether each observation derives from a sample consisting predominantly of students 
or non-students. Even if not explicitly stated, we assume experiments run at 
universities have at most a very small number of non-student participants. Likewise, 
while we accept experiments in the field may include a few student subjects, their 
proportion is likely to be low (unless otherwise stated). As another control, we 
include the size of the active decision-making sample from which a given result is 
derived (Sample Size).  
                                                          
11  The distinction between Soc/Geo Groupings and Natural Other is not arbitrary: in- and out-groups 
in the Natural Other category are not necessarily socially or geographically distinct. However, if the 
Natural Other observations are incorporated into the Soc/Geo Groupings category, the Soc/Geo 
Groupings coefficients do not change substantially and all other results discussed in the paper 
remain unaffected. 
12  Two papers provide separate results on more than one natural identity category. 
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3. Results 
3.1   What is the general pattern of discrimination across the literature? 
In total, as shown in Figure 1, there are 144 results indicating significant 
discrimination (32.65%), 28 indicating significant out-group favouritism (6.35%), and 
269 indicating no significant discrimination or out-group favouritism (61.00%). 57 of 
our 77 studies record at least one result of discrimination, while only 15 record any 
results of out-group favouritism. 10 studies separately record results of discrimination 
and out-group favouritism. The general tendency, then, leans towards insignificant 
results, although only 15 studies consist entirely of nulls. 
Figure 1: Breakdown of data-points by result type 
 
Note:  Blue bars show the percentage of observations in our dataset which find significant 
discrimination (at the 5% level), a null result, and significant out-group favouritism (at the 5% level). Red 
points show the average effect sizes for observations belonging to each category. 
For the sub-sample where we are able to generate effect sizes (364 of 441 
observations), the random effects meta-analysis finds an overall effect size of 0.256 
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(95% confidence range: 0.209 - 0.304). This can be interpreted as, on average, 
subjects’ discriminating against out-groups by about a quarter of a standard deviation. 
This is not significantly different from Balliet et al (2014), who find an overall effect 
size of 0.32 (95% confidence range: 0.27 – 0.38). Figure 1 also displays point 
estimates for aggregate effect sizes, conditional on the type of result found for each 
observation. Observations finding significant discrimination have an average effect 
size of 0.67, those yielding null results have an average effect size of 0.11, and those 
finding significant out-group favouritism have an average effect size of -0.51; this 
confirms that the strength of the effect size tends to be closely related to the type of 
result found for a given observation. 
Result 1: In general, there is limited discrimination against the out-group. 
 
3.2   How does the level of discrimination vary according to the type of identity 
groups are based upon? 
Table 1 displays a breakdown of our sample’s observations by identity category, and 
the results of random effects meta-analyses run on these sub-samples. For most 
categories the tendency is towards null results. Only for Soc/Geo Groupings – which 
yields no results of out-group favouritism – are observations of discrimination more 
likely than insignificant results, and this is also the identity type with the highest 
average effect size. The category for which there is least discrimination and most out-
group favouritism is gender; the average effect size for this sub-sample is negative.   
Table 2a extends the analysis of Table 1 through the use of regressions. LPMa 
is a linear probability model with the dependent variable discrimination against the 
out-group (equal to 1 if discrimination is found, 0 otherwise). Metareg is a meta-
regression with the dependent variable the discrimination effect size. In both models 
artificial identity and the dictator game are the benchmark categories13. In these 
                                                          
13  By necessity, the choices of omitted categories are somewhat arbitrary – there are no variables to 
serve as obvious baselines for comparison. We selected Artificial because we regard comparisons 
between discrimination with artificial and natural forms of identity to be particularly interesting 
(as discussed in Section 1). For role type; we selected Dictator because it is a commonly used 
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regressions we test whether our identity-type variables still yield significantly 
different levels of discrimination after controlling for other factors. Table 2b presents 
the results of linear restriction tests run on the sets of dummy variables featuring in 
the models.  
 
Table 1: Breakdown of data-points by result type and identity type 
Category Obs. Find 
discrimi-
nation 
(%) 
Find null 
(%) 
Find out-
group 
favouritism 
(%) 
Obs. with 
available 
effect 
sizes 
Average Effect size 
(d) (with 95% C.I. 
below) 
Artificial 169 42.0 55.6 2.4 150 0.365  
(0.279 – 0.450) 
Natural National 82 18.3 68.3 13.4 52 0.164 
(0.042 – 0.286) 
 Ethnic 63 11.1 82.6 6.3 59 0.134 
(0.013 – 0.255) 
 Gender 32 9.4 65.6 25.0 28 -0.177 
(-0.301 –  -0.053) 
 Religious 21 14.3 80.9 4.8 21 0.034 
(-0.062 – 0.131) 
 Soc/Geo 
Groupings 
57 64.9 35.1 0.0 51 0.551 
(0.432 – 0.669) 
 Natural Other 17 47.1 52.9 0.0 7 -0.036 
(-0.158 – 0.086) 
Notes: Table 1 shows, for each identity type: the number of observations in our dataset; the percentage 
of these observations that find significant discrimination (at the 5% level), null results, and significant 
out-group favouritism (at the 5% level); the number of observations for which effect sizes are calculable; 
and the weighted average effect size across such observations, with associated 95% confidence 
intervals. 
In both the linear probability models and meta-regression, the identity 
category linked to the strongest discrimination is social and geographical groupings. 
In Metareg it yields significantly higher discrimination, at the 1% level, than any of 
the other identity categories. In LPMa it does the same, except that the differences 
with Artifical and Natural Other are only significant at the 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
The identity category linked to the weakest discrimination is gender. Both the 
linear probability model and the meta-regression indicate weaker discrimination 
                                                          
game in experimental economics and arguably the simplest, making it a useful object for 
comparison. 
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between genders than between artificial groups, significant at the 1% level. The meta-
regression also finds gender discrimination to be weaker than ethnic and national 
discrimination (at the 1% level), and religious discrimination (at the 10% level). 
However, LPMa does not find these differences to be significant.14  
In LPMa the coefficients on the ethnic and national identity types are 
significantly negative at the 1% level, strongly indicating that discrimination is less 
likely to be observed when subject pools are split along these lines than on the basis 
of artificial identities. According to Metareg, however, ethnic and national identity 
experiments are only linked to significantly lower discrimination (i.e. less positive 
effect sizes) than artificial group experiments at the 10% level.  
Given the inconsistency, Table 2a also reports LPMb, a linear probability 
model run on the reduced sample for which effect size calculation is possible. This 
helps to distinguish whether the losses of significance when moving from LPMa to 
Metareg are due to the reduction in sample or the change in measurement technique. 
For the comparison of national and artificial identity, the loss of significance appears 
to be due to the change in sample, as in LPMb the coefficient is also insignificant. 
The same cannot be said for Ethnicity, however, as the linear probability model on the 
reduced sample continues to report significantly less discrimination between ethnic 
than artificial groups at the 1% level. Doubt, therefore, is cast over the robustness of  
 
                                                          
14  Gender is also found to be significant in a linear probability regression with out-group favouritism 
as the dependent variable, presented as LPMa1 in Appendix C, Table C.1. Our results show that 
gender experiments are more likely to yield observations of out-group favouritism than all other 
identity types except Nationality, with all differences significant at the 1% level. This model 
additionally finds experiments with socially or geographically distinct groups are less likely to 
provide results of out-group favouritism than those with artificial or national groups. Other 
identity types are not associated with significantly strong or weak out-group favouritism – 
however, we have few results of out-group favouritism across our sample. Where we do find 
significant identity type effects on out-group favouritism, they are in directions consistent with the 
results on discrimination – when an identity type is positively (negatively) associated with out-
group favouritism, it will be negatively (positively) associated with discrimination. 
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Table 2a: Linear probability regressions on discrimination and meta-regressions 
on effect size 
Dependent variable Discrimination d 
  LPMa LPMb Metareg 
Identity       
  Ethnicity -0.293*** -0.294*** -0.140* 
    (0.067) (0.070) (0.079) 
  Religion -0.235* -0.256* -0.164 
    (0.131) (0.144) (0.125) 
  Nationality -0.240*** -0.163 -0.145* 
    (0.079) (0.099) (0.075) 
  Gender -0.312*** -0.335*** -0.456*** 
    (0.068) (0.072) (0.099) 
  Soc/Geo Groupings 0.252** 0.229* 0.354*** 
    (0.099) (0.122) (0.089) 
  Natural Other -0.056 -0.243 -0.236 
    (0.165) (0.197) (0.192) 
Role Types       
  First Mover -0.033 -0.025 0.136* 
    (0.074) (0.081) (0.079) 
  Second Mover -0.079 -0.066 0.050 
    (0.065) (0.075) (0.085) 
  Simultaneous Mover 0.015 0.023 0.095 
    (0.102) (0.117) (0.095) 
  Allocator 0.371*** 0.408*** 1.077*** 
    (0.094) (0.140) (0.155) 
  Partner Chooser 0.070 0.118 0.110 
    (0.108) (0.113) (0.127) 
Controls       
  Students 0.005 -0.025 0.086 
    (0.063) (0.076) (0.077) 
  Sample Size 6.6e-4 4.9e-4 6.6e-4 
    (4.8e-4) (7.2e-4) (4.8e-4) 
  Constant 0.406*** 0.422*** 0.144* 
    (0.089) (0.104) (0.105) 
R2 (adjusted in Metareg) 0.201 0.196 0.240 
N   441 364 364 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LPMa is linear probability model run on full sample, Metareg is 
meta-regression run on sample for which effect sizes are available, LPMb is linear probability model 
run on same sample as Metareg; omitted categories are Dictator (role type) and Artificial (identity); 
errors in LPM models are corrected for heteroskedasticity, with 77 clusters in LPMa and 67 in LPMb; 
standard errors in italics.  
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Table 2b: Linear Restriction Tests on models presented in Table 2a 
  
Null Hypothesis 
P Value on two-tailed test 
  LPMa LPMb Metareg 
Identity       
  Ethnicity = Religion 0.662 0.776 0.848 
  Ethnicity = Nationality 0.533 0.201 0.952 
  Ethnicity = Gender 0.785 0.556 0.007*** 
  Ethnicity = Soc/Geo Groupings <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** 
  Ethnicity = Natural Other 0.144 0.786 0.612 
  Religion = Nationality 0.973 0.545 0.889 
  Religion = Gender 0.573 0.582 0.059* 
  Religion = Soc/Geo Groupings <0.001*** 0.001*** <0.001*** 
  Religion = Natural Other 0.365 0.951 0.719 
  Nationality = Gender 0.341 0.033** 0.006*** 
  Nationality = Soc/Geo Groupings <0.001*** 0.005*** <0.001*** 
  Nationality = Natural Other 0.294 0.699 0.648 
  Gender = Soc/Geo Groupings <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** 
  Gender = Natural Other 0.134 0.64 0.297 
  Soc/Geo Groupings = Natural Other 0.080* 0.018** 0.002*** 
Role 
Types         
  First Mover = Second Mover 0.444 0.552 0.175 
  First Mover = Simultaneous Mover 0.617 0.639 0.589 
  First Mover = Allocator <0.001*** 0.004*** <0.001*** 
  First Mover = Partner Chooser 0.309 0.17 0.831 
  Second Mover = Simultaneous Mover 0.329 0.399 0.579 
  Second Mover = Allocator <0.001*** 0.001*** <0.001*** 
  Second Mover = Partner Chooser 0.129 0.082* 0.621 
  Simultaneous Mover = Allocator 0.004*** 0.011** <0.001*** 
  Simultaneous Mover = Partner Chooser 0.636 0.434 0.902 
  Allocator = Partner Chooser 0.021** 0.064* <0.001*** 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LPMa is linear probability model run on full sample, Metareg is 
meta-regression run on sample for which effect sizes are available, LPMb is linear probability model 
run on same sample as Metareg. 
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our finding on ethnicity – although the coefficient’s sign is at least weakly 
significant15.16   
Result 2: The strength of discrimination depends upon the type of group identity 
under investigation. It is stronger when identity is artificially induced in the 
laboratory than when the subject pool is divided by ethnicity or nationality, and 
higher still when participants are split into socially or geographically distinct 
groups. 
 
3.3   How does the level of discrimination depend upon the decision-making 
context? 
Inspection of the coefficients on role type dummies in LPMa and Metareg (Table 2a) 
reveals discrimination is significantly stronger when the decision-maker is a third-
party allocator than when he or she is a dictator (the omitted category). Linear 
restriction tests (Table 2b) also show the third-party allocator role is more likely to be 
associated with discrimination than all the other role types, with the difference always 
significant at the 1% level under both models. The size of the Allocator coefficients in 
the meta-regression (1.077) is worth noting – it indicates that discrimination in games 
of this type tends to be very large indeed, with on average more than one standard 
deviation between subjects’ treatment of in- and out-groups. 
                                                          
15 In Table 3, we will later present a meta-regression with the number of role type dummies reduced 
from five to one. The purpose of this model is to investigate taste-based and statistical 
discrimination. However, it is worth noting that in this model with fewer independent variables, 
the coefficient on Ethnicity is found to be significantly negative at the 5% level. This improves our 
confidence that there is an effect. The coefficient on Nationality is also significant (at the 1% level) 
in that model. 
16 We are particularly interested in the finding that discrimination is stronger in artificial group 
experiments than those employing certain types of natural identity. In an attempt to gain a greater 
understanding of what drives discrimination between artificial groups, we ran regressions focusing 
on just the artificial identity sample, coding for the method experimenters used to create artificial 
groups. We find it makes no difference whether groups are based on preferences (such as for a 
particular painting) or sheer randomisation. Furthermore, we do not find that team-building 
exercises designed to strengthen artificial group identity significantly increase the level of 
discrimination. These results are all presented in greater detail in Appendix B. 
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The other role types do not carry significantly different effects from one 
another. This is at odds with Kiyonari and Yamagishi (2004), and Balliet et al (2014), 
who find discrimination to be stronger by simultaneous movers than first movers 
(Balliet et al do not investigate second movers). In an attempt to discern why our 
result differs from that of Balliet et al, we re-ran our analysis keeping only the 
observations included in their study. We found there was still no significant difference 
between First Mover and Simultaneous Mover (the remaining sample on which to run 
this regression was small; however, we also compared the aggregate effect sizes for 
each category and found they are very similar). This suggests the significance of the 
finding in Balliet et al is driven by studies outside our dataset, i.e. outside the 
economics literature.17  
Result 3: Third-party allocators discriminate more than decision-makers in all 
other roles. 
 
3.4   Do students discriminate any more or less than non-students? 
Most decision-makers in our analysis were students. Only 101 observations, from 22 
studies, are produced by in-groups not comprised (at least in their near-entirely) of 
university students. 31.8% of the observations for students return discrimination, 
while 6.8% find out-group favouritism and 61.5% are null; for non-students 35.6% 
find discrimination, 5.0% yield out-group favouritism and 59.4% are null. The 
coefficient on Students is not significant in any of our regressions. That experiments 
with students do not generate significantly different levels of discrimination than 
those with non-students is an interesting non-result which suggests that, in this 
literature, working with student samples will not generate a biased perception of the 
extent and magnitude of discrimination by the wider population.18 
                                                          
17 With out-group favouritism as the dependent variable (LPMa1 in Appendix C, Table C.1), we find no 
significant differences at all between any role type pair. 
18 In Appendix B, we also show that the country where an experiment is run is not a significant 
predictor of the extent of the discrimination found. 
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Result 4: Discrimination does not significantly differ between students and non-
students. 
 
3.5   Does the experimental literature provide more support for taste-based or 
statistical theories of discrimination? 
For 262 (59.4%) of our observations, as a result of the experimental design any 
discrimination must be taste-based, as it cannot be statistical. Statistical 
discrimination cannot occur when a player is making the only or last move in a game, 
unless the game is to be repeated, or possibly if the move is made simultaneously 
with others. Discrimination by trust game returners, for example, can only be taste-
based, because opponents then have no control over the final outcome and beliefs 
about their type are therefore irrelevant.19 All observations under the Dictator and 
Allocator categories preclude the possibility of statistical discrimination, as do all 
except seven (due to the game being repeated) in the Second Mover category. All 
observations under the First Mover category permit the possibility of statistical 
discrimination, as do most in the Partner Chooser category and around a third in the 
Simultaneous Mover category.20 
In Table 3, we run a linear probability regression on discrimination and a 
meta-regression on the discrimination effect size, with role types re-coded into two 
types: one, Taste + Statistical, where there is scope for both taste-based and statistical 
discrimination, the other (the omitted category) where there is scope only for taste-
based discrimination. Note that in this literature any game-role contains scope for 
taste-based discrimination. The coefficient on Taste + Statistical is positive but 
insignificant in both the linear probability regression (p=0.87) and the meta-
regression (p=0.18). This indicates there is no significant difference in the likelihood 
                                                          
19  There is a grey area to be acknowledged here. One could have a model of statistical taste-based 
discrimination, in which people have a taste for discrimination against a group because of beliefs 
they hold about its members (for instance, about how rich they are). In this paper, we do not 
distinguish between this and any other type of taste-based discrimination (i.e. we do not consider 
root motivations for taste-based discrimination). 
20 In Appendix A, Table A.2, we list which specific games permit which forms of discrimination.  
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of observing discrimination, or in the predicted effect size, when scope for statistical 
discrimination is added.21  
This would suggest taste-based discrimination is an important driver of 
behaviour in these experiments and statistical discrimination is not, but we probe 
further by analysing the results of individual experiments. Where there is scope for 
statistically-motivated discrimination, by design for 66.5% of these observations it is 
not possible to disentangle its effects from taste-based motivations. To be able to do 
so, an experiment must either use belief elicitation or include a control game in which 
behaviour can only be taste-based – the most common case of this is adding a dictator 
game to extricate taste-based from statistical discrimination by trust game senders22. 
In the 60 cases that it  
                                                          
21 We also ran a linear probability model on out-group favouritism, with the equivalent specification 
to LPMa1 in Table 3. This is reported as LPMa2 in Appendix C, Table C.1. As with discrimination, 
there is no significant difference in the likelihood of observing out-group favouritism when scope 
for statistical discrimination is added. 
22 There are no precisely standard methods for disentangling taste-based and statistical 
discrimination. When using a control game in which only taste-based discrimination is possible, 
statistical discrimination is identified if this game finds significantly weaker discrimination than the 
setting with scope for both types of discrimination. When using belief elicitation, statistical 
discrimination is confirmed if beliefs about the in-group and out-group significantly differ, and 
there is significant discrimination in the direction that would maximise the decision-makers’ 
payoffs based on these beliefs; taste-based discrimination is confirmed if there is still significant 
discrimination after controlling for the beliefs. Some studies use regression analysis, others non-
parametric tests. 
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Table 3: Linear probability regressions on discrimination and out-group 
favouritism, and meta-regression on effect size, with or without scope for 
statistical discrimination.23 
Dependent variable Discrimination D 
  LPMa Metareg 
Type of discrimination possible     
  Taste + Statistical 0.009 0.071 
    (0.056) (0.053) 
Identity     
  Ethnicity -0.285*** -0.189** 
    (0.063) (0.080) 
  Religion -0.279** -0.232* 
    (0.134) (0.131) 
  Nationality -0.237*** -0.225*** 
    (0.072) (0.079) 
  Gender -0.315*** -0.545*** 
    (0.064) (0.100) 
  Soc/Geo Groupings 0.238** 0.265*** 
    (0.097) (0.093) 
  Natural Other 0.074 -0.306 
    (0.266) (0.202) 
Controls     
  Students 0.043 0.116 
    (0.072) (0.080) 
  Sample Size 4.5e-4 -2.7e-4 
    (4.7e-3) (4.4e-3) 
  Constant 0.350*** 0.238** 
    (0.089) (0.093) 
R2 (adjusted in Metareg) 0.157 0.138 (adjusted) 
N   441 364 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LPMa is linear probability model run on full sample, Metareg is meta-
regression run on sample for which effect sizes are available; omitted categories are taste-based only (type 
of discrimination possible) and Artificial (identity); errors in LPMa are corrected for heteroskedasticity, with 
77 clusters; standard errors in parentheses. 
 
                                                          
23 Table 3 does not present an LPMb model because in this case we are not interested in 
investigating any disparities between LPMa and Metareg – the Taste + Statistical coefficient is 
insignificant in both models. 
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is possible to distinguish between discriminatory motives, the authors find significant 
statistical discrimination to occur in 13 cases (10 times against the out-group and 
three times in favour of it). Within the same sample, for given beliefs or behaviour in 
a game with a belief-based component, they find significant taste-based deviations 
from own-payoff-maximisation in 26 cases (16 times against the out-group and 10 
times in favour of it). In 26 cases neither statistical nor taste-based discrimination is 
found at the 5% level. We list all significant findings of taste-based and statistical 
discrimination from experiments designed to distinguish between the two in 
Appendix A, Table A.3. 
Although the sample is small, tastes are found to affect behaviour more often 
than statistical beliefs. It seems, however, that beliefs do play some role in 
determining discriminatory behaviour in economics experiments. We conjecture that 
the insignificant regression results in Table 3 may be due to the fact that beliefs can 
either increase or reduce discrimination. This would be because individuals have 
favourable beliefs about the cooperativeness of out-groups, or because unfavourable 
beliefs about the out-group’s cooperativeness can in some cases actually lead to 
statistical out-group favouritism. That is, depending on the game setting, self-serving 
optimal behaviour can either become more or less generous in response to the 
perception that one's partner is relatively uncooperative. In ultimatum games, for 
instance, if proposers expect out-group responders to treat them less favourably than 
in-group responders do, the self-serving optimum is to send them relatively kind 
offers. This is in contrast to how first mover behaviour would work in trust games, 
say, where a self-serving sender will send relatively low investments to an out-group 
responder if it expects to be treated unfavourably by them.2425 
                                                          
24 We are unable to explore this empirically. We can separate games into those where favourable 
beliefs about a partner’s cooperativeness should either increase or decrease the selfish decision-
maker’s cooperation towards them, but we would need data on beliefs about in-groups and out-
groups to predict the direction of discrimination this should result in. 
25 In Appendix B, section B.4, we analyse how the relative strength of discrimination in experiments 
featuring different identity types interacts with the type of discrimination possible. We show 
discrimination is only significantly stronger across artificial groups than across ethnic, religious or 
national groups when there is no scope for statistical discrimination, while discrimination is only 
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Result 5: There is evidence for both taste-based and statistical discrimination. 
Tastes appear to drive the general tendency for discrimination against the out-
group, but individual studies have found beliefs to affect discrimination. 
 
3.6   In gender experiments, how does male-to-female discrimination compare 
with female-to-male discrimination? 
An immediately obvious finding is that gender acts very differently from other 
identity types. It is the only identity category which is more likely to be associated 
with a bias against the in-group than against the out-group, with eight results of the 
former and three of the latter out of a total 32 observations. On the reduced sample, 
the random effects meta-analysis finds an overall discrimination effect size of -0.177 
(95% confidence range: -0.301 – -0.053) for gender experiments, representing 
significant out-group favouritism. There is obvious intuition why gender is different 
from the other identity categories: it is the only case in which the effects of sexual 
attraction – towards the out-group more than the in-group, for most subjects – and 
‘chivalry’ (Eckel and Grossman, 2001) can be expected. 
Every experiment on gender in the meta-analysis has a symmetrical male-
female design, meaning that for every estimate of discrimination by men against 
women there is an identical treatment measuring discrimination by women against 
men. This allows a very clean comparison of these two behaviours across the sample. 
The only three significant results in our dataset of one gender discriminating against 
the other are female decision-makers discriminating against males, while six of the 
eight significant results of one gender favouring the other are male decision-makers 
favouring females. However, the calculated overall effect size for female decision-
makers is actually slightly more negative than for males: -0.181 (95% confidence 
range: -0.35 - -0.013) for females and -0.173 (95% confidence range: -0.369 – 0.024) 
for males, although the difference is far from significant. Note that while the effect 
                                                          
significantly stronger across social/geographical groups than across artificial groups when there is 
scope for statistical discrimination. 
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size indicates females significantly favour males at the 5% level, the equivalent effect 
for male decision-makers is only significant at the 10% level.  
Result 6: There is significant out-group favouritism in gender experiments. 
Females significantly favour males; males favour females but the effect is only 
weakly significant. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
A leading result of this paper is that discrimination in economics experiments varies 
by the type of identity groups are based upon. It is very strong when groups are 
socially or geographically distinct, and is relatively weak when they are based on 
ethnicity or nationality. Notably, it tends to be relatively strong in experiments using 
artificially-induced group identities – so it can confidently be stated that minimal 
groups do not produce the minimal level of discrimination. At first glance, this seems 
surprising.  
It might be that artificial group manipulations are stronger priming 
instruments than natural identity experiments tend to use – after all, these dedicate an 
entire preliminary phase of the experiment to inducing feelings of identity, which will 
remain at the front of subjects’ minds when they are then offered the chance to 
discriminate. This explanation is arguably supported by the evidence of Robbins and 
Krueger (2005), whose meta-analysis of psychology experiments shows subjects 
exhibit stronger in-group projection – that is, they perceive in-group members to be 
particularly similar to them, relative to out-group members – when identities are 
artificial than when they are natural. On the other hand, we do not find that team-
building exercises, which are designed specifically to strengthen artificially-induced 
identity and would seem to amplify priming, have a significant effect on the level of 
discrimination (this is consistent with the findings of Chen and Li, 2009).  
Conversely, it could be argued that, for the populations studied in the 
literature, membership of particular ethnic and national groups does not actually instil 
strong identity, so that even such trivial identities as can be artificially induced have a 
greater effect. There is evidence that the process of globalisation has weakened 
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national and ethnic parochialism (Buchan et al, 2009), and in recent decades youth 
identity in the West and increasingly elsewhere has come to define itself to a large 
extent upon individuals’ belonging to subcultures based on fashion and music tastes – 
preferences drawn from choice sets which are not, indeed, so different from the 
apparently arbitrary minimal group painting dichotomy. However, it would seem 
highly complacent to draw the conclusion from our results that racism and 
xenophobia are not big problems in many societies.  
 Another explanation may be that subjects in ethnic and national identity 
experiments are shying away from displaying ‘politically incorrect’26 behaviour, 
given that racism and xenophobia are taboo in most societies today. While the link 
between social acceptability and discrimination has not been well explored, the 
prejudice literature has yielded relevant findings: that expressions of prejudice 
correlate with perceptions towards the social acceptability of such prejudice (e.g. 
Crandall et al, 2003), and furthermore that this correlation is at least partly the result 
of norm-compliance (e.g. Blanchard et al, 1994).  
It seems unlikely that discriminating on the basis of a stated preference for 
Klee’s paintings over Kandinsky’s carries any taboo similar to ethnic or national 
discrimination. Indeed, some subjects may regard an artificial group situation as a 
game in which they belong to one of the teams, wherein the social norm actively 
encourages favouritism of one’s own group – the sheer strangeness of the setting may 
even lead subjects to perceive a demand for discrimination on the part of the 
experimenter (see e.g. Zizzo, 2010). Concerns about social acceptability could 
explain also why the Soc/Geo Groupings category produces significantly higher 
discrimination than other types of natural identity. Of course, it would not be 
surprising if relational and geographic proximity led to a stronger sense of belonging 
                                                          
26  Political correctness is defined as ‘The avoidance of forms of expression or action that are 
perceived to exclude, marginalize, or insult groups of people who are socially disadvantaged or 
discriminated against’ (Oxford Dictionaries). 
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than shared ethnicity, religion or nationality, but bear in mind too that there is 
arguably no taboo against favouring friends over strangers27.  
If it were shown that discrimination in economics experiments is indeed 
limited by concerns about social acceptability, it might cast doubt over the external 
applicability of such studies’ findings. It is possible that if participants guess an 
experiment is about a type of discrimination which is taboo, it will systematically 
generate a lower effect than if the subjects were unaware of its purpose. On the other 
hand, the very same concerns about social acceptability might also limit certain types 
of discrimination outside the lab. 
It is noteworthy that gender is the identity category producing the weakest 
discrimination: in fact, here the meta-analysis finds a significant amount of out-group 
favouritism. However, gender discrimination clearly persists in the outside world. It 
may be that economics experiments do not find it because they poorly reflect the 
conditions under which it survives beyond the lab – in particular, in the job market. 
It would be interesting to see more experiments designed to directly compare 
the effects of different types of group identity. This meta-analysis includes just four. 
Dugar and Shahriar (2009), Li et al (2011) and Goette et al (2012) all compare 
discrimination between social/geographical groups and artificial groups, while 
Abbink and Harris (2012) use artificial groups and political groups (which fall under 
the Natural Other category). The results of all four studies are consistent with ours – 
discrimination is always lower with artificial identity. However, direct comparisons 
between artificial group and ethnic or national discrimination are lacking, and it 
would be very illuminating to see whether such studies support – and if so, whether 
they can explain – the findings of this meta-analysis. 
What implications does our research have for future experiments on 
discrimination? First, using artificially induced identities as a control against which to 
pit the results of natural identity treatments may not be recommendable, as the 
                                                          
27  This does depend upon the context, however. There are strong taboos against nepotism in certain 
labour-market transactions. Possibly, the experiments in this literature do not recreate such 
circumstances. 
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artificial group manipulation appears not so much to capture the minimal level of 
discrimination that must result from priming any type of identity in a laboratory as to 
in fact often go beyond that.  
Regarding role type, we find discrimination by third-party allocators is much 
stronger than by participants in any other game setting. If social acceptability does 
indeed limit discrimination, this is a counterintuitive result, as the allocator role 
essentially invites subjects to overtly and consciously favour one group over another 
and therefore seems to be the one that most obviously telegraphs the purpose of this 
type of experiment. One possibility is that the role carries an experimenter demand 
effect – whereby subjects feel they are encouraged to discriminate – or even an action 
bias effect, if the equal split feels like a default non-move. Another relevant factor 
may be that the third-party allocator is unique amongst our role types in the decision-
maker’s payoff being entirely disconnected from the extent to which they 
discriminate. In any case, experimenters should bear in mind that because they are 
more likely to identify significant discrimination when they employ the allocator role, 
they should be less confident that the same groups will discriminate against each 
other in different contexts.  
We find the strength of discrimination does not significantly differ between 
student and non-student subject pools. This suggests – unlike in the context of social 
preferences (e.g. Bellemare and Kroger, 2007; Anderson et al, 2013) – student 
subjects are not a generally unrepresentative sample for questions relating to 
discrimination. However, we do not exclude the possibility that they are 
unrepresentative in specific instances, or within particular societies.  
There is scope for more experimental research investigating taste-based and 
statistical discrimination. We show both are relevant, and the two types manifest 
themselves to different extents in different contexts. However, relatively few 
experiments have been designed to distinguish between taste-based and statistical 
discrimination, and more could be known about the mechanisms underlying them. 
As a final observation, there is a great deal of variation in the findings of the 
experimental economics discrimination literature. Our analysis can explain some of it, 
but our LPM regressions typically have R2 statistics below 0.2, and the meta-
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regressions’ Adjusted R2s are rarely above 0.35. As might be expected, discrimination 
does seem to vary idiosyncratically and is not easy to predict. The results of natural 
identity experiments do not seem very generalizable – they probably reflect more the 
characteristics of the specific groups under investigation, and the relationships 
between them, than aspects of the experimental design. Whilst a drawback for some 
research questions, this also means there is a great deal of scope for future 
experimental studies aimed at measuring the levels of discrimination within subject 
pools of specific interest. Furthermore, given the potential concerns we raise about 
experimenter demand effects and the external validity of lab experiments on 
discrimination, the important role of field experiments should be emphasised. 
Subjects in such studies are unaware they are being observed by experimenters and 
their behaviour can therefore not be influenced by the fact. Field experiments can test 
the generalisability of lab findings on discrimination.  
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Appendix A 
Table A.1: Subjective decisions on appropriately defined groups 
Study Notes 
Burns, 2004 We consider ‘coloured’ to be an appropriate ethnic 
group in South Africa (as defined in comparison to 
‘white’ and ‘black’). 
Chen et al, 2011 We do not consider ‘Asian’ to be an appropriate ethnic 
group in the USA. 
Ferraro and Cummings, 2007 We consider ‘Hispanic’ to be an appropriate ethnic 
group in the USA. (Justification, relative to ‘Asian’: 
Hispanic people in the USA share a more unified culture 
than those of Asian descent; they are descended from 
more linguistically homogeneous peoples than Asians) 
Friesen et al, 2012 We do not consider ‘East Asian’ and ‘South Asian’ to be 
appropriate ethnic groups in Canada. 
 
52 
 
Table A.2: Game types in meta-analysis and how they measure discrimination 
Role Type How discrimination is measured Type of discrimination 
possible 
Trust Game Returner  
 
 
Difference in proportion of amount received from 
the sender that is returned*, between in-group 
and out-group matching.  
 
*NB: Ploner and Soraperra (2004) use Indirect 
Trust Game, where the amount returned is not 
given to the sender but a group member of theirs 
Taste-based only 
Agent in Principal-
Agent Game 
 
(Masella et al, 2012) 
Difference in amount sent to principal, between 
in-group and out-group matching. 
Taste-based only 
Dictator; Proposer in 
Unilateral Power 
Game (Zizzo, 2011) 
Difference in amount sent to recipient, between 
in-group and out-group matching. (NB: Buchner 
and Dittrich (2002) use a saving game where one 
player leaves the game early and decides how 
much to leave their partner. This decision is the 
equivalent of that faced by a dictator) 
Taste-based only 
Allocator Difference in amount allocated to in-group and 
out-group member. 
Taste-based only 
Responder in 
Ultimatum Game, 
Hold-up Game 
(Morita and Servatka, 
2013) 
Difference in likelihood of rejecting an offer, 
controlling for its size, between in-group and out-
group matching. 
Taste-based only 
Responder in 
Proposer-Responder 
Game (McLeish and 
Oxoby, 2007) 
Difference in amount by which proposer’s payoff 
is reduced, controlling for amount offered by 
proposer, between in-group and out-group 
matching. 
Taste-based only 
Responder in 
Proposer-Responder 
Game (Chen and Li, 
2009; Currarini and 
Mengel, 2012)  
Difference in rate of choosing more other-
regarding response, between in-group and out-
group matching. 
Taste-based only 
Third-party punisher Difference in punishment level, controlling for 
behaviour of punishee, between in-group and 
out-group matching. 
Taste-based only 
One-shot Prisoner’s 
Dilemma 
Difference in rate of cooperation, between in-
group and out-group matching.  
Taste-based only 
Trader in market 
games 
For bidders: difference in price offered, between 
in-group and out-group matching. For sellers: 
difference in price accepted, between in-group 
and out-group matching.  
Taste-based only for 
sellers in one-shot 
interactions; taste-
based and statistical for 
bidders in one-shot 
interactions, and for all 
players in repeated 
games. 
Public Goods Game Difference in contribution level, between in-group 
and out-group matching. 
Taste-based only in 
one-shot games 
(Hopfensitz, 2013); 
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taste-based and 
statistical in repeated 
games. 
Partner-Choosing 
Role 
Difference in rate of choosing in-group partner 
and out-group partner. 
Taste-based only if 
chosen partner does 
not become active 
decision-maker in 
subsequent games; 
taste-based and 
statistical if they do.  
Repeated Common 
Pool Withdrawal 
Game 
(Carpenter and 
Cardenas, 2011) 
   
Difference in withdrawal level, between in-group 
and out-group matching. 
Taste-based and 
statistical. 
Minimal Effort Game 
(Chen and Chen, 
2011) 
Difference in effort level, between in-group and 
out-group matching. 
Taste-based and 
statistical. 
Trust Game Sender; 
Principal in Principal-
Agent Game 
(Masella et al, 2012); 
First Mover in Hold-
up Game (Morita and 
Servatka, 2013) 
With continuous action space: difference in 
amount sent, between in-group and out-group 
matching. With binary action space: difference in 
rate of choosing to trust, between in-group and 
out-group matching. 
Taste-based and 
statistical. 
Investor in 
Investment Game 
(Wu, 2009) 
Difference in amount invested in manager’s 
project, between in-group and out-group 
matching. 
Taste-based and 
statistical. 
Ultimatum Game 
Proposer; Second 
Mover in Hold-up 
Game (Morita and 
Servatka, 2013); First 
Mover in Proposer-
Responder Game 
(McLeish and Oxoby, 
2007) 
Difference in amount offered, between in-group 
and out-group matching. 
Taste-based and 
statistical. 
Proposer in 
Proposer-Responder 
Game (Chen and Li, 
2009; Currarini and 
Mengel, 2012) 
Difference in rate of choosing more other-
regarding first move, between in-group and out-
group matching. 
Taste-based and 
statistical. 
Nash Demand Game 
(Ruffle and Sosis, 
2006; Zizzo, 2011) 
Difference in amount claimed, between in-group 
and out-group matching 
Taste-based and 
statistical. 
Stag Hunt Difference in rate of choosing hawkish strategy, 
between in-group and out-group matching. 
Taste-based and 
statistical. 
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Table A.3: List of significant results from studies designed to distinguish 
between taste-based and statistical discrimination 
Result Paper Role Groups 
Taste-based 
and statistical 
discrimination 
Banuri et al (2012) Partner-choosing role  
Colleges within university (Free Nepotism 
treatment) 
Bernhard et al (2006) Dictator Tribes 
Binzel and Fehr (2013) Trust Game Sender Social groups 
Currarini and Mengel 
(2012) 
Partner-choosing role 
Artificial (comparison of COORD, ENDO and 
LOWB treatments) 
Etang et al (2011a) Trust Game Sender Villages 
Taste-based 
discrimination 
only 
Burns (2004) 
Trust Game Sender  Ethnic (coloured in-group, black out-group) 
Trust Game Sender  Ethnic (coloured in-group, white out-group) 
Chuah et al (2013) 
Trust Game Sender  Religious (Hindu in-group, Muslim out-group) 
Trust Game Sender  Religious (Muslim in-group, Hindu out-group) 
Ferraro and Cummings 
(2007) 
Ultimatum Game Proposer  Ethnic (Hispanic in-group, Navajo out-group) 
Guillen and Ji (2011) Trust Game Sender  
National (Australian in-group, non-Australian 
out-group) 
Kim et al (2013) 
Trust Game Sender  
National (North Korean in-group, South Korean 
out-group – sample 1) 
Trust Game Sender  
National (North Korean in-group, South Korean 
out-group – sample 2) 
McLeish and Oxoby 
(2007) 
First Mover in Proposer-
Responder Game  
Artificial (OP treatment) 
First Mover in Proposer-
Responder Game  
Artificial (NO treatment) 
Ruffle and Sosis (2006) Nash Demand Game 
Social/geographical (Kibbutz in-group, city out-
group) 
Statistical 
discrimination 
only 
Banuri et al (2012) Partner-choosing role  
Colleges within university (Costly Nepotism 
treatment) 
Boarini et al (2009) Ultimatum Game Proposer  National (French in-group, Indian out-group) 
Chen and Chen (2011) Minimal Effort Game Artificial (Enhanced treatment) 
Haile et al (2008) Trust Game Sender  Ethnic (white in-group, black out-group) 
Masella et al (2014) 
Principal in Principal-Agent 
Game 
Artificial 
Taste-based 
out-group 
favouritism only 
Burns (2004) 
Trust Game Sender  Ethnic (white in-group, black out-group) 
Trust Game Sender  Ethnic (black in-group, white out-group) 
Trust Game Sender  Ethnic (black in-group, coloured out-group) 
Hennig-Schmidt et al 
(2007) 
Trust Game Sender  National (Israeli in-group, Palestinian out-group) 
Trust Game Sender  National (Palestinian in-group, Israeli out-group) 
Kim et al (2013) 
Trust Game Sender  
National (South Korean in-group, North Korean 
out-group – sample 1) 
Trust Game Sender  
National (South Korean in-group, North Korean 
out-group – sample 2) 
Slonim and Guillen 
(2010) 
Trust Game Sender 
Gender (male in-group, Gender/Ability Selection 
treatment) 
Trust Game Sender  Gender (male in-group, No Selection treatment) 
Partner-choosing role  Gender (male in-group, Trust Game treatment) 
Statistical out-
group 
favouritism only 
Boarini et al (2009) Ultimatum Game Proposer  National (Indian in-group, French out-group) 
Hennig-Schmidt et al 
(2007) 
Trust Game Sender  
National (German in-group, Palestinian out-
group) 
Slonim and Guillen 
(2010) 
Partner-choosing role  Gender (female in-group, Trust Game treatment) 
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Appendix B: Further Results 
B.1 Further analysis of role types 
In this section we investigate the effects on discrimination of using specific game 
types. We recode the role type variables, assigning dummies to specific game settings 
in the following way. Trust games and similar principal-agent games provide two 
roles: senders (TG Sender, 98 observations) and returners (TG Returner, 81). The next 
most common role type is the Dictator (68). Prisoner’s dilemmas, public goods 
games, and common pool withdrawal games are all social dilemmas, and are coded 
under a single category (Social Dilemma, 58). Next we have third-party allocators 
(Allocator, 33). Ultimatum games and similar bargaining settings are grouped 
together and split into two role types: first movers (Proposer, 31) and second movers 
(Responder, 27). Treating Dictator as the omitted category in our regressions, we 
form a set of binary independent variables from the other six role types, plus the 
additional variable Game Other (45 observations) into which are placed the 
remaining game settings that we did not think could be adequately categorised.28 
Table C.3a in Appendix C displays the output of regressions incorporating 
these variables. These regressions are the equivalent of those presented in Table 2, the 
only change being the recoding of the role type variables. As above, LPMa1 and 
Metareg1 show discrimination to be significantly stronger when the decision-maker is 
a third-party allocator than when he or she is a dictator (the omitted category). Linear 
restriction tests (Table C.3b) also show the third-party allocator role is more likely to 
be associated with discrimination than all the other role types, with the difference 
always significant at the 1% level under both models. Again, the other role types do 
not consistently carry significantly different effects from one another. This is at odds 
with the analysis of Balliet et al (2014), who find discrimination is stronger by trust 
                                                          
28 Specifically, the Game Other category consists of players in the following settings: unstructured 
bargaining games; the battle of the sexes; coordination games; indirect trust games; market-
trading games; minimal effort games; Nash Demand games; partner-choosing situations; saving 
games; stag hunts; and third-party punishment games. Several of these could have been coded 
under a standalone category – coordination games and variants – but there would only be eight 
observations in such a category. 
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game senders than by dictators, and stronger still in social dilemmas. With out-group 
favouritism as the dependent variable (LPMa2), the only significant differences 
between role types are that proposers are less likely to engage in out-group 
favouritism than dictators, trust game senders, trust game returners and subjects in the 
Game Other category.  
Result A1: We do not find strong effects associated with such specific role types as 
the trust game sender or returner, players in social dilemmas, or bargaining game 
proposers or responders. 
 
B.2 Does the strength of discrimination in artificial group experiments depend 
on the method used to induce identity? 
The way in which identity is artificially instilled in subjects varies from experiment to 
experiment. However, we can identity two broad categories of artificial group 
creation. One follows the original Tajfel et al (1971) process of allowing subjects to 
self-select into groups. Typically this involves asking participants to choose a 
preference between the art of Klee and Kandinsky, although some studies elicit 
preferences on other choice sets, such as favourite colours. We code these 
observations under Preferences. The other main category gives subjects no control 
over which group they belong to. In such cases they are simply randomly assigned 
and labelled as belonging to, for instance, the ‘red’ or ‘blue’ group. We code these 
manipulations as Labelling. Occasionally, a different type of identity inducement is 
done – for example, groups can be based on subjects’ tendency to overestimate or 
underestimate the number of dots on a screen (Guala et al, 2013; Ioannou et al, 2013), 
or by the time at which they undertake a particular task (Ahmed, 2007). These cases 
we code as Other Method. 
 Another way artificial group manipulations vary is by whether they contain 
additional stages in which group members interact, between being placed into groups 
and before the task upon which discrimination is measured. These stages often 
involve games in which group members must work together to earn monetary 
rewards, although on some occasions they merely interact non-strategically as a result 
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of being permitted to converse electronically. Such stages are introduced as a 
mechanism to strengthen artificial group identities. We code their presence in studies 
under Team Building. 
 In order to test how these different procedures affect the extent of 
discrimination, we run LPM and meta-regressions on our sub-sample of observations 
for which identity is artificial. These are presented in Appendix C, Table C.4. We find 
there is no significant difference between whether groups are self-selected or 
randomly selected. Also, while the coefficients are in the direction of strengthening 
discrimination, we find the effect of team-building exercises not to be significant. 
From these results, we infer that the precise form of identity inducement is not crucial 
to the outcome of artificial group experiments. This is consistent with the findings of 
Chen and Li (2009), whose experiment addresses these questions.   
Result A2: The strength of discrimination in artificial group experiments does not 
depend significantly on the method used to induce identity. 
 
B.3 Can country-level variables explain discrimination? 
Our meta-analysis encompasses geographical diversity, with data from 31 countries. 
Including cases where the out-group was located in a different country, 169 results 
from 34 studies come from Europe, 116 observations from 22 studies are from North 
America, 85 results from 17 studies are from Asia, 37 observations from seven 
studies come from Africa, nine results from three studies come from Latin America, 
and ten observations from three studies are from Australasia. Ten results from two 
papers have decision-makers located in more than one country, while one paper does 
not mention where its experiment took place. The country providing the most 
observations is the USA, with 106 from 19 studies. 
This diversity allows us a further set of variables to test for relationships 
between discrimination and characteristics of the country in which an experiment is 
run. In Appendix C, Table C.5, therefore, we report regressions including location 
dummies for the USA and Europe, and country-level measures of Individualism (from 
the Hofstede Centre), ethno-linguistic-religious Fractionalisation (constructed from 
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Alesina et al, 2003, by averaging each country’s scores for ethnic, linguistic and 
religious fractionalization29) and prosperity (Log GDPpc, the log of per capita 
national income at purchasing power parity, as estimated by the World Bank). Using 
these independent variables requires trimming the sample to exclude experiments 
conducted across countries, as well as those in locations for which data on 
Individualism is not available. 
We do not find any country-level variables to be significant, with rare 
exceptions. In LPMa2, we find the probability of observing out-group favouritism is 
lower in the USA than in the rest of the world, significant at the 5% level. However, 
once controlling for country-level individualism, as in LPMa3, the effect disappears. 
Individualism itself only has a weakly significant effect of reducing the likelihood of 
out-group favouritism, after omitting the USA dummy in LPMa4. 
While the insignificance of country-level variables in our analysis appears to 
show that results on discrimination can be generalised across cultures, we do not 
argue this is necessarily the case. The locations at which experiments on 
discrimination have been conducted are not a random global sample; in many cases 
they are handpicked by researchers who have prior reason to believe they have an 
interesting discrimination-related question to ask of a particular subject pool. 
Result A3: Country-level variables are not found to significantly explain 
discrimination. 
 
B.4   How does the experimental context affect the prevalence of each type of 
discrimination? 
To investigate the strength of different types of discrimination in experiments with 
different types of identity, we run LPM and meta-regressions on the sub-sample of 
observations for which there is scope only for taste-based discrimination, and the sub-
sample for which there is scope for both taste-based and statistical discrimination. 
                                                          
29  We also ran regressions containing separate variables for ethnic, linguistic and religious 
fractionalization, none of which were found to have significance. 
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The results are presented in Appendix C, Table C.6a; LPMa1 and Metareg1 relate to 
the taste-based only sub-sample, while LPMa2 and Metareg2 relate to the both-types 
sub-sample. The table reports whether the coefficients for each identity category 
significantly differ between models 1 and 2; this is deduced by running pooled 
models with interaction terms. The results of linear restriction tests are also presented 
in Appendix C, Table C.6b.  
When it can only be driven by taste, according to both the LPM and the meta-
regression discrimination is significantly greater across artificial groups than across 
ethnicities, religions, nationalities or gender. All of these differences are significant at 
the 1% level, apart from the difference between Artificial and Religion in Metareg(1), 
which is significant at the 5% level. However, when discrimination can be driven 
both by tastes and statistical beliefs, neither model finds it to significantly differ 
between artificial group experiments and those on nationality, religion or ethnicity.30 
With only taste-based discrimination possible, discrimination is not 
significantly different across artificial groups to across socially or geographically 
distinct groups. However, when there is also scope for statistical discrimination, 
discrimination is significantly higher (1% level) among socially or geographically 
distinct groups.   
The only identity category whose coefficient significantly differs between the 
sample where only taste-based discrimination is possible and the sample where both 
types of discrimination are possible, in models ran on both dependent variables, is 
Soc/Geo Groupings. The coefficients on Ethnicity, Religion and Nationality do not 
significantly differ between samples. The test on the omitted category, Artificial, 
shows its coefficient also does not significantly differ between samples. We therefore 
interpret the narrowing of the discrimination gap between Artificial and Ethnicity, 
Religion and Nationality when scope is added for statistical discrimination as being 
driven by beliefs either reducing discrimination in artificial identity experiments, or 
enhancing it in experiments with ethnicity, religion and nationality, or both. We 
interpret the widening of the discrimination gap between Artificial and Soc/Geo 
                                                          
30 Except with Ethnicity at the 10% level in the LPM. 
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Groupings when scope is added for statistical discrimination as being driven 
primarily by beliefs enhancing discrimination between social and geographical 
groups. 
Result A4: Discrimination is only significantly stronger between artificial groups 
compared to between ethnic, religious and national groups when there is scope only 
for taste-based discrimination. Discrimination is only significantly stronger 
between social/geographical groups compared to between artificial groups when 
there is scope for both types of discrimination.  
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Appendix C: Additional Regression Output 
Table C.1: Linear probability regressions on out-group favouritism 
Dependent variable Out-group favouritism 
  LPMa1 LPMa2 
Type of discrimination possible     
  Taste + Statistical   -0.003 
      (0.020) 
Role Types     
  First Mover -0.031   
    (0.029)   
  Second Mover -0.012   
    (0.027)   
  Simultaneous Mover -0.025   
    (0.038)   
  Allocator -0.049   
    (0.037)   
  Partner Chooser 0.031   
    (0.063)   
Identity     
  Ethnicity 0.041 0.035 
    (0.040) (0.036) 
  Religion -0.004 -0.008 
    (0.052) (0.050) 
  Nationality 0.118* 0.111 
    (0.069) (0.068) 
  Gender 0.222*** 0.231*** 
    (0.046) (0.047) 
  Soc/Geo Groupings -0.051** -0.045* 
    (0.024) (0.023) 
  Natural Other -0.025 -0.041 
    (0.034) (0.026) 
Controls     
  Students -0.023 -0.026 
    (0.041) (0.038) 
  Sample Size 4.9e-4 2.0e-4 
    (7.2e-4) (2.9e-4) 
  Constant 0.051 0.038 
    (0.046) (0.047) 
R2 0.088 0.084 
N   441 441 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LPMa1 and LPMa2 are linear probability models run on full 
sample; omitted categories are Dictator (role type) and Artificial (identity); errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity, with 77 clusters; standard errors in italics.  
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Table C.2: Logistic regressions on discrimination and out-group favouritism 
Dependent variable Discrimination Out-group favouritism 
  LOGITa1 LOGITa2 
Identity     
  Ethnicity -0.260*** 0.062 
    (0.046) (0.069) 
  Religion -0.195** -0.003 
    (0.098) (0.061) 
  Nationality 0.216*** 0.172* 
    (0.065) (0.095) 
  Gender -0.252*** 0.326*** 
    (0.045) (0.097) 
  Soc/Geo Groupings 0.244** (dropped) 
    (0.111)   
  Natural Other -0.056 (dropped) 
    (0.138)   
Role Types     
  First Mover -0.031 -0.022 
    (0.081) (0.017) 
  Second Mover -0.080 -0.007 
    (0.066) (0.017) 
  Simultaneous Mover 0.025 -0.011 
    (0.113) (0.030) 
  Allocator 0.413*** -0.035** 
    (0.103) (0.014) 
  Partner Chooser 0.075 0.035 
    (0.125) (0.045) 
Controls     
  Students 0.011 -0.037 
    (0.072) (0.053) 
  Sample Size 1.7e-4 1.9e-4 
    (4.9e-4) (1.8e-4) 
Pseudo R2 0.167 0.132 
N   441 367 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LPMa1 and LPMa2 are linear probability models run on full 
sample; omitted categories are Dictator (role type) and Artificial (identity); errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity, with 77 clusters in LOGITa1 and 66 in LOGITa2; standard errors in parentheses; for 
dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. 
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Table C.3a: Linear probability regression on discrimination and meta-regression 
on effect size (further analysis of role type) 
Dependent variable Discrimination d 
Out-group 
favouritism 
  LPMa1 LPMb1 Metareg1 LPMa2 
Identity         
  Ethnicity -0.287*** -0.282*** -0.113 0.032 
    (0.078) (0.084) (0.081) (0.041) 
  Religion -0.219 -0.220 -0.092 -0.027 
    (0.141) (0.156) (0.128) (0.057) 
  Nationality -0.234*** -0.133 -0.112 0.107 
    (0.085) (0.106) (0.078) (0.067) 
  Gender -0.314*** -0.339*** -0.500*** 0.233*** 
    (0.065) (0.069) (0.098) (0.042) 
  Soc/Geo Groupings 0.242** 0.242* 0.365*** -0.057** 
    (0.102) (0.124) (0.091) (0.023) 
  Natural Other -0.069 -0.286 -0.203 -0.034 
    (0.176) (0.179) (0.193) (0.035) 
Role Types         
  TG Sender -0.045 -0.045 0.002 -2.6e-4 
    (0.126) (0.086) (0.081) (0.027) 
  TG Returner -0.126* -0.147* -0.112 0.016 
    (0.074) (0.083) (0.087) (0.024) 
  Social Dilemma 0.014 0.010 -0.022 -0.011 
    (0.106) (0.115) (0.097) (0.039) 
  Allocator 0.348*** 0.400*** 0.991*** -0.042 
    (0.104) (0.141) (0.154) (0.034) 
  Proposer -0.081 -0.131 -0.012 -0.088** 
    (0.101) (0.090) (0.106) (0.041) 
  Responder -0.029 0.129 0.120 -0.017 
    (0.099) (0.109) (0.135) (0.055) 
  Game Other 0.045 0.087 0.034 0.004 
    (0.098) (0.119) (0.104) (0.037) 
Controls         
  Students 0.004 -0.028 0.103 -0.018 
    (0.068) (0.077) (0.077) (0.040) 
  Sample Size 1.2e-4 5.7e-5 -7.1e-4* 2.7e-4 
    (4.3e-4) (4.7e-3) (4.3e-3) (3.2e-3) 
  Constant 0.416*** 0.442*** 0.236** 0.037 
    (0.087) (0.100) (0.106) (0.048) 
R2 (adjusted in Metareg1) 0.206 0.214 0.237 0.094 
N   441 364 364 441 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LPMa1 and LPMa2 are linear probability models run on full 
sample, Metareg1 is meta-regression run on sample for which effect sizes are available, LPMb1 is 
linear probability model run on same sample as Metareg1; omitted categories are Dictator (role type) 
and Artificial (identity); errors in LPM models are corrected for heteroskedasticity, with 77 clusters in 
LPMa1 and LPMa2, and 67 in LPMb1; standard errors in italics.  
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Table C.3b: Linear Restriction Tests on models presented in Table C.3a 
  
Null Hypothesis 
P Value on two-tailed test 
  LPMa1 LPMb1 Metareg1 LPMa2 
Identity         
  Ethnicity = Religion 0.613 0.652 0.872 0.43 
  Ethnicity = Nationality 0.553 0.157 0.991 0.256 
  Ethnicity = Gender 0.705 0.452 0.001*** <0.001*** 
  Ethnicity = Soc/Geo Groupings <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** 0.066* 
  Ethnicity = Natural Other 0.203 0.983 0.642 0.164 
  Religion = Nationality 0.909 0.571 0.884 0.126 
  Religion = Gender 0.496 0.431 0.009*** <0.001*** 
  Religion = Soc/Geo Groupings 0.001*** 0.002*** <0.001*** 0.544 
  Religion = Natural Other 0.47 0.735 0.586 0.902 
  Nationality = Gender 0.286 0.017** 0.001*** 0.085* 
  Nationality = Soc/Geo Groupings <0.001*** 0.007*** <0.001*** 0.017** 
  Nationality = Natural Other 0.374 0.424 0.653 0.017** 
  Gender = Soc/Geo Groupings <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** 
  Gender = Natural Other 0.169 0.769 0.16 <0.001*** 
  Soc/Geo Groupings = Natural Other 0.092* 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.452 
Role Types         
  TG Sender = TG Returner 0.25 0.171 0.119 0.53 
  TG Sender = Social Dilemma 0.605 0.648 0.782 0.808 
  TG Sender = Allocator <0.001*** 0.008*** <0.001*** 0.2 
  TG Sender = Proposer 0.709 0.343 0.887 0.030** 
  TG Sender = Responder 0.891 0.25 0.37 0.758 
  TG Sender = Game Other 0.381 0.282 0.748 0.907 
  TG Returner = Social Dilemma 0.206 0.176 0.31 0.526 
  TG Returner = Allocator <0.001*** 0.001*** <0.001*** 0.138 
  TG Returner = Proposer 0.647 0.863 0.341 0.016** 
  TG Returner = Responder 0.414 0.061* 0.085* 0.551 
  TG Returner = Game Other 0.086* 0.050* 0.155 0.758 
  Social Dilemma = Allocator 0.014*** 0.019** <0.001*** 0.398 
  Social Dilemma = Proposer 0.415 0.213 0.932 0.058* 
  Social Dilemma = Responder 0.761 0.458 0.309 0.912 
  Social Dilemma = Game Other 0.788 0.564 0.616 0.726 
  Allocator = Proposer <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** 0.158 
  Allocator = Responder 0.005*** 0.107 <0.001*** 0.626 
  Allocator = Game Other 0.018** 0.050** <0.001*** 0.234 
  Proposer = Responder 0.722 0.093* 0.367 0.183 
  Proposer = Game Other 0.186 0.021** 0.699 0.034** 
  Responder = Game Other 0.542 0.806 0.554 0.699 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LPMa is linear probability model run on full sample, Metareg is 
meta-regression run on sample for which effect sizes are available, LPMb is linear probability model run on 
same sample as Metareg. 
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Table C.4 Linear probability regressions on discrimination and meta-regressions 
on effect size for artificial identity experiments only 
Dependent variable Discrimination d 
  LPM Metareg 
Role Types     
  First Mover -0.190 -0.074 
    (0.165) (0.127) 
  Second Mover -0.102 -0.098 
    (0.142) (0.135) 
  Simultaneous Mover -0.211 -0.005 
    (0.154) (0.139) 
  Allocator 0.236* 0.898*** 
    (0.130) (0.170) 
  Partner Chooser 0.061 0.083 
    (0.213) (0.182) 
Controls     
  Students 0.032 0.128 
    (0.123) (0.207) 
  Sample Size 0.002*** 0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Identity Inducement Method     
  Labelling -0.117 0.030 
    (0.081) (0.085) 
  Other Method -0.140 0.102 
    (0.125) (0.141) 
  Team Building 0.085 0.031 
    (0.095) (0.691) 
  Constant 0.409* 0.102 
    (0.207) (0.247) 
R2 (adjusted for Metareg) 0.154 0.262 
N   169 146 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LPM is linear probability model run on artificial identity sample, 
Metareg is meta-regression run on artificial identity sample for which effect sizes are available; omitted 
categories are Dictator (role type) and Preferences (Identity inducement method); errors in LPM are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity, with 32 clusters; standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table C.5: Linear probability regressions on discrimination and out-
group favouritism, and meta-regression on effect size, with country-level 
variables included 
Dependent variable Discrimination d Out-group favouritism 
  LPMa1 Metareg1 LPMa2 LPMa3 LPMa4 
Identity           
  Ethnicity -0.220** -0.171 0.053 0.044 0.042 
    (0.086) (0.104) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) 
  Religion -0.146 -0.198 0.014 -0.063 -0.069 
    (0.192) (0.179) (0.040) (0.090) (0.079) 
  Gender -0.294*** -0.386*** 0.254*** 0.244*** 0.239*** 
    (0.100) (0.113) (0.047) (0.048) (0.045) 
  Soc/Geo Groupings 0.260** 0.273*** -0.029* -0.052* -0.055** 
    (0.103) (0.095) (0.016) (0.029) (0.025) 
  Natural Other 0.008 -0.311 -0.023 -0.093 -0.099* 
    (0.177) (0.213) (0.017) (0.068) (0.057) 
Role Types           
  First Mover -0.027 0.245*** -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 
    (0.101) (0.088) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
  Second Mover -0.086 0.182* 0.014 0.014 0.014 
    (0.080) (0.094) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
  Simultaneous -0.080 0.206* -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 
    (0.108) (0.110) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) 
  Allocator 0.423*** 1.178*** -0.026 -0.046 -0.049* 
    (0.142) (0.165) (0.020) (0.029) (0.027) 
  Partner Chooser 0.058 0.208 0.049 0.067 -0.066 
    (0.130) (0.141) (0.060) (0.063) (0.063) 
Controls           
  Fractionalisation 0.015 0.414       
    (0.265) (0.257)       
  LogGDPpc 0.020 -0.031       
    (0.083) (0.089)       
  Europe 0.100 0.277*       
    (0.131) (0.150)       
  USA 0.038 0.096 -0.049** -0.012   
    (0.132) (0.163) (0.022) (0.034)   
  Individualism -0.001 -0.001   -0.002 -0.002* 
    (0.004) (0.003)   (0.002) (0.001) 
  Constant 0.191 0.174 0.035* 0.167 0.179* 
    (0.731) (0.813) (0.021) (0.119) (0.094) 
R2 (adjusted in 
Metareg1) 
0.217 0.256 0.112 0.122 0.122 
N   345 304 359 345 345 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LPMa1, LPMa3 and LPMa4 are linear probability models run on full 
sample excluding experiments conducted across countries and in countries for which data on Individualism is 
not available, LPMa2 is linear probability model run on full sample excluding experiments conducted across 
countries, Metareg1 is meta-regression run on sample for which effect sizes are available excluding 
experiments conducted across countries and in countries for which data on Individualism is not available; 
omitted categories are Dictator (role type) and Artificial (identity); errors in LPM models are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity, with 60 clusters in LPMa1, LPMa3 and LPMa4, and 65 in LPMa2; standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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Table C.6a: Linear probability regressions on discrimination and meta-
regressions on effect size, with scope only for taste-based discrimination (Model 
1) and scope for both types of discrimination (Model 2) 
Dependent variable Discrimination d 
  
  
Taste-based 
only 
Taste + 
Statistical 
Test of 
coefficient 
difference 
Taste-based 
only 
Taste + 
Statistical 
Test of 
coefficient 
difference   LPMa1 LPMa2 Metareg1 Metareg2 
Identity             
  Ethnicity -0.351*** -0.195*   -0.291*** 0.020   
    (0.078) (0.100)   (0.088) (0.169)   
  Religion -0.474*** -0.159   -0.443** -0.048   
    (0.125) (0.234)   (0.172) (0.206)   
  Nationality -0.292*** -0.162   -0.312*** -0.133   
    (0.089) (0.122)   (0.115) (0.113)   
  Gender -0.290*** -0.352***   -0.474*** -0.642***   
    (0.090) (0.080)   (0.122) (0.167)   
  Soc/Geo Groupings 0.081 0.408*** ** 0.015 0.532*** *** 
    (0.159) (0.126)   (0.125) (0.142)   
  Natural Other 0.146 -0.224   -0.301 -0.227   
    (0.263) (0.262)   (0.329) (0.281)   
Controls             
  Students 0.041 -0.047   0.034 0.178   
    (0.101) (0.095)   (0.101) (0.142)   
  Sample Size 6.6e-4 4.9e-4   1.7e-5 -3.1e-4  
    (4.8e-4) (7.2e-4)   (5.4e-4) (7.2e-4)  
  Constant 0.380*** 0.383***   0.355*** 0.178   
    (0.117) (0.120)   (0.114) (0.153)   
R2 (adjusted in Metaregs) 0.175 0.196   0.117 0.174   
N   262 179   204 160   
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LPMa1 is linear probability model run on the sample for which discrimination 
can only be taste-based, LPMa2 is linear probability model run on the sample for which dicrimination can be both 
taste-based and statistical, Metareg1 is meta-regression run on the sample for which discrimination can only be 
taste-based and effect sizes are available, Metareg2 is meta-regression run on the sample for which discrimination 
can be both taste-based and statistical and effect sizes are available; 'test of coefficient difference' reports whether 
coefficients differ significantly between models 1 and 2; the omitted category is Artificial (identity); errors in LPM 
models are corrected for heteroskedasticity, with 65 clusters in LPMa1 and 59 in LPMa2; standard errors in 
parentheses.   
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Table C.6b: Linear Restriction Tests on models presented in Table C.6a 
Null Hypothesis 
P Value on two-tailed test 
LPMa1 LPMa2 Metareg1 Metareg2 
Ethnicity = Religion 0.171 0.876 0.38 0.756 
Ethnicity = Nationality 0.353 0.788 0.87 0.405 
Ethnicity = Gender 0.348 0.045** 0.163 0.003*** 
Ethnicity = Soc/Geo Groupings 0.002*** <0.001*** 0.016** 0.005*** 
Ethnicity = Natural Other 0.052* 0.911 0.977 0.373 
Religion = Nationality 0.082* 0.989 0.509 0.699 
Religion = Gender 0.097* 0.413 0.878 0.020** 
Religion = Soc/Geo Groupings <0.001*** 0.013** <0.005*** 0.006*** 
Religion = Natural Other 0.018** 0.839 0.679 0.532 
Nationality = Gender 0.985 0.057* 0.29 0.005*** 
Nationality = Soc/Geo Groupings 0.012** <0.001*** 0.04** <0.001*** 
Nationality = Natural Other 0.099* 0.823 0.974 0.745 
Gender = Soc/Geo Groupings 0.015** <0.001*** 0.003*** <0.001*** 
Gender = Natural Other 0.097* 0.624 0.613 0.192 
Soc/Geo Groupings = Natural Other 0.81 0.015** 0.33 0.007 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter Three: On the social 
inappropriateness of 
discrimination31 
 
Abstract 
 
We experimentally investigate the relationship between discriminatory behaviour and 
the perceived social inappropriateness of discrimination. We test the framework of 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005), which suggests discrimination will be stronger 
when social norms favour it. Our results support this prediction. Using a Krupka-
Weber social norm elicitation task, we find participants perceive it to be less socially 
inappropriate to discriminate on the basis of social identities artificially induced, 
using a trivial minimal group technique, than on the basis of nationality. 
Correspondingly, we find that participants discriminate more in the artificial identity 
setting. Our results suggest norms and the preference to comply with them affect 
discriminatory decisions and that the social inappropriateness of discrimination 
moderates discriminatory behaviour.  
 
JEL classifications: C71 – Cooperative games; C92 – Laboratory Experiments (Group 
Behavior); D03 – Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles 
 
Keywords: Discrimination; Social norms; Krupka-Weber method; Allocator game 
                                                          
31 This chapter was co-authored with Abigail Barr and Daniele Nosenzo. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic theories seeking to explain discrimination focus on two mechanisms. First, 
in the presence of incomplete information, profit- or income-maximizing agents use 
aggregate group characteristics to form statistical beliefs about individual 
characteristics and then act in accordance with those beliefs by, potentially, treating 
members of different groups differentially (Arrow, 1972). Second, individuals are 
assumed to derive direct utility from favouring certain groups relative to others, i.e. 
they are assumed to have a ‘taste for discrimination’ (Becker, 1957). Such tastes 
explain why discrimination is observed even in settings where asymmetric or 
incomplete information is not an issue (e.g. Chen and Li, 2009; Abbink and Harris, 
2012). However, given their empirical importance, the psychological foundations of 
such tastes or preferences for discrimination have received remarkably little attention 
in the literature. 
In this paper we use experimental methods to test whether tastes for discrimination 
are systematically shaped by social norms, i.e. by collectively recognised rules of 
behaviour that define which actions are viewed as socially appropriate within a 
specific social group.32 The importance of norms for discriminatory behaviour has 
been suggested by Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005). In their framework, individuals 
mentally place themselves in social categories (or identity groups), thereby assigning 
themselves social identities.33 They have perceptions of the specific prescriptions 
(norms) that mandate how individuals within these identity groups are expected to 
behave, and gain utility from conforming to the prescriptions that apply to their own 
group, as it ‘affirms [their] self-image, or identity’ (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, p. 
716). Within this framework, intergroup discrimination arises if the behaviours that 
are prescribed to the members of one group involve differential treatment or 
consideration of in-group and out-group members.34 
                                                          
32 See Elster (1989) and Ostrom (2000) for definitions of social norms. 
33 See also Huang and Wu (1994) and Montgomery (1994) for related approaches. 
34 As an extreme example, consider the case of caste discrimination in South Asia and the belief that 
caste 'purity' (identity) can be 'polluted' by interactions with the individuals at the bottom of the 
caste system (known as 'Dalits'). This led to the so-called 'untouchability practices', a set of 
strongly discriminatory norms against Dalits, which, for example, impose segregation and 
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The Akerlof and Kranton framework implies a positive correlation between in-group 
members’ beliefs about the appropriateness of discrimination and the incidence of 
discriminatory behaviour. Similar correlations have been found in relation to other 
types of economic behaviour. Following Krupka and Weber (2013), experiments have 
shown that in a variety of economic contexts people are more likely to take an action 
if they perceive it to be more socially appropriate (e.g. Burks and Krupka, 2012 – 
corporate ethics; Gachter et al, 2013 – gift-exchange; Krupka et al, 2016 – informal 
contract enforcement; Banerjee, 2016 – bribery). There is also non-experimental 
evidence suggesting norms drive economically-relevant behaviour (e.g. Buonanno et 
al, 2009). Therefore, economists are increasingly invoking social norms and norm-
compliance to explain empirical behaviour. In driving behaviour, social norms may 
effectively substitute for laws (e.g. Huang and Wu, 1994), or may complement them 
(e.g. Sunstein, 1990; Kubler, 2001; Lazzarini et al, 2004; Posner, 2009; Benabou and 
Tirole, 2011).  
However, a correlation between individuals’ beliefs about the appropriateness of 
discrimination and the prevalence of discriminatory behaviour is a challenge to 
empirically document  using naturally occurring data, not least of all because of the 
difficulties associated with accurately measuring such beliefs.35  
Occasionally, attitudinal surveys include questions that can be interpreted as eliciting 
respondents’ perceptions of the appropriateness of discrimination. For instance, the 
2002 wave of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey asked respondents whether they 
believed that ‘sometimes there is good reason for people to be prejudiced against 
certain groups’. One can interpret positive responses to this question as an imperfect 
proxy for the perceived social appropriateness of racial discrimination. Using this 
interpretation, we calculated the percentage of residents in each local authority area of 
Scotland who agreed with the survey question. For each area, Figure 1 plots this 
                                                          
restrictions on occupation, prohibit inter-caste marriage, and limit or prohibit access to public 
places and services. 
35 See Krupka and Weber (2013) and Mackie et al. (2015) for a discussion of the difficulties of 
measuring social norms empirically.  
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variable against the number of racist incidents36, per 100 non-white residents37, 
reported to the police in the financial year 2003-4 (Scottish Executive Statistical 
Bulletin, 2007). A correlation of 0.27 between the two variables indicates a positive 
relationship between the social appropriateness of racial discrimination and the 
incidence of racially discriminatory behaviour, which is consistent with the Akerlof 
and Kranton framework.   
The acceptability of prejudiced-based humour has sometimes been used as a proxy 
for the normative appropriateness of discrimination (see, e.g., Crandall et al., 2002).  
Figure 2 plots, over the period 2004 to 2014, the frequency of Google searches in the 
US for ‘N***** jokes’ (we apply the censorship for this paper; the original search 
term was uncensored38), as a proportion of all Google searches in the US (Google 
Trends, 2016). Searching for racist jokes about black people can be treated as 
evidence that the searcher perceives discrimination against black people to be socially 
appropriate. Figure 2 also plots, on an annual basis over the same period, the number 
of incidents in the US involving hate crimes motivated by an anti-black bias that were 
reported to the FBI, per every 100 people living in areas where the hate crimes are 
reported39 (United States Department of Justice, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). Both the frequency of anti-black joke searches and 
the rate of anti-black hate crime incidents declined considerably over the period. This 
is suggestive of a positive relationship in the US between the change over time in the 
social appropriateness of discrimination against black people and the change over 
time in discriminatory behaviour against black people. 
                                                          
36 The Scottish police define a racist incident as ‘any incident which is perceived to be racist by the 
victim or any other person.’ (Scottish Executive Statistical Bulletin, 2007) 
37 The contemporaneous proportion of non-white residents in each Scottish local area is taken from 
the 2001 UK Census (National Records of Scotland, 2011). 
38 We deliberated over our decision to censor the word, but eventually concluded that we felt 
uncomfortable using it uncensored even in a scientific context. We expect readers will be able to 
guess the extremely derogatory term describing black people that we refer to.   
39 We report this, rather than the absolute number of hate crimes, to adjust for the fact that the 
population covered by the FBI’s hate crime statistics varies from year to year. The proportion of 
black people in the covered population is not available. 
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Figure 1: Variations in attitudes towards racial prejudice and race crimes across 
Scottish local authority areas   
 
Note: Figure 1 plots, at the level of local authority area, the relationship between 
attitudes to prejudice, as reported in the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2002, and 
the frequency of racist incidents reported to the police in the financial year 2003-4. 
Each data-point represents one local authority area in Scotland. 
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Figure 2: Google searches for racist jokes about black people and anti-black hate 
crimes in the US, 2004-14 
  
Note: The light grey line plots the number of anti-black hate crime incidents  reported 
to the FBI each year, adjusted for the population size covered by reporting agencies 
at the time. The dark grey line plots the relative frequency, amongst Google searches 
in the US, of the search term ‘N***** jokes’ (censorship applied retrospectively) – 
monthly data was recovered using the Google Trends tool, and is averaged over the 
course of each year.  
 
In spite of these examples, the paucity of useful naturally occurring data with which 
to investigate the empirical relevance of Akerlof and Kranton’s framework to the 
issue of discrimination advances the case for using experimental methods to address 
the question. Our paper does this, with an empirical strategy relying on four main 
elements.  
First, we use standard experimental techniques to prime participants to think about 
particular dimensions of their identities. The priming aims to trigger the process of 
social identification that is central to Akerlof and Kranton’s approach by encouraging 
75 
 
subjects to identify with half of the participants in their experimental session and not 
with the other half.    
Second, in the decision-making phase of the experiment we ask subjects to distribute 
a given amount of money between two potential recipients, one an individual sharing 
their primed identity, the other an individual not sharing their primed identity. This 
simple allocation task allows us to measure discrimination as the extent to which 
individuals are willing to favour members of their own social group at the expense of 
the out-group.  
Third, we vary the dimension of identity that is primed. Applying Akerlof and 
Kranton’s framework, the distributive decision that an individual makes within our 
experiment will depend on the normative prescriptions that apply, given the 
individual’s own social identity and the way the social identities of each of the two 
recipients relate to it. This implies that the content of the normative prescriptions 
pertaining to discrimination depend on what dimension of identity is salient within 
the decision-making context.40 Focusing on this aspect of Akerlof and Kranton's 
framework, we design two identity treatments, aimed at inducing different 
perceptions of the appropriateness of discrimination, while holding other aspects of 
the decision-making context constant. Under one treatment, social identities are based 
on nationality; we form groups in the laboratory based on whether participants are 
British or Chinese. Under the other treatment, social identities are entirely artificial; 
groups are formed according to the colour of ball that each participant draws blindly 
from a bag. We expect the prescriptions that mandate how a decision-maker should 
treat in-groups and out-groups in our experiment to differ across the two treatments. 
Specifically, we expect discrimination against out-group and in favour of in-group 
members to be perceived as less appropriate when identity groups are formed on the 
basis of nationality, than when they are artificially formed on the basis of the colour 
                                                          
40 For example, norms may render it appropriate to discriminate against others who support a 
different football team or listen to a different type of music from oneself, but not appropriate to 
discriminate against others who are different in terms of ethnicity or gender; and individuals may 
moderate their behaviour accordingly. 
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of balls randomly picked. Therefore, if discrimination is systematically shaped by 
norms, we expect discrimination to be stronger between the artificial groups. 
Fourth, as well as measuring discrimination, we directly measure the perceived social 
appropriateness of discrimination in each treatment. We do this by employing the 
'norm-elicitation' task introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013), in which participants 
are described the allocation game and are asked to evaluate the social appropriateness 
of each and every possible action available to the allocator. We use this norm-
elicitation task to construct an incentivized measure of the extent to which 
participants’ perceptions of the appropriateness of discrimination vary across our two 
treatments and to examine the extent to which these differences in perceived 
appropriateness translate into differences in discriminatory behaviour in the allocation 
task.  
Our results show that, in both treatments, discriminatory actions are viewed as 
socially inappropriate. However, as expected, discrimination is perceived to be 
significantly less appropriate in the nationality treatment compared to the artificial 
identity treatment. The results of the decision task match these differences in 
perceived appropriateness: while few participants discriminate in either treatment, 
discrimination is significantly stronger between artificial groups than between 
nationality groups. These results are consistent with the Akerlof-Kranton framework: 
the perceived social appropriateness of discrimination varies according to the way 
identity groups are defined, and this forms the basis for individuals’ revealed 
preferences for discrimination.  
Our study’s main contribution is in linking discrimination to social norms and social 
identity theory. In this sense, our study is closely related to the paper by Chang et al. 
(2015), who apply Akerlof and Kranton's framework to investigate the effect of 
priming US citizens’ political identities on redistributive behaviour. They show that 
individuals' primed political identities (Democratic or Republican) determine their 
perceptions of the social appropriateness of redistribution, and that this explains 
differences in redistributive behaviour between Democrats and Republicans. Like 
Chang et al., our experiment also shows that both individuals’ distributive decisions 
and their perceptions of the social appropriateness of such decisions are sensitive to 
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the dimension of identity that is salient in a given context. However, while the 
normative prescriptions upon which Chang et al focus relate to the social identity of 
the decision-maker alone, we focus on the social identities of both the decision-
makers and other individuals affected by their behaviour, and on how those social 
identities relate one to another. Thus, unlike Chang et al., in our experiment both the 
priming and the distributive decisions have an intergroup component which allows us 
to investigate the relationship between social identities, social norms, and 
discriminatory behaviour.  
Our paper is also related to work on the associations between social identity and norm 
enforcement.41 Bernhard et al. (2006) and Goette et al. (2006), for instance, use third-
party punishment games to study whether the willingness to enforce norms of sharing 
and cooperation depends on the social identities of the norm violator and of the victim 
of the norm violation and on how those identities relate to that of the norm enforcer. 
Both papers find that social identity systematically affects the patterns of norm 
enforcement: enforcers are generally more willing to mete out punishment against 
violators when the victim of the norm violation is an in-group rather than an out-
group member. Also related is Harris et al. (2014), who study whether in-group 
favouritism is proscribed by social norms by observing the extent to which 
individuals are willing to incur costs to punish it. They find that in-group favouritism 
goes largely unpunished when the punisher belongs to the same identity group as the 
norm violator or when she belongs to a neutral group. In-group favouritism is instead 
frequently punished when the punisher belongs to a different identity group. Harris et 
al. conclude that in-group favouritism is not always considered a violation of social 
norms, as this depends on the identities of the agents involved in the interaction.  
                                                          
41 Also relevant is the research, mostly undertaken by psychologists, on the associations between 
social norms and the expressions of prejudiced views – a related but different phenomenon to 
acts of discrimination. Crandall et al (2002), for instance, found that expressions of prejudice 
towards groups are very strongly correlated with reported beliefs on the social appropriateness of 
such prejudice. Other studies have shown that the degree to which individuals are willing to 
express prejudice can easily be swayed by the views of others (Blanchard et al, 1994; Zitek and 
Hebl, 2007), or by an experimenter deceptively varying the social norm that is presented to them 
(Nesdale et al, 2005), suggesting that normative consideration may play an important role on the 
expression of prejudice. 
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While these studies strongly suggest an association between discrimination and social 
norms and identities, none of them has directly measured the norms that underlie the 
observed patterns of behaviour. Moreover, none of these studies has investigated 
whether variations in primed social identity trigger differences in norms that, in turn, 
predict variations in discrimination. Thus, our study fills an important gap in this 
literature, as we are the first to provide direct evidence not only that discrimination 
co-varies with group norms, but also that these norms vary across particular 
dimensions of an individual’s identity.     
The rest of the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 sketches a simple theoretical 
model of identity and norm-compliance that we use to motivate and inform our 
empirical strategy. Section 3 outlines our experimental design; Section 4 presents our 
results; Section 5 concludes and discusses our findings. 
2. Theoretical framework 
Our simple model of social norm-compliance closely follows Krupka and Weber 
(2013), and in particular Chang et al (2015), who based theirs on Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000, 2005). We first assume that individuals have multiple social identities, the 
salience of which depends on the decision-making context.  
An individual 𝑖’s utility 𝑈𝑖 depends on the actions of him- or herself and others, 
𝑎 = (𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖), and the salient social identities of him- or herself and others, 
𝐼 = (𝐼𝑖, 𝐼−𝑖): 
𝑈𝑖(𝑎, 𝐼) = 𝑉𝑖(𝑎) + 𝛾𝑖𝑁(𝑎𝑖|𝑎−𝑖, 𝐼) 
We assume that the decision-maker’s utility can be broken into two components. The 
first component, 𝑉𝑖(𝑎), describes individual 𝑖's utility over material payoffs, which in 
turn depend upon his or her own actions and the actions of others. Note that this 
accommodates standard self-regarding preferences, where the individual only cares 
about his or her own material payoff, as well as various forms of outcome-based 
other-regarding preferences, where individual 𝑖's utility also depends on others’ 
material payoffs (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).  
79 
 
The second component of utility is derived from complying with normative 
prescriptions and is captured by the function 𝑁(. ). The normative prescriptions 
define, for each action 𝑎𝑖 available to individual 𝑖, the social appropriateness of that 
action, given the actions of other players. Crucially, as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 
2005), we assume that normative prescriptions also depend on the salient identities of 
𝑖 and other players, and on how these relate to one another. This takes into account 
that differently defined identity groups may normatively prescribe different 
behaviours, and therefore that the same action may be viewed as more or less socially 
appropriate depending on the salient dimension of the identity of the decision-maker 
in a given context, as well as the identities of the other players with whom the 
decision-maker interacts. Finally, 𝛾𝑖   is an individual-specific parameter defining the 
importance that individual 𝑖 attaches to complying with social norms. 
In our experiment, subjects face a simple allocation task (described in detail in the 
next section), which measures the extent to which they are willing to treat differently 
those who belong to the same identity group as themselves from those who belong to 
a different one. In all treatments of the experiment, we keep constant the set of 
material payoffs available to players and the mapping from actions into payoffs. Thus, 
the first component 𝑉𝑖(𝑎) of the utility function above is held constant across 
treatments.  
Our treatments vary the dimension of identity 𝐼 that is made salient to the decision-
makers and, hence, the process by which the relevant identity groups are defined in 
the experiment. As we describe in detail in the next section, in one treatment 
participants are encouraged to form identity groups on the basis of a random event, 
while in the other treatment identity groups are based on a meaningful personal 
characteristic. An implication of this treatment manipulation is that the normative 
prescriptions, 𝑁(𝑎𝑖|𝑎−𝑖, 𝐼), that regulate the second component of the utility function 
described above may differ across treatments. Specifically, the same action 𝑎𝑖 
available to the decision-maker may be evaluated differently depending on how 
identity groups are formed. We employ a norm-elicitation technique, based on the 
task introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013), to quantify, in an incentive-compatible 
way, the function 𝑁(. ) in each treatment. This allows us to assess the extent to which 
normative prescriptions do indeed differ across treatments; and therefore to examine 
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the extent to which differences between treatments in the level of discrimination in 
the allocation task are explained by differences in the perception of its 
appropriateness. 
3. Experimental design 
Measuring discrimination – the allocator game 
In the allocator game, one participant was endowed with £16 and asked to allocate it 
between two passive players, one belonging to his or her own identity group and the 
other belonging to a different identity group.42 The decision-maker could not keep 
any of the money for him- or herself but knew he or she would receive a payment, 
between £6 and £10, which the computer would randomly pick at the end of the 
experiment.43 Allocators could split the money any way they liked between the other 
two players, as long as each amount was a multiple of two. Thus, the allocator had to 
choose one of nine possible allocations of money between the two passive players, 
ranging from (£16; £0) to (£0; £16). In order to maximize sample sizes, we elicited 
decisions using a role randomisation method: all participants were asked to make a 
decision in the allocator role knowing that their actual role would be determined at 
random at the end of the experiment (participants had a one-third chance of being 
assigned the allocator role and a two-thirds chance of being assigned the passive 
player role). Role assignment was implemented at the end of experiment, once 
everyone had submitted an allocation decision. Decisions were made anonymously 
and the only information allocators had about their recipients was the identity group 
that each of them belonged to. 
We chose the allocator game as our discrimination-eliciting device for the following 
reasons. First, given our focus on the micro-foundations of taste-based discrimination, 
we wanted a decision-making task within which statistical discrimination had no 
relevance; in the allocator game the decision-maker’s material payoff does not 
                                                          
42 See Supplementary Online Materials A for a copy of the instructions used in the experiments.  
43 The possible payments were £6, £8 and £10; each had 1/3 probability of occurring. Our aim was to 
pay allocators £8 on average. However, had we had made this payoff a certainty it might have 
inflated the salience of the (8,8) split in the allocator game, as this allocation would ensure payoff 
equality across all three players.  
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depend on what any other player does, so statistical beliefs about other players are 
irrelevant.44 Second, to maximise our chances of discerning treatment differences, we 
wanted a task that reliably produces discriminatory behaviour; in a meta-analysis 
Lane (forthcoming) found the allocator game to be the experimental task that yielded 
the strongest discrimination. Finally, in the allocator game, discrimination is 
measured within-participants, so it is obvious to participants what the experiment is 
about and any observed discrimination is interpretable as conscious rather than 
subconscious. Thus, the game is an ideal subject for a norm-elicitation task; it is much 
simpler to assess the social appropriateness of conscious behaviour than of 
subconscious behaviour.  
Measuring the social appropriateness of discrimination – the Krupka-Weber 
norm-elicitation task 
We elicited the social appropriateness of discrimination in the allocator game using 
an adaptation of the task design pioneered by Krupka and Weber (2013). Participants 
were described the allocator game, were presented with a table listing the nine 
possible actions the allocator could take, and were asked to evaluate the social 
appropriateness of each by marking one option on a four-point scale: ‘Very socially 
inappropriate’, ‘Somewhat socially inappropriate’, ‘Somewhat socially appropriate’ 
or ‘Very socially appropriate.’ To ensure that the relevant perceptions of 
appropriateness are measured, the evaluators should be, to the greatest extent 
possible, in the mind-set of the person making the decision they are evaluating. In our 
experiment, participants in the norm-elicitation task were the same as those playing 
the allocator game, although we varied which task came first (participants were 
unaware of the content of the second task until they had completed the first). All 
participants were assigned to identity groups before their first task, so those taking the 
norm-elicitation task first had had their identities primed in exactly the same way as 
the allocator game participants whose behaviour they were evaluating. Each 
                                                          
44 Note that given the non-strategic nature of the allocator game certain elements of the utility 
function set out in the previous section are redundant. This notwithstanding the proposed 
framework remains relevant. In section 4, for the purpose of analysis, we set out a parameterised 
version of the utility function that is directly and entirely relevant to the game.  
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individual in the norm-elicitation task only evaluated the appropriateness of actions 
made by allocators of the same identity group as that individual.  
The evaluation of actions was incentivised. Participants were told that, at the end of 
the experiment, one of the nine actions they had evaluated would be randomly 
selected, and each participant’s evaluation of the action would be compared to that of 
another randomly selected participant. If a participant’s evaluation matched that of 
the person they were compared with, that participant would earn £8; otherwise they 
would earn nothing. The incentives transform the task into a coordination game, 
where participants are incentivised to match other participants’ evaluations of 
appropriateness. Krupka and Weber (2013) argue that this gives participants an 
incentive to reveal their perception of what is commonly regarded as appropriate or 
inappropriate behaviour in the decision situation, rather than their own personal 
evaluation of the actions they are asked to consider. This is important because social 
norms are collectively recognized rules of behaviour, rather than personal opinions 
about appropriate behaviours (e.g. Elster, 1989; Ostrom 2000). 
Moreover, because we wanted to incentivise participants to coordinate on identity-
specific social norms (i.e. the social norms that were recognised by those belonging to 
a specific identity group), participants were told that the person whose evaluation 
theirs would be compared to would be a member of their own identity group. 
Participants were told:  
‘By socially appropriate, we mean behaviour that you think most 
participants [of your group] would agree is the "correct" thing to do. 
Another way to think about what we mean is that if [the allocator] 
were to select a socially inappropriate action, then another participant 
[of your group] might be angry at [the allocator].’ 
Treatments 
Our treatments, labelled Nationality and Artificial, differed in the way identity groups 
were formed. In Nationality participants in the experiment were segregated into 
identity groups based on nationality (previous economics studies taking this approach 
include Hennig-Schmidt et al, 2007; Netzer and Sutter, 2009; Guillen and Ji, 2011). 
In Artificial participants were split into ‘minimal groups’, using a variant of the 
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technique first introduced by Tajfel et al (1971), wherein social identities are 
artificially instilled in participants during the experiment.  
For both treatments we recruited British and Chinese students at the UK campus of 
the University of Nottingham, a British institution which hosts a large number of 
students from China.45 In the Nationality treatment, upon arrival, the British were 
seated on one side of the lab and the Chinese on the other. At every computer 
terminal on the British (Chinese) side was placed a sign reading ‘YOU ARE ON THE 
BRITISH (CHINESE) SIDE OF THE ROOM. ALL PARTICIPANTS ON THIS 
SIDE OF THE ROOM ARE BRITISH (CHINESE)’ (see Supplementary Online 
Materials B). In the instructions at the beginning of the experiment, it was again made 
explicitly clear that the lab and the participants had been divided based on nationality. 
In the Artificial treatment, upon arrival, participants blindly drew a ball from a bag. In 
each session the bag initially contained equal numbers of green and yellow balls, and 
participants continued to draw from it until the bag was empty, thus ensuring an equal 
split of green and yellow balls drawn. Those with green balls were then seated on one 
side of the lab, and those with yellow on the other. Consistent with the Nationality 
treatment, signs were placed at each terminal, reading ‘YOU ARE ON THE 
(GREEN/YELLOW) SIDE OF THE ROOM. ALL PARTICIPANTS ON THIS SIDE 
OF THE ROOM DREW A (GREEN/YELLOW) BALL’, and it was again made 
explicit at the beginning of the instructions that the lab and the participants had been 
divided on the basis of ball colour.  
                                                          
45 Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), an online database of experimental 
participants, upon which participants are asked to state their nationality when they sign up. We 
were able to cross-check nationalities using the University of Nottingham’s central student register 
system, which lists students’ official nationalities. Note that we based the groups in our 
experiment on official nationalities, rather than self-identified ones (e.g. we did not invite 
Malaysian students who listed their nationality as Chinese). Chinese participants were 
mainlanders, with none from Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan. 
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As in the Nationality treatment, we invited an equal mix of British and Chinese 
students to the Artificial sessions. This ensures comparability between the two 
treatments.46  
We chose our treatment manipulation because we conjectured that it would produce 
the differences that we needed to test the Akerlof and Kranton framework. 
Specifically, we conjectured that discrimination would be stronger in the Artificial 
compared to the Nationality condition. This conjecture was based primarily on 
existing evidence from previous research: experiments priming national identity (e.g. 
Hennig-Schmidt et al, 2007; Netzer and Sutter, 2009; Willinger et al, 2003) have 
often not found significant discrimination, while experiments involving minimal 
group identity (e.g., Ahmed, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo, 
2009) do so more frequently, and according to a recent meta-analysis by Lane 
(forthcoming), on average, discrimination is significantly weaker in the former 
compared to the latter type of experiment. There are also theoretical reasons why 
discrimination would be stronger in the Artificial condition. First, members of newly 
formed groups may be more inclined to draw boundaries between in- and out-groups 
than members of more established groups (Jetten et al., 1996). In our experiment, the 
groups in the Artificial treatment are new, while those in the Nationality treatment are 
not. Second and more closely related to the theoretical framework above, the extent to 
which individuals are willing to behave prejudicially may be related to how easily the 
expression of prejudice can be justified to oneself or others (Crandall et al., 2002).47 
In our experiment, discrimination against people who randomly drew a ball of a 
                                                          
46 Given the relatively small Chinese community in Nottingham, Chinese participants in our 
experiment were more likely to know each other than were the British. This could be problematic 
if, particularly in the Nationality treatment, participants based their behaviour on the number of 
friends they had on either side of the lab. We controlled for this by asking each participant, in the 
post-experimental questionnaire, how many people on each side of the lab they had previously 
met. Chinese participants were indeed more likely to know each other, but there was no 
association between the number of friends on either side of the lab and participants’ behaviour in 
either treatment (available on request). 
47 For instance, Crandall et al. (2002) show that there are large differences in the perceived 
appropriateness of prejudice against Blacks vis-à-vis members of the American Nazi Party. They 
argue that this is related to the differences in “… an outside perceiver’s sense of the justification of 
the prejudices …. the justifications of the prejudice against Nazis are widely accepted; the 
justifications of the prejudice against Blacks are not.” (p. 361). 
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different colour may be easier to justify than discrimination on the basis of 
nationality. Third and again closely related to the theoretical framework, relatively 
weak norms against discrimination in the Artificial treatment could arise because it 
triggers group identity akin to sports fandom, a dimension of identity across which 
discrimination, via competition, is expected. In contrast, there may be stronger norms 
proscribing discrimination against foreign nationals, given the historical sensitivities 
this could arouse.  
Procedure 
All participants participated in both the allocator game and the norm-elicitation task, 
as well as completing a post-experimental questionnaire. In each session, everyone 
received payment either for the allocator game or for the norm-elicitation task, as 
determined by a coin toss at the end of the experiment. Participants also received a £4 
show-up fee. The order in which the tasks were performed was randomised between 
sessions, so that we could check for ordering effects. We do not find such effects (see 
Supplementary Online Materials C for the analysis), which is consistent with the 
findings of Erkut et al (2015) and D’Adda et al (2016). Therefore, in the analysis 
below we pool across ordering conditions. All sessions had 24 participants – twelve 
belonging to each group – and were conducted in March or April 2015, using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). We conducted ten sessions, with 120 participants participating 
in each treatment.48 
4. Results 
Treatment differences – social norms 
We look first at the social appropriateness of discrimination in each treatment, as 
measured by the norm-elicitation task. Figure 3 plots the mean appropriateness 
ratings assigned to each allocation in the Nationality and Artificial treatments. 
Following the approach of Krupka and Weber (2013), we assign evenly-spaced 
values of -1 for the rating ‘very socially inappropriate’, -0.33 for the rating 
                                                          
48 We conducted one additional session in the Artificial treatment which we exclude from the analysis. 
This is due to procedural issues that resulted from a low turn-up rate. Excluding the session does 
not meaningfully affect any important results.  
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‘somewhat socially inappropriate’, 0.33 for the rating ‘somewhat socially 
appropriate’ and 1 for the rating ‘very socially appropriate.’ The table at the bottom 
of the figure displays the distribution of evaluations for each allocation in each 
treatment, and presents the results of randomisation tests on the treatment differences 
in mean ratings. Our results are corrected for the fact that we are performing multiple 
tests; applying the Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method (Benjamini and 
Hochberg, 1995), we sort our p-values in ascending rank and multiply each by the 
number of separate tests being performed (in our case nine, one for each possible 
allocation) before dividing each by its rank – thus the greatest adjustment is made to 
smaller p-values.49 
In each treatment the mean and modal evaluations follow the same general pattern. 
Participants tend to regard extreme discrimination against recipients belonging to 
either identity group to be very socially inappropriate, while the equal split is 
generally regarded as very socially appropriate. There is a lack of strong consensus on 
allocations mildly favouring members of one group or the other. This pattern is 
consistent with a social norm of equality. However, in both treatments the perceived 
social appropriateness decays faster as allocations move away from equality towards 
favouring the out-group member than when they move towards favouring the in-
group member, indicating that social norms against discrimination are stronger when 
the victim is a member of one’s own identity group.50 
By design, any treatment differences in the ratings assigned to a given allocation can 
only be driven by contextual differences in the perceived appropriateness of 
discrimination. We observe subtle but significant treatment differences. Whereas 95% 
of participants in the Nationality treatment perceive the equal split to be very 
appropriate, the equivalent figure is only 84.2% in the Artificial treatment; mean 
                                                          
49 All p-values reported in this paper are two-sided and based on Fisher randomisation tests and 
corrected using the Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method. See Moir (1998) for a 
discussion of the randomisation test, and Kaiser and Lacy (2009) for information on the Stata 
command used to apply it. 
50 OLS regressions confirm that, in both treatments, the rate of decay of appropriateness of 
allocations favouring the out-group is significantly higher than that of allocations favouring the in-
group (both p-values < 0.002).   
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ratings for the equal split are significantly higher in the Nationality treatment. 
Furthermore, as the allocations move away from the equal split towards favouring the 
in-group, the appropriateness ratings decline at a faster rate in the Nationality 
treatment than in the Artificial treatment. For the extreme (16,0) split, 92.5% of 
participants in the Nationality treatment opt for ‘very inappropriate’, while only 
80.8% do so in the Artificial treatment. And while only 5% of participants rate the 
(16,0) allocation as socially appropriate in the Nationality treatment, 18% do so in the 
Artificial treatment. In fact, Figure 3 shows that, for any in-group-favouring 
allocation, there are more participants in the Artificial than Nationality treatment who 
find discrimination to be socially appropriate.51  
As a consequence, all in-group-favouring allocations are on average perceived to be 
more appropriate in the Artificial treatment, and the differences are statistically 
significant at the 5% level or lower in three out of four possible  
                                                          
51 In Supplementary Online Materials D we show that these treatment differences in the perceived 
norms are driven by variations in the within-subject response patterns to the norm-elicitation task 
across treatments. In particular, in the Artificial treatment we find relatively more subjects who 
assign their highest appropriateness rating to the (16,0) allocation and then monotonically 
decrease their ratings of appropriateness as more money is given to the out-group member. Such 
a pattern indicates the perception of a social norm of in-group favouritism. 
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Figure 3: Perceived social appropriateness of actions in allocator game 
 
 
Notes: Figure 3 presents the distribution of social appropriateness ratings of each allocation in the two 
treatments. Allocations (e.g. 16,0) are denoted by the amount given to the in-group member on the left (£16), 
and the amount given to the out-group member on the right (£0). Shaded cells represent the modal ratings for 
each allocation in each treatment. Mean ratings are taken by assigning values of 1, 0.33, -0.33 and -1 for the 
ratings ‘very appropriate’, ‘somewhat appropriate’, ‘somewhat inappropriate’ and ‘very inappropriate’ 
respectively, and averaging the values for all participants in a given treatment. Benjamini-Hochberg-corrected 
p-values are reported from randomisation tests.
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cases (the exception being the allocation 14,2 for which the difference is significant at 
the 10% level). Moreover, the differences in perception of appropriateness of 
discrimination only pertain to in-group favouritism and not to any form of 
discrimination; Figure 3 shows that, while out-group-favouring allocations are on 
average perceived to be slightly more appropriate in the Artificial treatment, only for 
the (6,10) allocation is the difference significant, and then only at the 10% level.52 
Treatment differences – discrimination 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of decisions made in the allocator game in each 
treatment. In the Nationality treatment, 83.3% of participants choose to allocate the 
money evenly between the in-group member and the out-group member. Only 69.2% 
of the participants in the Artificial treatment make this choice. The remainder of 
participants in each treatment discriminate against out-group members; no individual 
in either treatment allocates more money to the out-group member than the in-group 
member. 12.5% of participants in the Artificial treatment allocate all the money to the 
in-group member, while only 4.2% do so in the Nationality treatment. 
In the Nationality treatment, participants allocate an average of £8.67 to the in-group 
member and £7.33 to the out-group member, resulting in a mean difference of £1.33. 
In the Artificial treatment, participants allocate an average of £9.52 to the in-group 
member and £6.48 to the out-group member, resulting in a mean difference of £3.03. 
A randomisation test indicates that the mean difference in the Artificial treatment is 
significantly higher than that in the Nationality treatment (p=0.007). This is consistent 
with the conjecture that discrimination is stronger in the treatment where it is 
perceived to be more socially appropriate. It suggests that norm-compliance 
moderates discriminatory behaviour.  
 
                                                          
52 In Supplementary Online Materials E, we analyse cross-national differences in responses to the 
norm-elicitation task. We show that in both the Artificial and Nationality treatments, Chinese 
participants perceived discrimination to be more socially appropriate than British participants. 
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Figure 4: Discrimination in the allocator game 
 
Notes: Figure 4 shows the percentage of participants in each treatment 
who choose each allocation. Allocations are denoted by the amount 
given to the in-group member on the left, and the amount given to the 
out-group member on the right – e.g. (16,0) denotes allocating £16 to 
the in-group member and £0 to the out-group member. 
In Table 1, an OLS regression confirms that the treatment effect on discrimination is 
robust to the inclusion of various controls – such as age, gender, nationality and the 
extent to which participants understand the tasks.53  
                                                          
53 In addition to the regression in Table 1, we ran further models on the British and Chinese 
subsamples to investigate the effects on discrimination of several other variables which were 
nationality-specific. These variables were not significant. For the British, we found no significant 
effect on discrimination of: ethnicity, political persuasion, views on immigration, or hostility 
towards foreign students. For the Chinese, we found no significant effect of: views towards 
foreigners in China, feeling welcome in the UK, or hostility towards domestic students. Output is 
available on request. 
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Table 1: OLS regressions of treatment differences in discrimination 
 Dependent variable = Difference in amount allocated to 
in-group member and out-group member 
  OLS model OLS model 
Treatment      
  Artificial 1.700***    (0.605) 1.974*** (0.626) 
Controls      
  Male  0.229 (0.664) 
  Age  -0.121 (0.229) 
  Year of study  -0.280 (0.379) 
 Chinese  2.212*** (0.802) 
  Misunderstanding  0.875 (0.687) 
  Rural background  0.637 (0.705) 
  Economics student  -0.060 (0.775) 
  Constant    1.333    (0.428)    3.113 (4.003) 
R2    0.032 0.082   
N      240 234   
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. 
Misunderstanding = number of control questions answered incorrectly at first 
attempt; Six observations dropped from model with controls owing to missing data 
for age and year of study. 
 
Econometric analysis of individual behaviour 
So far we have analysed the link between behaviour and norms at the group level, by 
showing that there is more discrimination in the treatment where it is perceived as 
less socially inappropriate. We now exploit the within-subject nature of our 
experiment to extend the analysis to the individual level. Specifically, we investigate 
whether a model that incorporates a preference for norm compliance is better able to 
explain the behavioural regularities in our experiment than a model that does not 
incorporate such a factor. 
Following the theoretical framework introduced in section 2, we assume that the 
utility that allocators derive from choosing allocation 𝑥 depends on two components, 
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one defined on material payoffs and the other defined on normative prescriptions. We 
assume that the first component depends on the absolute difference between the 
material payoffs of the two passive players implied by allocation 𝑥. The second 
component depends on the social appropriateness of the allocation. For allocator 𝑖,  
𝑈𝑖(𝑎𝑥) = 𝑣|𝜋𝑗(𝑎𝑥) − 𝜋𝑘(𝑎𝑥)| + 𝛾𝑁𝑖(𝑎𝑥) 
where 𝜋𝑗(𝑎𝑥) and 𝜋𝑘(𝑎𝑥) are the material payoffs that the two passive players 𝑗 and 
𝑘 receive from allocation 𝑥, and 𝑁𝑖(𝑎𝑥) is the social appropriateness that allocator 𝑖 
ascribes to allocation 𝑥, as measured in the norm-elicitation task.54  
The parameter 𝑣 captures the weight that the allocator places on the material payoff 
component of the utility function, while the parameter 𝛾 captures the weight that 
allocators place on norms. Note that the material payoff component of the utility 
function is blind to the identities of the passive players, and allocations that 
implement unequal payoffs carry the same weight to utility, regardless of whether the 
inequality favours the in-group or out-group. Thus, the parameter 𝑣 simply captures 
(identity-blind) preferences associated with payoff inequality. In contrast, the 
normative component of the utility function allows allocations to weigh differently in 
the utility function depending on the identities of the passive players. Hence, the 
parameter 𝛾 captures the weight that allocators place on a wider array of normative 
considerations, including both norms of equality and identity-related prescriptions.55    
Following Gaechter et al. (2013) and Krupka and Weber (2013), we use fixed-effects 
conditional logit regressions to estimate the weights 𝑣 and 𝛾 on the two components 
of the utility function. Specifically, we assume that allocators choose allocations 
                                                          
54 Recall that our experiment delivers, for each allocator 𝑖, a measurement of 𝑖's perceived social 
appropriateness of allocation 𝑥. This is because each participant in our experiment made decisions 
in both the allocation task and the norm-elicitation task. 
55 While the allocation that equalises payoffs between passive players is a strict maximum for both the 
first and second component of the utility function for many participants, this is not true for all. In 
particular, about 15% of participants in Artificial and 3% in Nationality do not identify the equal-
split as the most socially appropriate allocation. Moreover, for another 7% of participants in 
Artificial and 5% in Nationality the equal-split is not a strict maximum for the normative 
component of the utility function. 
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following a logit choice rule, whereby the likelihood of choosing each of the nine 
possible allocations depends on the utility associated with that choice, 𝑈(𝑎𝑥), relative 
to the utility associated with the alternative allocations: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑎 = 𝑎𝑥) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝⁡{𝑈(𝑎𝑥)}
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝⁡{𝑈(𝑎𝑙)}𝑙=1,…,9
, 𝑥 = 1,… , 9 
Our objective, here, is to show that a norm-augmented model is better able to capture 
treatment differences in choices than a model which is identity-blind. Thus, in Table 
2 we report the output of two fixed-effects conditional logit models, each estimated 
using all of the allocation decisions and all of the social appropriateness evaluations 
generated under either the Nationality or the Artificial treatment. In the first model we 
impose the restriction 𝛾 = 0 to the utility function and, thus, estimate a choice model 
where the decision-maker is purely concerned with identity-blind payoff inequality. 
In the second model this restriction is removed and utility is allowed to depend on 
both payoff inequality and wider normative prescriptions.  
 
 
Table 2: Conditional logit regressions of the likelihood of choosing an 
action 
Dependent variable = 1 if action is chosen; 0 otherwise 
 Model (1) (2) 
𝑣 (weight on payoff inequality) -0.338*** -0.111*** 
 (0.021) (0.028) 
𝛾 (weight on normative prescriptions)  1.081*** 
   (0.119) 
Pseudo R2 0.424 0.511 
Bayesian Information Criterion 615.17 531.02 
Number of Observations 2,160 2,160 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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The significant negative estimates of 𝑣 in both models indicate actions that yield 
larger payoff inequality are less likely to be chosen. The significant positive estimate 
of 𝛾 in model (2) indicates that more appropriate actions are more likely to be chosen. 
The significant estimate of 𝛾 in a model that also includes the 𝑣 parameter indicates 
that the normative component of the utility function can explain variation in choice 
behaviour that cannot be entirely captured by pure (identity-blind) inequality 
considerations. This also explains why the Bayesian Information Criterion is 
significantly lower for model (2) than (1) (p < 0.001 on a likelihood-ratio test) 
indicating that the norm-augmented model fits the data significantly better than the 
model without norms.  
The reason why the norm-augmented model performs better is made clear in Figure 5, 
in which the aggregate action choice rates predicted by each of the models are 
graphed next to the actual choice rates (as displayed in Figure 4). The left-hand panel 
of Figure 5 presents the choice rates predicted by model (1). The right-hand panel 
presents the choice rates predicted by model (2). For ease of comparison, actual 
choice rates are reproduced in both panels. In each panel, the predicted choice rates 
(striped bars) and actual choice rates (shaded bars) of the Nationality (Artificial) 
treatment are shown in dark (light) grey.  
The model in which participants are identity-blind and care only about inequality fails 
to capture the most important features of the choice data. Most notably, the model is 
unable to predict any treatment differences in choice, since the implied inequality of 
an allocation is not different across the Artificial and Nationality treatments. 
Moreover, the model predicts that deviations from equality are symmetric across the 
choice space. That is, the probability of choosing an in-group-favouring allocation is 
predicted to be the same as that of choosing an allocation which favours the out-group 
by the equivalent amount. This is not the case in the actual choice data, as no-one 
chooses out-group-favouring allocations, while 24% of participants choose an in-
group-favouring allocation.  
In contrast, the norm-augmented model predicts a lower probability of choosing the 
equal split allocation and higher probabilities of choosing in-group-favouring 
allocations in the Artificial than Nationality treatment. This is in line with what we 
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observed in the experiment. Moreover, although the model still assigns positive 
probabilities to out-group-favouring allocations, it predicts lower probabilities for 
them than for the comparable in-group-favouring allocations. 
5. Conclusion 
We show that discrimination is perceived to be socially inappropriate. However, the 
extent of this perceived inappropriateness depends on the identities upon which 
discrimination is based: when the identities are defined with reference to a brief, 
random event, discrimination in favour of the in-  
Figure 5: Actual choice rates in the allocator game and choice rates predicted by 
conditional logits 
  Model with material payoff considerations only                         Norm-augmented model 
  
Notes: Figure 5 shows the percentage of participants in each treatment who 
choose each allocation, compared to the percentages of participants choosing 
each allocation in each treatment as predicted by conditional logit models; 
left-hand panel:  model only taking into account considerations for material 
payoffs, right-hand panel: model augmented by normative considerations; 
allocations are denoted by the amount given to the in-group member followed 
by amount given to the out-group member – e.g. (16,0) denotes allocating £16 
to the in-group member and £0 to the out-group member. 
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group is viewed as more appropriate than when the identities are based on nationality. 
Furthermore, we show that discrimination in the allocator game is stronger in the 
setting where it is perceived to be more appropriate, and the econometric analysis 
confirms that the differences in perceived appropriateness predict actual behaviour.  
These findings are strongly supportive of Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) 
providing a useful framework within which to think about and model taste-based 
discrimination. We offer direct evidence that differences in the way identity groups 
are defined translate into differences in the perceived normative prescriptions, in 
choice contexts that are otherwise identical. This offers direct support for Akerlof and 
Kranton’s conjecture that the process of social identification plays a key role in the 
formation of normative prescriptions.   
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Supplementary Online Materials 
A: Experimental instructions 
 
A.1 Instructions for subjects in the Nationality treatment, playing allocator game first 
Instructions 
Welcome to this experiment. This is an experiment about decision-making. During the 
experiment, we request that you remain quiet and do not attempt to communicate with other 
participants. Participants not following this request may be asked to leave without receiving 
payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to 
you. For your participation, you will be paid a show-up fee of £4. You may also receive some 
additional money based on your choices and the choices of others in the tasks described 
below. 
There will be two tasks for all participants to perform. At the end of the experiment, the 
experimenter will toss a fair coin. If it lands on heads, all participants will receive payment 
for the first task only; if it lands on tails, all participants will receive payment for the second 
task only. As you will not know until the end of the experiment which task you will receive 
payment for, please make your decisions in each task carefully. You will not receive feedback 
on the outcome of any task until the end of the experiment, and your decisions in the first task 
will have no effect on the nature or outcome of the second task. You will not receive any 
instructions for or information about the second task until you have completed the first task. 
After the second task, there will also be a questionnaire. The anonymity of your responses to 
all parts of all tasks and questions is guaranteed. 
Please now answer two questions on your screen, to ensure you understand the process of the 
experiment.  
 
In this experiment, the room has been divided into two sections on the basis of nationality. On 
one side everyone is British; on the other side everyone is Chinese. The sign on your desk 
reminds you whether you are on the British or Chinese side of the room. 
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Task One 
 
In this experiment, one third of you will be randomly assigned by the computer into a role 
entitled ‘Individual A’. The decisions made by Individual As during the task will determine 
the payments from the task received by the other two thirds of participants. Each of you has 
an equal chance of being an Individual A. Exactly who the Individual As are will not be 
revealed until the end of the experiment. In the meantime, we ask all participants to make a 
decision as if they are an Individual A.  
Please make your decision carefully, as it may be used to determine participants’ payments. 
Assume for the rest of this paragraph that you are an Individual A. Your task will be to decide 
how to divide £16 between two other participants in the experiment, one who has the same 
nationality as you, and another who has a different nationality from you. You may divide the 
money any way you like so long as the amount allocated to each person is a multiple of two. 
You may not allocate any of the money to yourself. However, you will also receive a 
payment. This payment might be £6, £8 or £10. This will be randomly decided at the end of 
the experiment by the computer, which is equally likely to select any of these amounts.  
Please now answer two questions on your screen, to ensure you understand this part of the 
experiment.  
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Task Two 
In the second part of this experiment, you will receive a description of a situation. This 
description corresponds to a situation in which one person, “Individual A,” must decide how 
to act. You will be given a description of various possible actions Individual A can choose to 
take.    
After you receive the description of the situation, you will be asked to evaluate each of the 
various possible actions Individual A can choose to take. You must indicate, for each of the 
possible actions, whether taking that action would be "socially appropriate" or "socially 
inappropriate". By socially appropriate, we mean behaviour that you think most participants 
of your nationality would agree is the "correct" thing to do. Another way to think about what 
we mean is that if Individual A were to select a socially inappropriate action, then another 
participant of your nationality might be angry at Individual A. 
In each of your responses, we would like you to answer as truthfully as possible, based on 
your opinions of what constitutes socially appropriate or socially inappropriate behaviour.   
To give you an idea of how the experiment will proceed, we will go through an example 
situation and show you how you will indicate your responses.  
 
Example Situation 
Individual A is at a local coffee shop near campus. While there, Individual A notices that 
someone has left a wallet at one of the tables. Individual A must decide what to do. Individual 
A can choose four possible actions: take the wallet, ask others nearby if the wallet belongs to 
them, leave the wallet where it is, or give the wallet to the shop manager. 
The table below presents the list of the possible actions Individual A can choose. For each of 
the actions, you would be asked to indicate whether you believe choosing that action is very 
socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially appropriate, or 
very socially appropriate. To indicate your response, you would click on the corresponding 
button. 
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If this was the situation for this study, you would consider each of the possible actions above 
and, for that action, indicate the extent to which you believe taking that action would be 
"socially appropriate" or "socially inappropriate". Recall that by socially appropriate we mean 
behaviour that most participants of your nationality agree is the "correct" thing to do. 
For example, suppose you thought that taking the wallet was very socially inappropriate, 
asking others nearby if the wallet belongs to them was somewhat socially appropriate, 
leaving the wallet where it is was somewhat socially inappropriate, and giving the wallet to 
the shop manager was very socially appropriate. Then you would indicate your responses as 
follows: 
 
If you have any questions about this example situation or about how to indicate your 
responses, please raise your hand now. 
You will next be given the description of a situation where Individual A, a participant in an 
experiment, has to choose between various possible actions. After you read the description, 
you must consider the possible actions and indicate on your computer screen how socially 
appropriate these are in a table similar to the one shown above for the example situation. 
After this, the computer will randomly select one participant of your nationality (that is, it 
will select a British participant if you are British, or a Chinese participant if you are Chinese). 
The computer will then randomly select one action Individual A can choose. Your evaluation 
of this action will be compared with that of the randomly selected participant of your 
nationality. If your evaluation is the same as theirs, you will receive £8 for this task; 
otherwise you will receive zero. 
For instance, imagine the example situation above was the actual situation and the possible 
action "Leave the wallet where it is" was selected by the computer. If your evaluation had 
been "somewhat socially inappropriate" then your task earnings would be £8 if the person 
you are matched with also evaluated the action as “somewhat socially inappropriate” and zero 
otherwise. 
 
The situation 
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The situation you are asked to evaluate is like the one you participated in in the previous task. 
Here is a summary. 
Individual A is taking part in an experiment in this lab. The room has been divided into two 
sections on the basis of nationality. On one side everyone is British; on the other side 
everyone is Chinese. The anonymity of Individual A’s decisions in the experiment is 
guaranteed. 
Individual A’s task will be to decide how to divide £16 between two other participants in the 
experiment, one who has the same nationality as Individual A, and another who has a 
different nationality from Individual A. Individual A may divide the money any way he or she 
likes so long as the amount allocated to each person is a multiple of two. Individual A may 
not allocate any of the money to his- or herself. However, Individual A will also receive a 
payment. This payment might be £6, £8 or £10. This will be randomly decided at the end of 
the experiment by the computer, which is equally likely to select any of these amounts.  
 
 
A.2. Instructions for subjects in the Nationality treatment, taking the norm-elicitation task 
first 
Instructions 
Welcome to this experiment. This is an experiment about decision-making. During the 
experiment, we request that you remain quiet and do not attempt to communicate with other 
participants. Participants not following this request may be asked to leave without receiving 
payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to 
you. For your participation, you will be paid a show-up fee of £4. You may also receive some 
additional money based on your choices and the choices of others in the tasks described 
below. 
There will be two tasks for all participants to perform. At the end of the experiment, the 
experimenter will toss a fair coin. If it lands on heads, all participants will receive payment 
for the first task only; if it lands on tails, all participants will receive payment for the second 
task only. As you will not know until the end of the experiment which task you will receive 
payment for, please make your decisions in each task carefully. You will not receive feedback 
on the outcome of any task until the end of the experiment, and your decisions in the first task 
will have no effect on the nature or outcome of the second task. You will not receive any 
instructions for or information about the second task until you have completed the first task. 
After the second task, there will also be a questionnaire. The anonymity of your responses to 
all parts of all tasks and questions is guaranteed. 
Please now answer two questions on your screen, to ensure you understand the process of the 
experiment.  
 
In this experiment, the room has been divided into two sections on the basis of nationality. On 
one side everyone is British; on the other side everyone is Chinese. The sign on your desk 
reminds you whether you are on the British or Chinese side of the room. 
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Task One 
In the first part of this experiment, you will receive a description of a situation. This 
description corresponds to a situation in which one person, “Individual A,” must decide how 
to act. You will be given a description of various possible actions Individual A can choose to 
take.    
After you receive the description of the situation, you will be asked to evaluate each of the 
various possible actions Individual A can choose to take. You must indicate, for each of the 
possible actions, whether taking that action would be "socially appropriate" or "socially 
inappropriate". By socially appropriate, we mean behaviour that you think most participants 
of your nationality would agree is the "correct" thing to do. Another way to think about what 
we mean is that if Individual A were to select a socially inappropriate action, then another 
participant of your nationality might be angry at Individual A. 
In each of your responses, we would like you to answer as truthfully as possible, based on 
your opinions of what constitutes socially appropriate or socially inappropriate behaviour.   
To give you an idea of how the experiment will proceed, we will go through an example 
situation and show you how you will indicate your responses.  
 
Example Situation 
Individual A is at a local coffee shop near campus. While there, Individual A notices that 
someone has left a wallet at one of the tables. Individual A must decide what to do. Individual 
A can choose four possible actions: take the wallet, ask others nearby if the wallet belongs to 
them, leave the wallet where it is, or give the wallet to the shop manager. 
The table below presents the list of the possible actions Individual A can choose. For each of 
the actions, you would be asked to indicate whether you believe choosing that action is very 
socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially appropriate, or 
very socially appropriate. To indicate your response, you would click on the corresponding 
button. 
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If this was the situation for this study, you would consider each of the possible actions above 
and, for that action, indicate the extent to which you believe taking that action would be 
"socially appropriate" or "socially inappropriate". Recall that by socially appropriate we mean 
behaviour that most participants of your nationality agree is the "correct" thing to do. 
For example, suppose you thought that taking the wallet was very socially inappropriate, 
asking others nearby if the wallet belongs to them was somewhat socially appropriate, 
leaving the wallet where it is was somewhat socially inappropriate, and giving the wallet to 
the shop manager was very socially appropriate. Then you would indicate your responses as 
follows: 
 
If you have any questions about this example situation or about how to indicate your 
responses, please raise your hand now. 
You will next be given the description of a situation where Individual A, a participant in an 
experiment, has to choose between various possible actions. After you read the description, 
you must consider the possible actions and indicate on your computer screen how socially 
appropriate these are in a table similar to the one shown above for the example situation. 
After this, the computer will randomly select one participant of your nationality (that is, it 
will select a British participant if you are British, or a Chinese participant if you are Chinese). 
The computer will then randomly select one action Individual A can choose. Your evaluation 
of this action will be compared with that of the randomly selected participant of your 
nationality. If your evaluation is the same as theirs, you will receive £8 for this task; 
otherwise you will receive zero. 
For instance, imagine the example situation above was the actual situation and the possible 
action "Leave the wallet where it is" was selected by the computer. If your evaluation had 
been "somewhat socially inappropriate" then your task earnings would be £8 if the person 
you are matched with also evaluated the action as “somewhat socially inappropriate” and zero 
otherwise. 
 
The situation 
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Individual A is taking part in an experiment in this lab. The room has been divided into two 
sections on the basis of nationality. On one side everyone is British; on the other side 
everyone is Chinese. The anonymity of Individual A’s decisions in the experiment is 
guaranteed. 
Individual A’s task will be to decide how to divide £16 between two other participants in the 
experiment, one who has the same nationality as Individual A, and another who has a 
different nationality from Individual A. Individual A may divide the money any way he or she 
likes so long as the amount allocated to each person is a multiple of two. Individual A may 
not allocate any of the money to his- or herself. However, Individual A will also receive a 
payment. This payment might be £6, £8 or £10. This will be randomly decided at the end of 
the experiment by the computer, which is equally likely to select any of these amounts.  
Please now answer one question on your screen, to ensure you understand this situation.  
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Task Two 
 
In this experiment, one third of you will be randomly assigned by the computer into a role 
entitled ‘Individual A’. The decisions made by Individual As during the task will determine 
the payments from the task received by the other two thirds of participants. Each of you has 
an equal chance of being an Individual A. Exactly who the Individual As are will not be 
revealed until the end of the experiment. In the meantime, we ask all participants to make a 
decision as if they are an Individual A.  
Please make your decision carefully, as it may be used to determine participants’ payments. 
Assume for the rest of this paragraph that you are an Individual A. Your task is like the one 
you evaluated in the previous task. Your task will be to decide how to divide £16 between two 
other participants in the experiment, one who has the same nationality as you, and another 
who has a different nationality from you. You may divide the money any way you like so 
long as the amount allocated to each person is a multiple of two. You may not allocate any of 
the money to yourself. However, you will also receive a payment. This payment might be £6, 
£8 or £10. This will be randomly decided at the end of the experiment by the computer, which 
is equally likely to select any of these amounts.  
You will next see one question on your screen. Please answer it to ensure you understand this 
part of the experiment.  
 
 
 
A.3. Instructions for subjects in the Artificial treatment, playing the allocator game first 
Instructions 
Welcome to this experiment. This is an experiment about decision-making. During the 
experiment, we request that you remain quiet and do not attempt to communicate with other 
participants. Participants not following this request may be asked to leave without receiving 
payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to 
you. For your participation, you will be paid a show-up fee of £4. You may also receive some 
additional money based on your choices and the choices of others in the tasks described 
below. 
There will be two tasks for all participants to perform. At the end of the experiment, the 
experimenter will toss a fair coin. If it lands on heads, all participants will receive payment 
for the first task only; if it lands on tails, all participants will receive payment for the second 
task only. As you will not know until the end of the experiment which task you will receive 
payment for, please make your decisions in each task carefully. You will not receive feedback 
on the outcome of any task until the end of the experiment, and your decisions in the first task 
will have no effect on the nature or outcome of the second task. You will not receive any 
instructions for or information about the second task until you have completed the first task. 
After the second task, there will also be a questionnaire. The anonymity of your responses to 
all parts of all tasks and questions is guaranteed. 
Please now answer two questions on your screen, to ensure you understand the process of the 
experiment.  
 
In this experiment, the room has been divided into two sections on the basis of which colour 
of ball you drew from the bag at the beginning of the experiment. On one side everyone drew 
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a green ball; on the other side everyone drew a yellow ball. The sign on your desk reminds 
you whether you are on the green or yellow side of the room. 
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Task One 
 
In this experiment, one third of you will be randomly assigned by the computer into a role 
entitled ‘Individual A’. The decisions made by Individual As during the task will determine 
the payments from the task received by the other two thirds of participants. Each of you has 
an equal chance of being an Individual A. Exactly who the Individual As are will not be 
revealed until the end of the experiment. In the meantime, we ask all participants to make a 
decision as if they are an Individual A.  
Please make your decision carefully, as it may be used to determine participants’ payments. 
Assume for the rest of this paragraph that you are an Individual A. Your task will be to decide 
how to divide £16 between two other participants in the experiment, one who drew the same 
ball colour as you, and another who drew a different ball colour from you. You may divide 
the money any way you like so long as the amount allocated to each person is a multiple of 
two. You may not allocate any of the money to yourself. However, you will also receive a 
payment. This payment might be £6, £8 or £10. This will be randomly decided at the end of 
the experiment by the computer, which is equally likely to select any of these amounts.  
Please now answer two questions on your screen, to ensure you understand this part of the 
experiment.  
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Task Two 
In the second part of this experiment, you will receive a description of a situation. This 
description corresponds to a situation in which one person, “Individual A,” must decide how 
to act. You will be given a description of various possible actions Individual A can choose to 
take.    
After you receive the description of the situation, you will be asked to evaluate each of the 
various possible actions Individual A can choose to take. You must indicate, for each of the 
possible actions, whether taking that action would be "socially appropriate" or "socially 
inappropriate". By socially appropriate, we mean behaviour that you think most participants 
who drew your ball colour would agree is the "correct" thing to do. Another way to think 
about what we mean is that if Individual A were to select a socially inappropriate action, then 
another participant who drew your ball colour might be angry at Individual A. 
In each of your responses, we would like you to answer as truthfully as possible, based on 
your opinions of what constitutes socially appropriate or socially inappropriate behaviour.   
To give you an idea of how the experiment will proceed, we will go through an example 
situation and show you how you will indicate your responses.  
 
 
Example Situation 
Individual A is at a local coffee shop near campus. While there, Individual A notices that 
someone has left a wallet at one of the tables. Individual A must decide what to do. Individual 
A can choose four possible actions: take the wallet, ask others nearby if the wallet belongs to 
them, leave the wallet where it is, or give the wallet to the shop manager. 
The table below presents the list of the possible actions Individual A can choose. For each of 
the actions, you would be asked to indicate whether you believe choosing that action is very 
socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially appropriate, or 
very socially appropriate. To indicate your response, you would click on the corresponding 
button. 
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If this was the situation for this study, you would consider each of the possible actions above 
and, for that action, indicate the extent to which you believe taking that action would be 
"socially appropriate" or "socially inappropriate". Recall that by socially appropriate we mean 
behaviour that most participants who drew your ball colour agree is the "correct" thing to do. 
For example, suppose you thought that taking the wallet was very socially inappropriate, 
asking others nearby if the wallet belongs to them was somewhat socially appropriate, 
leaving the wallet where it is was somewhat socially inappropriate, and giving the wallet to 
the shop manager was very socially appropriate. Then you would indicate your responses as 
follows: 
 
If you have any questions about this example situation or about how to indicate your 
responses, please raise your hand now. 
You will next be given the description of a situation where Individual A, a participant in an 
experiment, has to choose between various possible actions. After you read the description, 
you must consider the possible actions and indicate on your computer screen how socially 
appropriate these are in a table similar to the one shown above for the example situation. 
After this, the computer will randomly select one participant who drew a ball of the same 
colour as you (that is, it will select a participant who drew a green ball if you drew a green 
ball, or a participant who drew a yellow ball if you drew a yellow ball). The computer will 
then randomly select one action Individual A can choose. Your evaluation of this action will 
be compared with that of the randomly selected participant who drew a ball of the same 
colour as you. If your evaluation is the same as theirs, you will receive £8 for this task; 
otherwise you will receive zero. 
For instance, imagine the example situation above was the actual situation and the possible 
action "Leave the wallet where it is" was selected by the computer. If your evaluation had 
been "somewhat socially inappropriate" then your task earnings would be £8 if the person 
you are matched with also evaluated the action as “somewhat socially inappropriate” and zero 
otherwise. 
  
The situation 
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The situation you are asked to evaluate is like the one you participated in in the previous task. 
Here is a summary. 
Individual A is taking part in an experiment in this lab. The room has been divided into two 
sections on the basis of which colour of ball participants drew from a bag at the beginning of 
the experiment. On one side everyone drew a green ball; on the other side everyone drew a 
yellow ball. The anonymity of Individual A’s decisions in the experiment is guaranteed. 
Individual A’s task will be to decide how to divide £16 between two other participants in the 
experiment, one who drew the same ball colour as Individual A, and another who drew a 
different ball colour from Individual A. Individual A may divide the money any way he or she 
likes so long as the amount allocated to each person is a multiple of two. Individual A may 
not allocate any of the money to his- or herself. However, Individual A will also receive a 
payment. This payment might be £6, £8 or £10. This will be randomly decided at the end of 
the experiment by the computer, which is equally likely to select any of these amounts.  
 
 
A.4. Instructions for subjects in Artificial treatment, taking norm-elicitation task first 
Instructions 
Welcome to this experiment. This is an experiment about decision-making. During the 
experiment, we request that you remain quiet and do not attempt to communicate with other 
participants. Participants not following this request may be asked to leave without receiving 
payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to 
you. For your participation, you will be paid a show-up fee of £4. You may also receive some 
additional money based on your choices and the choices of others in the tasks described 
below. 
There will be two tasks for all participants to perform. At the end of the experiment, the 
experimenter will toss a fair coin. If it lands on heads, all participants will receive payment 
for the first task only; if it lands on tails, all participants will receive payment for the second 
task only. As you will not know until the end of the experiment which task you will receive 
payment for, please make your decisions in each task carefully. You will not receive feedback 
on the outcome of any task until the end of the experiment, and your decisions in the first task 
will have no effect on the nature or outcome of the second task. You will not receive any 
instructions for or information about the second task until you have completed the first task. 
After the second task, there will also be a questionnaire. The anonymity of your responses to 
all parts of all tasks and questions is guaranteed. 
Please now answer two questions on your screen, to ensure you understand the process of the 
experiment.  
 
In this experiment, the room has been divided into two sections on the basis of which colour 
of ball you drew from the bag at the beginning of the experiment. On one side everyone drew 
a green ball; on the other side everyone drew a yellow ball. The sign on your desk reminds 
you whether you are on the green or yellow side of the room. 
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Task One 
In the first part of this experiment, you will receive a description of a situation. This 
description corresponds to a situation in which one person, “Individual A,” must decide how 
to act. You will be given a description of various possible actions Individual A can choose to 
take.    
After you receive the description of the situation, you will be asked to evaluate each of the 
various possible actions Individual A can choose to take. You must indicate, for each of the 
possible actions, whether taking that action would be "socially appropriate" or "socially 
inappropriate". By socially appropriate, we mean behaviour that you think most participants 
who drew your ball colour would agree is the "correct" thing to do. Another way to think 
about what we mean is that if Individual A were to select a socially inappropriate action, then 
another participant who drew your ball colour might be angry at Individual A. 
In each of your responses, we would like you to answer as truthfully as possible, based on 
your opinions of what constitutes socially appropriate or socially inappropriate behaviour.   
To give you an idea of how the experiment will proceed, we will go through an example 
situation and show you how you will indicate your responses.  
 
 
Example Situation 
Individual A is at a local coffee shop near campus. While there, Individual A notices that 
someone has left a wallet at one of the tables. Individual A must decide what to do. Individual 
A can choose four possible actions: take the wallet, ask others nearby if the wallet belongs to 
them, leave the wallet where it is, or give the wallet to the shop manager. 
The table below presents the list of the possible actions Individual A can choose. For each of 
the actions, you would be asked to indicate whether you believe choosing that action is very 
socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially appropriate, or 
very socially appropriate. To indicate your response, you would click on the corresponding 
button. 
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If this was the situation for this study, you would consider each of the possible actions above 
and, for that action, indicate the extent to which you believe taking that action would be 
"socially appropriate" or "socially inappropriate". Recall that by socially appropriate we mean 
behaviour that most participants who drew your ball colour agree is the "correct" thing to do. 
For example, suppose you thought that taking the wallet was very socially inappropriate, 
asking others nearby if the wallet belongs to them was somewhat socially appropriate, 
leaving the wallet where it is was somewhat socially inappropriate, and giving the wallet to 
the shop manager was very socially appropriate. Then you would indicate your responses as 
follows: 
 
If you have any questions about this example situation or about how to indicate your 
responses, please raise your hand now. 
You will next be given the description of a situation where Individual A, a participant in an 
experiment, has to choose between various possible actions. After you read the description, 
you must consider the possible actions and indicate on your computer screen how socially 
appropriate these are in a table similar to the one shown above for the example situation. 
After this, the computer will randomly select one participant who drew a ball of the same 
colour as you (that is, it will select a participant who drew a green ball if you drew a green 
ball, or a participant who drew a yellow ball if you drew a yellow ball). The computer will 
then randomly select one action Individual A can choose. Your evaluation of this action will 
be compared with that of the randomly selected participant who drew a ball of the same 
colour as you. If your evaluation is the same as theirs, you will receive £8 for this task; 
otherwise you will receive zero. 
For instance, imagine the example situation above was the actual situation and the possible 
action "Leave the wallet where it is" was selected by the computer. If your evaluation had 
been "somewhat socially inappropriate" then your task earnings would be £8 if the person 
you are matched with also evaluated the action as “somewhat socially inappropriate” and zero 
otherwise. 
  
The situation 
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Individual A is taking part in an experiment in this lab. The room has been divided into two 
sections on the basis of which colour of ball participants drew from a bag at the beginning of 
the experiment. On one side everyone drew a green ball; on the other side everyone drew a 
yellow ball. The anonymity of Individual A’s decisions in the experiment is guaranteed. 
Individual A’s task will be to decide how to divide £16 between two other participants in the 
experiment, one who drew the same ball colour as Individual A, and another who drew a 
different ball colour from Individual A. Individual A may divide the money any way he or she 
likes so long as the amount allocated to each person is a multiple of two. Individual A may 
not allocate any of the money to his- or herself. However, Individual A will also receive a 
payment. This payment might be £6, £8 or £10. This will be randomly decided at the end of 
the experiment by the computer, which is equally likely to select any of these amounts.  
Please now answer one question on your screen, to ensure you understand this situation.  
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Task Two 
 
In this experiment, one third of you will be randomly assigned by the computer into a role 
entitled ‘Individual A’. The decisions made by Individual As during the task will determine 
the payments from the task received by the other two thirds of participants. Each of you has 
an equal chance of being an Individual A. Exactly who the Individual As are will not be 
revealed until the end of the experiment. In the meantime, we ask all participants to make a 
decision as if they are an Individual A.  
Please make your decision carefully, as it may be used to determine participants’ payments. 
Assume for the rest of this paragraph that you are an Individual A. Your task is like the one 
you evaluated in the previous task. Your task will be to decide how to divide £16 between two 
other participants in the experiment, one who drew the same ball colour as you, and another 
who drew a different ball colour from you. You may divide the money any way you like so 
long as the amount allocated to each person is a multiple of two. You may not allocate any of 
the money to yourself. However, you will also receive a payment. This payment might be £6, 
£8 or £10. This will be randomly decided at the end of the experiment by the computer, which 
is equally likely to select any of these amounts.  
You will next see one question on your screen. Please answer it to ensure you understand this 
part of the experiment.  
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B: Photo of sign on desks in computer lab 
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C: Analysis of the significance of ordering effects 
In each of the Nationality and Artificial treatment we conducted three sessions (72 
participants) wherein subjects first played the allocator game and then the Krupka-
Weber norm elicitation task, and two sessions (48 participants) where the order of 
tasks was reversed. We test whether the order in which the tasks are played affects 
either discrimination behaviour or the perceived appropriateness of discrimination.  
Regarding the impact of task order on discrimination behaviour, randomisation tests 
find the average level of observed discrimination does not significantly differ 
between participants who play the allocation game first and those who have already 
undergone the norm elicitation task, in either the Nationality treatment (p = 0.77) or 
the Artificial treatment (p = 0.23). Regarding the impact of task order on the 
perceptions of the appropriateness of discrimination, none of the evaluations are 
subject to significant ordering effects in either the Nationality treatment (all p-values 
> 0.229) or Artificial treatment (all p-values > 0.309). As in the main text, p-values 
are corrected using the Benjamini-Hochberg false discovery rate procedure to account 
for the fact that we are conducting multiple tests.  
  
123 
 
D: Individual patterns of behaviour 
We divide participants into five categories, on the basis of their responses to the 
norm-elicitation task. Most individuals’ ratings monotonically increase in 
appropriateness as allocations move away from the in-group favouring (16,0) towards 
more equal allocations, until a peak is reached (usually the 8,8 split) after which the 
individual’s ratings monotonically decrease in appropriateness. This means that the 
individual believes the most appropriate possible action is not extreme discrimination. 
We subdivide these participants into three types. UNBIASED types perceive 
discrimination against the in-group member to be of equal appropriateness to 
discrimination against the out-group member. IG-BIASED types perceive 
discrimination against the in-group member to be of lesser appropriateness. OG-
BIASED types perceive discrimination against the out-group member to be of lesser 
appropriateness. This categorisation is done by comparing the sum of the ratings the 
individual assigns to in-group-favouring allocations against the sum of the ratings 
they assign to out-group-favouring allocations.  
Some participants, however, assign their highest rating to the (16,0) allocation and 
then monotonically decrease the appropriateness of their ratings as more money is 
given to the out-group member. Such participants are perceiving extreme 
discrimination against the out-group member to be the social norm. We label them 
PRO-DISCRIMINATORS. The few participants whose ratings do not follow any of 
the above patterns are categorised as OTHER. 
Figure D1 displays the percentage of participants in each treatment who followed 
each pattern as well as their average levels of discrimination.  
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Figure D1 
 
Notes: Figure D1 shows the percentage of participants in each treatment whose 
evaluations follow each pattern. Above each bar, D=the average level of 
discrimination against out-group members by participants of the given type in the 
given treatment – e.g. for UNBIASED participants in the Nationality treatment, 
D=1.22 indicates these participants discriminated by an average of £1.22. 
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E: Cross-national differences  
We conclude with an analysis of cross-national differences in the perceptions of 
appropriateness of discrimination as well as in discriminatory behaviour. Figure E1 
compares, across nationalities, the mean evaluations of social appropriateness in each 
treatment, while Tables E2a and E2b provide a full breakdown of responses, with 
tests of significance. In both the Artificial and the Nationality treatment, Chinese 
participants perceive discrimination to be more socially appropriate than British 
participants. The general pattern of norms and most of the modal evaluations for a 
given allocation is the same for the two nationalities. However, in both treatments all 
in-group-favouring allocations are given significantly higher appropriateness ratings 
by the Chinese. Out-group-favouring allocations are also perceived to be more 
socially appropriate by the Chinese, but the difference is only significant for the 
(6,10) split in Nationality. Finally, in both treatments, the equal split is given a lower 
appropriateness rating by the Chinese, although the difference is significant only in 
the Artificial treatment (p=0.028). 
As the Chinese give relatively favourable evaluations to allocations favouring either 
the in-group member or the out-group member, one might question whether what we 
find is actually national differences in the social appropriateness of inequality rather 
than of discrimination. However, note that the national differences in evaluations are 
greater for in-group-favouring allocations than out-group-favouring ones. If the 
national differences existed only for the social appropriateness of inequality, they 
would be reflected in symmetrical national differences in the evaluation of in-group 
and out-group favouring allocations.  
In Table E3 we confirm this asymmetry is significant. We subtract the rating each 
individual assigns to an allocation discriminating by a given amount in favour of the 
out-group member from the rating they assign to the allocation which discriminates 
by the same amount in favour of the in-group member. This provides a measure of the 
relative appropriateness an individual ascribes to discriminating in favour of their 
own group member rather than the other group member. We run randomisation tests 
on these relative ratings for each level of discrimination, and find that in each case 
there are significant national differences in the means. This indicates that, in both 
treatments, the relative appropriateness of discriminating in favour of one’s own 
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group member rather than the other group member is perceived to be significantly 
higher by the Chinese than by the British. 
Figure E1: Social appropriateness of allocations in the Nationality treatment 
(left) and Artificial treatment (right) 
 
Notes: Figure E1 shows the mean ratings participants of each nationality ascribe to 
each allocation, in the Nationality treatment (left) and the Artificial treatment (right). 
Mean ratings are constructed by assigning values of 1, 0.33, -0.33 and -1 for the 
ratings ‘very appropriate’, ‘somewhat appropriate’, ‘somewhat inappropriate’ and 
‘very inappropriate’ respectively, and averaging the values for all participants in a 
given treatment. Allocations are denoted by the amount given to the in-group member 
on the left, and the amount given to the out-group member on the right – e.g. (16,0) 
denotes allocating £16 to the in-group member and £0 to the out-group member. 
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Table E2a: Social appropriateness ratings of British and Chinese in Nationality 
treatment 
Allocation 16,0 14,2 12,4 10,6 8,8 6,10 4,12 2,14 0,16 
British participants 
v.appropriate 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 96.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
s.appropriate 0.0 0.0 3.3 33.3 1.7 26.7 3.3 1.7 1.7 
s.inappropriate 1.7 15.0 41.7 38.3 1.7 41.7 36.7 10.0 1.7 
v.inappropriate 98.3 85.0 55.0 26.7 0.0 31.7 60.0 88.3 96.7 
Mean rating -0.99 -0.90 -0.68 -0.27 0.97 -0.37 -0.71 -0.91 -0.97 
Chinese participants 
v.appropriate 3.3 5.0 5.0 8.3 93.3 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
s.appropriate 6.7 11.7 16.7 70.0 5.0 43.3 5.0 1.7 1.7 
s.inappropriate 3.3 25.0 53.3 18.3 1.7 45.0 51.7 20.0 1.7 
v.inappropriate 86.7 58.3 25.0 3.3 0.0 10.0 43.3 78.3 96.7 
Mean rating -0.82 -0.58 -0.32 0.22 0.95 -0.09 -0.59 -0.85 -0.97 
 
p-value 
(Benjamini-
Hochberg) 
0.026 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.883 0.008 0.167 0.364 1.000 
Table E2b: Social appropriateness ratings of British and Chinese in Artificial treatment 
Allocation 16,0 14,2 12,4 10,6 8,8 6,10 4,12 2,14 0,16 
British participants 
v.appropriate 7.6 6.1 6.1 3.0 92.4 0.0 0.0 1.5 3.0 
s.appropriate 0.0 1.5 3.0 53.0 4.6 40.9 6.1 1.5 0.0 
s.inappropriate 0.0 12.1 50.0 31.8 1.5 42.2 43.9 12.1 0.0 
v.inappropriate 92.4 80.3 40.9 12.1 1.5 16.7 50.0 84.9 97.0 
Mean rating -0.85 -0.78 -0.51 -0.02 0.92 -0.17 -0.63 -0.87 -0.94 
Chinese participants 
v.appropriate 20.0 10.0 4.0 16.0 72.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 
s.appropriate 12.0 20.0 36.0 78.0 18.0 52.0 6.0 2.0 0.0 
s.inappropriate 0.0 24.0 48.0 4.0 6.0 36.0 50.0 18.0 0.0 
v.inappropriate 68.0 46.0 12.0 2.0 4.0 10.0 42.0 78.0 96.0 
Mean rating -0.44 -0.37 -0.12 0.39 0.72 -0.03 -0.55 -0.81 -0.92 
 
P-value 
(Benjamini-
Hochberg) 
0.006 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.177 0.492 0.571 1.000 
Notes: Tables E2a and E2b presents the breakdown, by percentage, of social appropriateness 
ratings assigned to each allocation by participants of each nationality, in the Nationality 
treatment (top) and Artificial treatment (bottom). Allocations (e.g. 16,0) are denoted by the 
amount given to the in-group member on the left (£16), and the amount given to the out-
group member on the right (£0). Shaded cells represent the modal ratings for each allocation 
in each treatment. Mean ratings are taken by assigning values of 1, 0.33, -0.33 and -1 for the 
ratings ‘very appropriate’, ‘somewhat appropriate’, ‘somewhat inappropriate’ and ‘very 
inappropriate’ respectively, and averaging the values for all participants in a given 
treatment. Benjamini-Hochberg-corrected p-values are reported from randomisation tests on 
the null hypothesis that the mean ratings on a given allocation are statistically 
indistinguishable by nationality. 
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Table E3: Appropriateness bias towards in-group favouritism over out-group 
favouritism 
Level of discrimination £16 £12 £8 £4 
Nationality treatment 
British -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.10 
Chinese 0.15 0.27 0.27 0.31 
p-Value (Bonferroni) 0.020 0.004 0.021 0.022 
Artificial treatment 
British 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.19 
Chinese 0.48 0.44 0.43 0.42 
p-Value (Bonferroni) 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.005 
Notes: Table E3 shows the extent to which, on average, participants of each nationality 
perceive discrimination by a given amount to be more appropriate when the beneficiary is the 
in-group member, in the Nationality treatment (top) and the Artificial treatment (bottom). 
The measure is constructed by subtracting each individual’s rating of an out-group-favouring 
allocation from their rating of the equivalent in-group-favouring allocation. Benjamini-
Hochberg-corrected p-values are reported from randomisation tests on the null hypothesis 
that the relative perceived appropriateness of discriminating in favour of an in-group 
member rather than an out-group member does not differ between nationalities. 
 
Finally, in Table E4 we look at whether the national differences in the perceived 
social appropriateness of discrimination are reflected in more discriminatory choices 
actually being made by the Chinese. In the Nationality treatment, the answer is no. 
The distribution of allocations made by each nationality in this treatment is almost 
identical. The mean difference between allocation to the in-group and out-group is 
£1.27 by the British and £1.40 by the Chinese, amounts which are statistically 
indistinguishable. However, in the Artificial treatment, the Chinese are more 
discriminatory; 81.8% of British participants distribute the money equally compared 
to only 52% of the Chinese, and the mean differences in allocations are significantly 
different (p=0.007), at £1.88 and £4.72 for the British and Chinese participants 
respectively.  An OLS regression (Table E5) indicates that this finding is robust to the 
inclusion of various controls.  
Table E4: Discrimination in the allocator game – national comparisons 
Allocation (16,0) (14,2) (12,4) (10,6) (8,8) (6,10) (4,12) (2,14) (0,16) 
 Nationality treatment 
British 3.3 1.7 1.7 10.0 83.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Chinese 5.0 1.7 0.0 10.0 83.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Artificial treatment 
British 9.1 0.0 1.5 7.6 81.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Chinese 18.0 6.0 4.0 20.0 52.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Notes: Table E4 shows the percentage of participants of each nationality who choose each 
allocation, in the Nationality treatment (top) and the Artificial treatment (bottom). 
Allocations are denoted by the amount given to the in-group member on the left, and the 
amount given to the out-group member on the right – e.g. (16,0) denotes allocating £16 to the 
in-group member and £0 to the out-group member. 
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Chapter Four: Nudging the electorate:  
what works and why?56 
Abstract 
We report results from two studies designed to test the effectiveness of different 
interventions to raise voter registration rates, and to probe the mechanisms underlying 
observed behavior change. In the first study, in a natural field experiment ahead of the 
2015 UK General Election, we varied the content of a postcard sent by Oxford City 
Council to 7,679 unregistered student voters encouraging them to register onto the 
electoral roll. We find that relative to a baseline condition, emphasising negative 
monetary incentives (i.e. the possibility of being fined) significantly increases 
registration rates, while positive monetary incentives (being entered into a lottery if 
you register) may have some tendency to reduce registration rates.  A third class of 
purely non-monetary nudges have no overall effect on registration rates. In the second 
study, we show that these differences can be explained, at least in part, by social 
norms. 
 
JEL classifications: D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, 
Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D03: Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying 
Principles; C93: Field Experiments; H83: Public Administration. 
Keywords: Voter Registration; Voting; Field Experiment; Nudging; Social Norms; 
Fines; Rewards. 
 
                                                          
56 This chapter was co-authored with Felix Kölle, Daniele Nosenzo and Chris Starmer 
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1. Introduction  
Behavioural science is increasingly being used to advance low-cost interventions 
across a growing spectrum of public policy areas. The associated body of research is 
being built by – and is of interest to – both academics (e.g. Chetty, 2015; Hallsworth 
et al., 2014) and applied policy units (e.g. Behavioural Insights Team, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2016). Interventions often take the form of ‘nudges’ – manipulations of the 
‘choice architecture’ which aim to systematically change people’s behaviour at low 
cost for the policymaker.57 This paper explores aspects of the mechanics of nudging 
by using a combination of field and online experiments. Our natural field experiment 
explores the extent to which a particular decision can be influenced by different types 
of nudge; with our online experiment we investigate the underlying mechanisms that 
lead to the success or failure of different nudges.  
We do this in the context of a particular policy area: voter registration. In many 
countries – including the United Kingdom, where our study is conducted – any citizen 
wishing to vote must first register on the electoral roll. Registration in the UK is 
technically mandatory, with non-registration punishable with an £80 fine, although in 
the past two decades a substantial gap has emerged between the numbers of eligible 
and registered voters (Bite the Ballot, 2016), one which was further increased by the 
implementation of a legislative change in 2014: previously all members of a 
household could be registered collectively, but the law now requires each person to 
register individually (Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013). Besides 
any intrinsic benefits of wide democratic participation, high registration rates serve 
the government’s interest insofar as the electoral roll has secondary uses such as 
fraud-detection and jury recruitment. Given its very low cost nature, nudging – if it 
can be shown to be effective – would be an attractive strategy for such organisations 
to employ in pursuit of this goal. Our study therefore explores interventions that can 
                                                          
57 We are using the label ‘nudge’ to describe any type of low-cost intervention that is designed with 
the objective of changing individuals’ behaviour. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) refer to ‘nudges’ to 
describe interventions that leave unaffected the underlying economic incentives: some of the 
manipulations that we use in our experiment have this property, whereas others induce small 
changes in the underlying incentives and so, strictly speaking, would not qualify as nudges 
according to the Thaler and Sunstein’s definition. 
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be applied, at minimal financial expense, to nudge citizens to register to vote in 
elections. 
In the first part of this paper, we report the results of a natural field experiment run 
ahead of the 2015 UK General Election in partnership with one such interested party, 
Oxford City Council, who sent postcards to students living in university 
accommodation, encouraging them to register. Councils have a particular interest in 
discovering successful ways of targeting such students, as they represent a segment of 
society whose registration rates have been particularly affected by the recent legal 
change – previously universities could register en masse all accommodated students, 
but students are now required to register themselves individually. While all the 
postcards urged recipients not to miss their chance to vote, we systematically varied 
the precise content of their messages in order to test the effects of different nudges on 
registration rates. 
We investigated two broad types of nudges, relying on monetary incentives in the 
form of either a small gain or a small loss. There is a large and diverse literature in 
economics showing that interventions based on negative incentives, such as the threat 
of monetary loss, may produce stronger responses than those relying on positive 
incentives, such as the promise of monetary gains, even when the interventions 
involve identical financial incentives and the only difference is in the way these 
incentives are described to the individual (for reviews of these literatures, see, e.g., 
Balliet et al., 2011; van Lange et al., 2014; Nosenzo, 2016). In the context of policy 
interventions aimed at reinforcing civic duties, as in the case of voter registration, 
positive and negative incentives may produce different behaviours because of the way 
they interact with the very notion of 'civic duty': while negative incentives may 
reinforce the perception that registering to vote is what one ought to do, positive 
incentives may have the opposite effect. In the second part of our paper, we 
investigate this hypothesis by examining the effects that positive and negative 
incentives have on the perception that registering to vote is a normative obligation. 
We also investigated another class of nudges, which do not involve financial 
incentives but rely on purely psychological mechanisms to affect behaviour. We refer 
to these as our non-monetary nudges. Non-monetary nudges are sometimes regarded 
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as preferable to monetary ones, especially in areas of public policy, such as voter 
registration programs, where intrinsic motivations may play an important role in 
producing the desired behaviour: the concern here is that the use of extrinsic 
(monetary) incentives may crowd-out these intrinsic motivations (see, e.g., Gneezy et 
al., 2011; Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012). Another advantage of non-monetary 
interventions, compared to monetary ones, is that the former typically involve smaller 
financial costs than the latter.  
In our field experiment, we implement these nudges across six treatments. In a 
baseline treatment, the postcard that was sent to unregistered student voters simply 
encouraged them to register, without any additional message. We investigate the 
effectiveness of monetary losses in a second treatment by adding a message 
highlighting the existence of the potential £80 fine for those who fail to register. 
Emphasising the possibility of encountering financially costly legal action has 
previously been found to exert a substantial positive effect in other domains of policy 
intervention, such as the enforcement of TV license registration (Fellner et al., 2013), 
credit card debt repayment (Bursztyn et al., 2015), or traffic violations (Lu et al., 
2016).58 Kleven et al. (2011) similarly found that the threat of audits raised tax 
returns, although mixed evidence was found in this domain by Blumenthal et al. 
(2001) and Slemrod et al. (2001).59  
To test the effectiveness of monetary gains, we designed two further treatments where 
students were offered entry into a lottery to win small cash prizes (of the value of 
£80) for those who registered early. Financial inducements have previously been 
found to raise voter registration (John et al., 2015) and voter turnout (Panagopoulos, 
2013), although in the latter case only when the inducements were sufficiently large. 
Moreover, in John et al. (2015) the lottery involved large financial incentives 
(between £1000 and £5000) and produced only a small positive effect (an increase of 
two percentage points in registration rates). 
                                                          
58 However, Lu et al. (2016) found that messages were effective only when they contained 
personalised information about own past traffic violations, and not when they communicated the 
mere existence of fines. 
59 See Hallsworth (2014) for a recent review of field experiments on tax compliance interventions.  
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Finally, we investigate the effectiveness of non-monetary nudges in two treatments 
where we included in the postcard messages that invoked purely psychological 
mechanisms. Specifically, we attempted to harness the so called ‘foot-in-the-door’ 
mechanism. First identified by Freedman and Fraser (1966), this is a psychological 
effect – which has been replicated across a wide array of circumstances (see e.g. 
Burger, 1999) – wherein people are more likely to comply with a large request, 
oriented towards a particular goal, after they have first complied with a small request. 
In our case, the small requests took the form of asking students to provide their phone 
number (so that they could be sent a reminder to register); or simply to report by text 
whether they intended to register.  
Our results show that emphasising the possibility of being fined yielded a large 
positive effect, with subjects exposed to this intervention being around 1.7 times more 
likely to register than those exposed to the baseline intervention. In contrast, the 
prospect of financial gain had no overall effect on registration – and once the deadline 
for entry into the lottery had passed, subjects exposed to this intervention were 
significantly less likely to register than those in the baseline condition. Meanwhile, 
the non-monetary interventions had no discernible effect. 
In the second part of the study reported in this paper, we investigated a possible 
mechanism underlying the effectiveness of the negative monetary incentives and the 
ineffectiveness of positive incentives: their contrasting effects on the perception of 
what constitutes socially appropriate behaviour in the context of voter registration. A 
growing body of recent economic research (e.g., Burks and Krupka, 2012; Gächter et 
al., 2013; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Banerjee, 2016; Barr et al., 2016; Krupka et al., 
2016) suggests that social norms and norm-compliance drive behaviour in a wide 
range of contexts. We hypothesised that the fine and lottery treatments may have 
divergent effects on the perceptions of normative appropriateness of registering to 
vote: emphasising that failing to register is punishable by law may strengthen the 
perception that one ought to register, while offering monetary inducements for 
registering may weaken the perception that doing so is an action already expected 
within society. 
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Our results support these hypotheses. Using the incentivised norm-elicitation method 
introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013), we found that exposing individuals to the 
fine nudge strengthened their perception that failing to register to vote was socially 
inappropriate behaviour, while exposing them to the lottery nudge weakened the 
perception that registering to vote was socially appropriate behaviour. Consequently, 
we propose that strengthening/weakening the social norm relating to registration had 
a direct effect on respondents’ likelihood of registering, and that this partly explains 
why the fine intervention was successful while the lottery intervention was not. 
Indeed, a possible interpretation of our results is that– just as in some previous 
research (e.g. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Ariely et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 
2011; Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012) – the introduction of monetary incentives 
crowded out individuals’ intrinsic motivation to engage in socially constructive 
behaviour (especially once the deadline for the lottery had passed), and the adverse 
effect of the lottery intervention on the perceived social norm of registering may be 
partly behind this effect. 
Our study contributes to the literature regarding behavioural insights and nudging in 
public policy. We identify a low-cost strategy – emphasising the possibility of a fine 
for not registering – that governments can use to substantially increase registrations. 
However, we also identify cases where nudges can fail to work or perhaps even 
backfire. We show offering monetary rewards for registering can have neutral or 
adverse effects, while attempting purely psychological interventions may not yield 
any desired positive effects. One advantage of our study is that our investigation into 
the relative effectiveness of non-monetary and monetary nudges (and, within the 
latter, of positive and negative incentives) is done within a unified experimental 
design and in the context of a large-scale field intervention (N = 7,679).  
Moreover, another distinctive feature of our paper is that our focus is not only on 
identifying which intervention is most effective to encourage voter registration, but 
also on understanding the underlying behavioural and psychological mechanisms that 
make specific interventions more successful than others. In particular, we believe that 
we are the first to show that policy interventions that rely on positive incentives may 
weaken, whereas those relying on negative incentives strengthen, the perceptions of 
normative appropriateness of the target behaviour. These differences in normative 
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perceptions may explain the relative success of the positive and negative monetary 
interventions that we found in our field experiment. In this sense, our paper also adds 
to the recent economic literature on the importance of social norms for understanding 
human social behaviour (Krupka and Weber, 2013; Gächter et al., 2013; Kimbrough 
and Vostroknutov, 2016). 
2. Study I: Field experiment on voter registration 
 
2.1 Experimental design  
Our field experiment was designed to test the effectiveness of six different low cost, 
nudge-style, interventions for raising voter registration rates ahead of the 2015 UK 
General Election. These six interventions fall into three broad categories: negative 
monetary nudges; positive monetary nudges; and non-monetary nudges.  All of these 
interventions were implemented via adjustments to a message sent in a bulk, 
randomised, mail out (details below) to students living in the UK City of Oxford.  
We implemented one negative monetary intervention invoking the threat of a 
monetary loss for failing to register. We did this by highlighting to subjects the 
truthful fact that they could be fined £80 if they did not register. This penalty is 
specified in UK law, and it is referred to in standard materials that Oxford City 
Council (OCC) use to promote voter registration. Despite the power existing in law, 
however, it is rarely used by councils and it is unclear how aware a typical 
unregistered voter would be of the possibility of being fined for failure to register.  
We implemented two interventions involving the prospect of monetary gain for 
registering. We did this with two treatments offering entry into a lottery to win cash 
prizes of the value of £80 for those who registered by a specific deadline. The two 
treatments differed only in that one attempted also to harness regret aversion (Loomes 
and Sugden, 1982), by telling recipients that those who did not register would still be 
entered into the lottery and informed if they won, but would be unable to claim their 
prize. Regret aversion has previously been shown to affect entry decisions into 
lotteries (Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2004; Gneezy, 2014; Imas et al., 2016). 
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We also implemented two interventions involving non-monetary mechanisms.60, 61 
These were motivated by the so called foot-in-the-door effect (Freedman and Fraser, 
1966). More specifically, we tested whether message recipients were more likely to 
register (i.e., comply with a large request) if they had first complied with a small 
request related to voter registration: in both variants, subjects were asked to send a 
one-word text message to OCC; in one case subjects were asked to text the word 
‘myvote’ to indicate that they planned to register; in the other, subjects could text the 
word ‘reminder’ to register to receive a free reminder text to prompt them to register 
nearer the deadline for voters to register in the 2015 UK General Election.62 Foot-in-
the-door mechanisms have previously been tested in the context of voter turnout, with 
mixed results: asking subjects if they intended to vote was found to have a large, 
positive impact on turnout by Greenwald et al. (1987, 1988), but not by Smith et al. 
(2003).  
Our nudges were transmitted via postcards, which OCC mailed to all unregistered 
voters living in student accommodation belonging to the University of Oxford and 
Oxford Brookes University on March 9-10 2015, ahead of the April 20 deadline for 
                                                          
60 There are a number of non-monetary interventions that have been shown to positively affect voter 
turnout, e.g. personalised get-out-the-vote contact (e.g. Gerber and Green, 2000; Ramirez, 2005),  
priming one’s identity as a voter (Bryan et al., 2011), or applying social pressure on people to vote 
(e.g. Gerber et al., 2008, 2010; Davenport, 2010; Panagopoulos, 2010). See Rogers et al. (2013) for 
a recent review of this literature. While one might expect that what works for voter turnout should 
also work for voter registration, ultimately this is an empirical question. Nevertheless, the fact that 
voter turnout appears quite susceptible to psychological processes provides a strong motive for 
exploring non-monetary nudges as a policy tool regarding registration. 
61 We also considered designing a ‘peer pressure’ treatment, where we would inform students of the 
past registration rates of their peers in order to induce them to register. However, at the time we 
designed the experiment, the registration rate of students was very low (about 8-9%) and we 
thought that informing subjects of such low rates may actually have the opposite effect of 
discouraging registrations.  
62 Our primary interest in relation to this treatment was in assessing whether the act of registering for 
an automated text reminder (which was designed to be very quick and easy) would act as a foot in 
the door, enhancing the propensity to subsequently register to vote. We were not especially 
interested in the later effect that a subsequent automated reminder might have (we do not have 
controlled comparisons for benchmarking any such effect). Of course all of our treatments can be 
considered as sending slightly different forms of reminder and, more broadly, reminders have 
been shown to be effective nudges in relation to voter registration (Bennion and Nickerson, 2011), 
as well as in other contexts (e.g. Altmann and Traxler, 2014) 
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voters to register in the General Election. We collaborated with the Council to 
engineer the content of these postcards. While all postcards encouraged their 
recipients to register, the content of the messages they contained varied, allowing us 
to test the effects of different nudges on registration rates. 
All postcards were double sided (see Figure 1 for a copy of the postcard used in our 
baseline condition and Appendix A for copies of the other postcards). The back 
simply contained the message, ‘IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR 
RIGHT TO VOTE, OVERLEAF.’ The front featured the heading, ‘DON’T MISS 
YOUR CHANCE TO VOTE! According to our records you have not yet registered to 
vote. It’s easy to register online. To go to the registration page simply use one of the 
links below.’ The bottom of this side contained the address of the government web 
page for registering to vote, and a QR code which would take recipients to the same 
page. These features were held constant across treatments. The postcards differed by 
treatment only according to the text included in a box below the heading on the front 
side. 
Figure 1: Postcard used in the Baseline treatment 
 
2.2 Treatments 
In the Baseline treatment, the box was left blank (Figure 1). This treatment therefore 
serves as a basis for comparison against the other treatments. 
139 
 
In the Monetary Loss treatment, the box contained the message: ‘If you don’t 
register you could be fined £80.’.  
In treatment Monetary Gain 1, the box contained the message: ‘If you register by 27 
March 2015 you will be entered into a lottery to receive one of ten £80 prizes. 
Winning students will be notified in June 2015.’. In treatment Monetary Gain 2, the 
box contained the message: ‘You have been entered into a lottery to receive one of ten 
£80 prizes. Winners will be notified in June 2015 but you will only be able to claim 
your prize if you were already registered by 27 March 2015. If not your prize will go 
to another student.’.  
In treatment Non-Monetary 1, the box contained the message: ‘We’d like to know if 
you are intending to register. If you are, please text ‘myvote’ to 60886.’. In treatment 
Non-Monetary 2, the box contained the message: ‘Would you like us to send you a 
text reminder? If you do, please text ‘reminder’ to 60886.’. In both cases, texts were 
free of charge and this was clearly stated in the postcard.  
2.3 Assignment to treatment 
The postcards were sent out on March 9-10 2015 to 7,679 voters who were still 
unregistered at the time and who lived in student accommodation buildings belonging 
to the University of Oxford and Oxford Brookes. In order to minimise the likelihood 
of subjects seeing postcards belonging to treatments other than the one they were 
assigned to, we randomised assignment to treatment at the building level: all students 
living in a single building were assigned to the same treatment. For the University of 
Oxford, all students living in a single college were assigned to the same treatment. 
For Oxford Brookes University, all students living in a single hall of residence were 
assigned to the same treatment, with the exception that two very large halls were split 
into several geographically distinct units of assignment. This was to ensure balance 
between treatments in the proportion of subjects attending each university – we 
considered this important, given large demographic (in particular, socioeconomic) 
differences between the student populations of each university. We further balanced 
treatment assignment by residence size (small and large) and to the age of college 
(ancient and modern) to account for other potential unobserved characteristics. The 
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resulting sample sizes were as follows: Baseline (n = 1193); Monetary Loss (n = 
1357); Monetary Gain 1 (n = 1250); Monetary Gain 2 (n = 1317); Non-Monetary 1 (n 
= 1262); and Non-Monetary 2 (n = 1300). See Appendix B for further details on the 
assignment procedure and for a full breakdown of the colleges and halls assigned to 
each treatment. 
2.4 The dataset 
OCC provided us with anonymised data on registration rates amongst students 
residing in each college and hall at various points in time between January and April 
2015. In particular, for each individual in our dataset, our data specify whether or not 
they were registered on: January 2, March 8 (the day before the postcards of our 
experiment were sent out), and any subsequent day between March 9 and April 20 
(the formal deadline to register to vote for the General Election). The data also 
contain information on the treatment each individual was assigned to, their university 
affiliation (University of Oxford or Oxford Brookes University), and their hall or 
college. Other demographic data such as gender, age, etc. was not available to the 
Council. 
3. Results  
In the following analysis we pool data from the two Monetary Gain treatments. This 
is because we found there were no significant differences between the effects of 
Monetary Gain 1 and Monetary Gain 2 (see Table C1 in the Appendix). Similarly, we 
found no significant differences between the two Non-Monetary treatments (see 
Table C1) and thus, for ease of exposition, we combine these two treatments in our 
analysis. Thus, in the remainder of the section, our analysis is based on the following 
four conditions: Baseline (n = 1193); Monetary Loss (n = 1357); Monetary Gain  (n = 
2567); and Non-Monetary  (n = 2562). 
Figure 2 shows how registration rates differ between treatments over the entire period 
between the intervention and the deadline for registering. On a daily basis between 
March 8 and April 20, it displays the cumulative fraction, by treatment, of registered 
subjects amongst those who were unregistered on January 2. 
141 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative registration rates by treatment 
 
Notes: Figure 2 shows, on a daily basis between March 8 and April 20, the amount of 
registered students in the treated buildings as a fraction of all students in these 
buildings who had been unregistered on January 2. The first vertical line represents 
the day of our treatment intervention (March 9) and the second line represents the day 
of the lottery deadline in the Monetary Gain treatments (March 27). 
Pre-intervention registration rates (i.e. in the period January 2 – March 8) are very 
similar across all treatments; the fraction of registered subjects ranges between 0.080 
and 0.088, showing no significant differences across treatments (see also Table 1 
below). This suggests that later treatment differences are unlikely to be driven by pre-
existing differences between the subjects assigned to each intervention.  
After our intervention (i.e. in the period March 9 – April 20), substantial differences 
emerge in the registration rates across treatments. On April 20 (the day of the 
registration deadline), the fraction of registered students amounts to 0.25 in Baseline, 
0.31 in Monetary Loss, 0.21 in Monetary Gain, and 0.25 in the Non-Monetary 
treatment. Hence, compared to the case of a simple postcard, only the emphasis of 
(potential) negative monetary consequences had a positive effect on registration; 
registration rates in Monetary Loss are 24% higher than in Baseline. The emphasis of 
(potential) positive monetary consequences, in contrast, had no positive effect on 
registration rates. While registration rates are initially somewhat above the ones in 
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Baseline, this effect flips towards the end of our observation period, after monetary 
incentives have been removed again. Overall, the registration rate in our Monetary 
Gain treatments is 16% lower than in Baseline. For the Non-Monetary treatments, we 
find almost identical registration rates as in Baseline, suggesting that the effects of the 
non-monetary nudges were minimal in our setup. Given how few engaged with the 
invitation to send a text message (only 4 students requested a text reminder, while a 
mere 9 texted their intention to register) it is not surprising that we record no 
discernible foot-in-the-door effect. 
To further explore the observed treatment differences in registration rates, we run 
logistic regressions to model the individual level registration decision. Our dependent 
variable is 1 or 0 depending on whether or not an individual has registered in a given 
period. As independent variables, we use dummies to represent the treatment an 
individual was assigned to. Given the very different nature of the two universities that 
were included in our study, we also include a dummy variable for whether a student 
was affiliated with either Oxford Brookes University or University of Oxford. As 
further controls we include: which of the two Oxford voting areas (General Election 
constituencies) a given student resides in; the size of the residence unit they live in; 
and an ‘ancient’ dummy, which takes value 1 if the college or hall in which they live 
is older than 100 years, and value 0 otherwise.63 To correct for heteroscedasticity and 
potential dependency of observations within halls, we cluster standard errors by 
residence unit.64 The results of these regressions are reported in Table 1. 
Model (1) reports, for each treatment relative to Baseline (the omitted category), the 
factor changes in the odds of registering in the period before our intervention (i.e. 
between January 2 and March 8). The sample includes all students in treated 
buildings who were unregistered on January 2. In the Baseline treatment, the odds of 
registering in the pre-intervention period are 0.174, i.e. there are expected to be 
approximately 6 unregistered students for each registered student in our benchmark 
                                                          
63 We included this dummy because we conjectured that there could be some difference in ethos or 
culture which could be relevant to the registration decision, comparing older and more newly 
established colleges.  
64 That is, each college, hall, residence block, and/or cross-college accommodation is treated as 
providing a cluster of observations (see Appendix B for further details).   
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condition. The odds of registering are very similar in the other treatments: in all cases 
the factor changes in the odds are close to 1 and none of the treatment variables are 
significant (all p-values > 0.532). This confirms that registration rates are 
indistinguishable across treatments in the pre-intervention period. 
Table 1: The effects of treatments on registration rates 
Dependent variable  Registered (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
 (1) (2) 
 
Before  
Intervention 
(Jan 2 – Mar 8) 
After  
Intervention 
(Mar 9 – Apr 20) 
   
Monetary Loss 0.968 1.739*** 
 (0.250) (0.348) 
   
Monetary Gain 1.123 0.749 
 (0.209) (0.171) 
   
Non-Monetary 0.930 1.009 
 (0.195) (0.180) 
   
Odds of registering in Baseline 
0.174*** 0.250*** 
(0.064) (0.072) 
Controls Yes Yes 
N 8397 7679 
Notes: The table reports odds ratios from logistic regressions. Note that a ratio greater than 1 implies a 
positive effect, whereas a ratio smaller than 1 implies a negative effect. The dependent variable 
indicates whether an individual registered within a given period. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
residence unit are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In model (2), we look at the effect of our different nudges after their implementation. 
The dependent variable now is whether an individual registered or not during the 
period between March 9 and April 20, the day of the registration deadline. The 
sample includes all students in treated buildings who were still unregistered on March 
8 (i.e., we drop those who registered before the intervention, since they did not 
receive the postcards that were sent out on March 9). The treatment dummies 
therefore represent treatment differences in registration rates after the intervention. 
The odds of registering in Baseline are now 0.25: there are expected to be 4 
unregistered students for each registered student in Baseline. The higher odds of 
registering in the post-intervention period relative to the pre-intervention period may 
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reflect an impact of sending the postcard per se, or a natural increasing trend in 
registrations as the deadline for the General Election draws nearer.65  
The Monetary Loss treatment increases the Baseline odds by a factor of 1.7 and the 
effect is significant at the 1% level. This implies an expected ratio of almost 2:1 
between unregistered and registered students in the Monetary Loss treatment (the 
odds of registering are 0.25 x 1.739 = 0.43). In contrast, the Monetary Gain treatment 
reduces the odds of registering relative to Baseline by a factor of 0.749, although the 
effect does not reach statistical significance (p = 0.205). The Non-Monetary treatment 
has virtually no impact on the odds of registering, with a factor change close to 1 and 
very far from statistical significance (p = 0.958).66 
Another interesting feature of the effect of the Monetary Gain Treatments is apparent 
in Figure 2.  While at the beginning registration rates under the Monetary Gain 
treatments are very similar to the ones in Baseline, in the former they experience a 
less pronounced uptick towards the end of the post-intervention period, after the 
deadline for eligibility to enter the lottery has passed (on March 27).  
To quantify the negative post-deadline effect of the Monetary Gain treatments, we 
split our data into two time periods. The first period spans from the day of our 
intervention until the lottery deadline (i.e. between March 8 and March 27). The 
second period starts from the first day after the lottery deadline until the registration 
deadline (i.e. between March 28 and April 20). As before, we apply logistic 
regression analysis. Note that we only use data from Baseline and Monetary Gain 
treatments, as the March 27 deadline is inconsequential in the other treatments. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 2. Model (1) reports the factor changes 
in the odds of registering in Monetary Gain relative to Baseline in the first period. 
The sample includes all students in treated buildings who were unregistered on March 
8. In Model (2), we instead only look at the period after the deadline for the lottery 
                                                          
65 We cannot distinguish between these two explanations because, in designing our treatments in 
collaboration with OCC, we agreed not to have a treatment where no postcard was sent.  
66 To test the robustness of these results, for the post-intervention period we also apply duration 
analysis to examine the time it takes an individual to register after having received our postcards. 
The results of the duration analysis are consistent with those of the logistic regressions, as we 
show in Appendix C, Table C2 (model (1)). 
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has passed already. The sample now includes all students in treated buildings who 
were still unregistered on March 28, i.e., we drop those subjects who registered 
before the lottery deadline. As before, we cluster standard errors by unit of residence..  
Table 2: The effect of the lottery deadline on registrations relative to Baseline  
Dependent variable:  
Registered (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
(1) (2) 
Before  
Deadline 
(Mar 8– Mar 27) 
After  
Deadline 
(Mar 28 – Apr 20) 
   
Monetary Gain 1.286 0.657* 
 (0.463) (0.425) 
   
Monetary Gain x Post deadline   
   
   
Odds of registering in Baseline 
0.070*** 0.096*** 
(0.047) (0.026) 
Controls Yes Yes 
N 3760 3579 
Notes: The table reports odds ratios from logistic regressions. Note that a ratio greater than 1 implies a 
positive effect, whereas a ratio smaller than 1 implies a negative effect. The dependent variable indicates 
whether an individual registered within a given period. Only data from Monetary Gain and Baseline are 
included. Robust standard errors clustered at the hall level are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of model (1) reveal that before the end of the lottery deadline being 
subject to the Monetary Gain treatment slightly increases the odds of registering 
relative to being subject to the Baseline treatment, by a factor of 1.286, but the effect 
does not reach statistical significance (p = 0.485). In contrast, once the deadline for 
the lottery has passed, i.e., monetary incentives for registering have been removed 
again, being subject to the Monetary Gain treatment reduces the odds of registering 
relative to being subject to the Baseline treatment by a factor of 0.657, and this effect 
is statistically significant (p = 0.057).67 This suggests that implementing monetary 
incentives has no positive effect while in place, but removing the monetary incentives 
                                                          
67 To test the robustness of this result, we again use duration analysis. As we show in Appendix C, 
Table C2 (model (2)), the result of the duration analysis is consistent with that of the logistic 
regression analysis. 
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afterwards has a negative effect on registration rates. This would be in line with the 
literature on motivational crowding out (e.g. Deci And Ryan, 1985; Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Meier, 2007), However, it is also possible that the low post-
deadline registration rate amongst subjects in the Monetary Gain treatments, relative 
to those in Baseline, was the result of individuals who otherwise would have 
registered during this period having been motivated by the lottery to already register 
before the deadline passed. 
To summarise our main findings so far, we find that emphasising the possibility of 
being fined significantly raises registration rates, while attempting to invoke the foot-
in-the-door effect makes no significant impact. Furthermore, using positive monetary 
incentives may actually backfire and even lower registration rates, especially after the 
incentives are removed. 
4. Study II: The effects of the monetary nudges on social norms 
The main finding of our field experiment is that the threat of a monetary fine is more 
effective in encouraging registrations than the chance of a monetary gain (which has 
initially no effect and later, once the possibility of gain is removed, a negative effect), 
or foot-in-the-door type interventions (which have no effect). There are a number of 
possible mechanisms that could explain why the threat of a fine is more effective than 
the chance of a gain overall (e.g., loss aversion; or a bias in beliefs whereby 
individuals assess the probability of being fined as higher than the probability of 
winning the lottery). While we do not rule out such mechanisms being at work in our 
data, other explanations would be required for how the offer of a monetary gain in the 
form of a lottery could have a negative effect on registration, even compared to 
Baseline. In this section, we explore a possible explanation that might organize the 
contrasting impacts of money gains and money losses in our design. Specifically, we 
investigate the potentially different effect of these interventions on social norms, i.e. 
collectively recognised rules of behaviour that define which actions are viewed as 
socially appropriate (Elster, 1989; Ostrom, 2000). We considered this to be a 
promising channel to pursue because, as we now explain, there are plausible and 
contrasting effects that our fine and lottery nudges could have had on the perceived 
social appropriateness of registration behaviour.  
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We conjecture that the Monetary Loss treatment may strengthen a pre-existing social 
norm that registering to vote is what one ought to do: emphasising that failing to 
register is against the law may solidify one’s perception that such behaviour is 
socially inappropriate.68 In contrast, the Monetary Gain treatments may weaken that 
same social norm – the offer of money for registering may suggest to recipients that 
registering is not something already unconditionally demanded of them by society. If 
social norms influence registration behaviour, such alterations of subjects’ 
perceptions of them could directly affect their decisions over registration. Indeed, the 
failure of the Monetary Gain treatments is reminiscent of previous research showing 
the introduction of economic incentives can crowd out people’s intrinsic motivation 
to behave pro-socially (e.g. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Ariely et al., 2009; 
Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012). A plausible mechanism 
behind the offer of financial reward crowding out intrinsic motivation to register 
could be the lottery’s weakening effect on the social norm of registering.  
4.1 Experimental design and procedures 
To investigate this, we ran an online study, employing the social norm elicitation task 
pioneered by Krupka and Weber (2013). In this study, we first described to subjects 
the setting of our field experiment. We then exposed each subject to the postcard used 
in one of three treatments – Baseline, Monetary Loss and Monetary Gain 169 – and in 
each case measured the social norms they perceived pertaining to registration 
behaviour. 
This study was run in June 2016, with subjects who were students at the University of 
Nottingham, recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), an online database of 
                                                          
68 There is some debate over whether social norms and laws are substitutes, or whether laws directly 
shape norms. See, for instance, Posner (2009) and Benabou and Tirole (2011). 
69 We chose to focus only on the Monetary Loss and Gain treatments because in the field experiment 
the monetary interventions produced the most interesting effects on registration rates relative to 
Baseline. The Non-Monetary treatments had no significant effects on registration rates and were 
indeed highly ineffective in engaging subjects. We only focus on one version of the Monetary Gain 
treatments because in the field experiment the Monetary Gain 2 treatment was statistically 
indistinguishable from Monetary Gain 1 and we thought that Monetary Gain 1 was easier to 
describe to subjects. 
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experimental participants. Thus, the subjects would have been demographically 
similar to those in the field experiment, but would not have been previously exposed 
to the postcards. In total 189 subjects participated in the study: 65 were shown the 
Baseline postcard, 61 the Monetary Loss postcard, and 63 the Monetary Gain 1 
postcard. The study was conducted using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2016), an online 
survey platform. 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were told to ‘Imagine that the date is 
March 8, 2015. There is an upcoming General Election on May 7, and a local council 
wants to encourage people to register to vote before the deadline on April 20.’. They 
were further informed that the council is considering strategies to raise registration 
amongst students in university accommodation, where rates have been particularly 
low. They were then told that the council decides to send a card to every unregistered 
student living in university accommodation, and were presented with a picture of one 
of three cards. These were replicas of the postcards sent out to students in the 
Baseline, Monetary Loss and Monetary Gain 1 treatments (the only difference was 
that the cards were cropped to cut off the OCC logo).  
Subjects were then asked to evaluate ‘how socially appropriate most people would 
think it would be for a student, having received this card, to register to vote or not to 
register to vote.’. Earlier in the instructions, we had defined social appropriateness as 
‘behaviour that you think most people would agree is the "correct" thing to do. 
Another way to think about what we mean is that if someone were to behave in a 
socially inappropriate way, then other people might be angry at them.’.70 
We then asked subjects to evaluate the social appropriateness of each action (register 
to vote, not register to vote) on a four-point scale, encompassing ‘very socially 
appropriate’, ‘somewhat socially appropriate’, ‘somewhat socially inappropriate’, and 
‘very socially inappropriate’. These evaluations were incentivised such that subjects 
were encouraged to coordinate on the social norm: we told subjects we would 
randomly select one of the two actions, and for this action, they would be eligible to 
                                                          
70 This follows the experimental instructions introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). See Appendix D 
for the experimental instructions and screenshots of the online survey. 
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receive a cash prize if their evaluation of its social appropriateness was the same as 
that chosen by the most other subjects.71 
4.2 Results 
To analyse the data, we follow Krupka and Weber (2013) in transforming the 
evaluations into numerical values. We assign evenly-spaced values of -1 for the rating 
‘very socially inappropriate’, -0.33 for the rating ‘somewhat socially inappropriate’, 
0.33 for the rating ‘somewhat socially appropriate’ and 1 for the rating ‘very socially 
appropriate.’ We then calculate the mean ratings for each action by subjects exposed 
to each treatment. The results are displayed in Figure 3. 
We find that regardless of the treatment subjects are exposed to, registering to vote 
tends to be seen as highly appropriate behaviour, while failing to register is generally 
seen as inappropriate. However, there are also subtle but significant treatment 
differences in peoples’ appropriateness judgments. In particular, subjects exposed to 
the Monetary Gain treatment perceived registering to vote to be less appropriate than 
did those exposed to the Baseline treatment (two tailed Fisher Randomisation Test, p 
= 0.012).72 Moreover, failing to register to vote was perceived to be more 
inappropriate by subjects exposed to the Monetary Loss treatment than it was by 
those exposed to the Baseline treatment (p = 0.016). In contrast, we find no 
significant differences in the perception of appropriateness of registering between 
                                                          
71 As the study was very short and conducted online, we paid only one out of every eight subjects, 
determined retrospectively by a random lottery (subjects were informed about this at the 
beginning of the experiment). Those chosen for payment received an automatic £10, plus a 
further £30 if their evaluation matched that of the most other subjects in their treatment. 
Although most subjects would not be paid, the study was still incentivised to a conventional level: 
all subjects had a 1/8 chance of receiving between £10 and £40 for an approximately five-minute 
task. 
72 See Moir (1998) for a discussion of the randomisation test, and Kaiser and Lacy (2009) for 
information on the Stata command used to apply it. In Study II, we correct our p-values for the fact 
that we are testing multiple hypotheses relating to two interrelated dependent variables (the 
appropriateness of registering to vote and not registering to vote). For each dependent variable, 
we test Monetary Gain vs. Baseline and Monetary Loss vs. Baseline, a total of four tests. The 
correction method we use is that of Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and corrected p-values are 
displayed in the text. 
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Monetary Loss and Baseline (p = 0.543), or the inappropriateness of non-registering 
between Monetary Gain and Baseline (p = 0.718). 
Figure 3: Social appropriateness of registration behaviour by treatment 
 
Notes: Figure 3 shows the mean appropriateness ratings assigned to each 
action (registering to vote, not registering to vote) by subjects exposed to the 
Monetary Loss, Baseline and Monetary Gain 1 postcards. Mean ratings are 
taken by assigning values of -1, -0.33, 0.33 and 1 for the ratings ‘very 
inappropriate’, ‘somewhat inappropriate’, ‘somewhat appropriate’ and ‘very 
appropriate’ respectively, and averaging the values for each action for all 
participants exposed to a given treatment. Error bars indicate standard errors 
of the mean. 
Table 3 sheds light on how these treatment differences arise. It presents, for each 
treatment, the distribution of subjects’ evaluations of the social appropriateness of 
each possible action. It shows that the lower perceived social appropriateness of 
registering to vote under Monetary Gain is driven by fewer subjects regarding 
registering as ‘very socially appropriate’ relative to Baseline (50.8% versus 78.1%). It 
can also be seen that the higher perceived social inappropriateness of failing to 
register under the Monetary Loss treatment is driven by more subjects regarding non-
registering as ‘very socially inappropriate’ relative to Baseline (25.0% versus 10.9%), 
and by fewer regarding it as ‘somewhat socially appropriate’ (13.3% versus 28.1%). 
To summarise the results of Study II, we find that subjects exposed to the Monetary 
Loss treatment perceived a relatively strong social norm against failing to register, 
while subjects exposed to the Monetary Gain treatment perceived a relatively weak 
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social norm in favour of registering. This suggests that emphasising the fine for 
failing to register strengthens the social norm against such behaviour, while offering 
monetary incentives for successfully registering weakens the social norm demanding 
such behaviour. Given the strong evidence from previous studies (see introduction) 
that social norms influence economic behaviour, we propose that these normative 
effects explain at least part of the success of the Monetary Loss treatment and 
ineffectiveness of the Monetary Gain treatments.  
Table 3: Distribution of social appropriateness evaluations 
Appropriateness of registering to vote 
 
Very socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very socially 
appropriate 
Baseline 1.6 0 20.3 78.1 
Monetary Loss 0 1.7 31.7 66.7 
Monetary Gain 0 8.2 41.0 50.8 
 
Appropriateness of not registering to vote 
 
Very socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very socially 
appropriate 
Baseline 10.9 54.7 28.1 6.3 
Monetary Loss 25.0 58.3 13.3 3.3 
Monetary Gain 9.8 60.7 23.0 6.6 
Notes: Table 3 displays, by treatment, the percentage of subjects who evaluated registering to vote 
(top) or not registering to vote (bottom) as very socially inappropriate, somewhat socially 
inappropriate, somewhat socially appropriate, or very socially appropriate. 
5. Conclusion 
We investigated the effectiveness of different nudges aimed at raising voter 
registration rates. A unique feature of our study is that it combines two types of 
experiment: a natural field experiment to measure which nudge is most effective in 
raising registrations, and an online experiment to investigate possible reasons why 
different nudges may trigger different behavioural responses.  
Our field experiment shows that highlighting to citizens the possibility of being fined 
for failing to register is an effective strategy for public bodies to use. The effect we 
identified by doing this was not only statistically significant, but also of a substantial 
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magnitude: having the fine emphasised made subjects around 1.5 times more likely to 
register. 
In contrast, we do not find evidence that offering financial inducements for 
registration is an effective strategy, nor do we find an effect of  non-monetary 
interventions based on the foot-in-the-door technique (i.e., asking people to comply 
with small requests in order to get them agree to a subsequent larger request). The 
ineffectiveness of the latter can be explained by the fact that, of 3562 people who 
were asked to agree with our small requests, only 13 did so. The effect had no chance 
of taking hold, as we were unable to get our foot through the door in the first place.  
The lack of success of our Monetary Gain treatments may represent another case of 
economic incentives crowding out people’s intrinsic motivation to behave in a 
socially constructive way, to add to those uncovered in previous research (e.g. Frey 
and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Ariely et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and 
Polania-Reyes, 2012). We note that, in this respect, our study’s results differ from 
those of John et al. (2015), who also offered entry into a cash lottery as a reward for 
registering to vote in the UK. They found a small (approximately 4%) but significant 
positive effect of monetary rewards on registration rates. We conjecture that a 
plausible explanation for the contrast in results is that the maximum winnings offered 
by John et al. (2015) were much larger than ours (between £1000 and £5000). Their 
large material incentives may well have been enough to produce a positive effect, 
even if they had to overcome a crowding out effect (Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 
2012). A tentative conclusion could then be that, when offering cash for registration 
or similar behaviours where there is danger of crowding out intrinsic motivations, one 
must ‘pay enough or don’t pay at all’ (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). This would also 
be consistent with Panagopoulos (2013), who found that financial inducements raised 
voter turnout but only once they were sufficiently large. In our study registration rates 
amongst those offered financial incentives were particularly low once the opportunity 
for financial gain had passed; this may suggest– if our results generalise – that would-
be nudgers seeking to use monetary incentives to promote specific behaviours, in 
environments where instrinsic motives can be crowded out, would be well warned 
against subsequently turning off those financial incentives. 
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Finally, our online experiment sheds light on a possible explanation for the 
contrasting effects that positive and negative monetary incentives have on voter 
registration rates. We propose that a plausible explanation for these effects may be via 
their influence on social norms. Our online experiment shows that emphasising the 
fine strengthens the perception that failing to register is socially inappropriate, while 
offering money for registering weakens the perception that registering is socially 
appropriate. We interpret this as evidence that social norms are a significant factor 
determining voter registration, a finding which is consistent with other recent 
experimental literature pointing to the importance of social norms as drivers of a wide 
range of behaviours (e.g. Burks and Krupka, 2012; Gachter et al., 2013; Krupka and 
Weber, 2013; Banerjee, 2016; Barr et al., 2016; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016; 
Krupka et al., 2016). A key novel contribution of our study in relation to this 
literature is in identifying the potentially important role of norms in determining the 
effectiveness of different types of nudge intervention.   
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Online Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Postcard Intervention in Study I 
Baseline Treatment 
 
 
 
Monetary Loss treatment 
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Monetary Gain Treatment 1 
 
 
Monetary Gain Treatment 2 
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Non-monetary Treatment 1 
 
 
Non-monetary Treatment 2 
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Appendix B: Details on assignment to treatment 
Table B1 presents a breakdown, by university and place of residence, of the subjects 
assigned to each treatment. As stated in Section 2.3, we randomised assignment to 
treatment at the building level. For the University of Oxford, all students living in a 
single college were assigned to the same treatment. Two university-owned buildings 
(140 Walton St. and Castle Mill) which house students from various colleges were 
treated as if they were colleges, with common treatment assignment within each 
building. Two colleges, St. Cross and Brasenose, share a residence building (the St. 
Cross/Brasenose Annex). St. Cross and Brasenose were assigned to the same 
treatment. For the purposes of clustering in our regression analysis, 140 Walton St., 
Castle Mill and the St. Cross/Brasenose Annex are all treated as independent units of 
residence. 
For Oxford Brookes University, all students living in a single hall of residence were 
assigned to the same treatment, with the exception that two very large halls, Cheney 
and Clive Booth, which were split into several units of assignment. Cheney and Clive 
Booth are naturally split into discrete residence blocks, so we subdivided them on this 
basis, ensuring maximum geographical distance between the subjects in these halls 
assigned to different treatments. For the purposes of clustering in our regression 
analysis, each subdivision that we split Cheney and Clive Booth into is treated as one 
unit of residence. 
Beyond balancing assignment at the university level, the randomisation was also 
subject to the following constraints. Each treatment had to feature a mixture of large 
and small residence units; we ensured this by splitting the residence units into pools 
based on size, and assigned one unit from each pool to each treatment. Each treatment 
also had to feature a mixture of ancient and modern University of Oxford colleges, to 
the extent that the average college age in all treatments had to be within 200 years. 
Finally, the total number of subjects assigned to the largest treatment had to be no 
more than 15% greater than the number assigned to the smallest. We repeated the 
randomisation until it produced an assignment which met all the above criteria. 
Our randomisation strategy was imperfectly implemented. Mailing errors resulted in 
some subjects being assigned to treatments we did not intend them to be (in italics in 
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Table B1). This explains why 16 students in Lincoln College were assigned to the 
Monetary Loss treatment, while the other 132 were assigned to the Baseline 
treatment; and why 6 Kellogg College students were assigned to Non-Monetary 
Treatment 2, with the other 11 were assigned to the Monetary Loss Treatment. As a 
robustness check, we re-ran our analysis excluding Lincoln and Kellogg from our 
dataset. All our results are robust and change only marginally. 
 
  
164 
 
Table B1: Breakdown of treatment assignment by university and college/hall 
Treatment College/hall Number 
assigned 
Percentage of total 
assigned to treatment 
Baseline University of Oxford 
 
Keble 
Magdalen  
St Hugh’s 
Lincoln 
Corpus Christi 
Harris Manchester 
All Souls 
 
Oxford Brookes  
 
 
Clive Booth  
Paul Kent 
 
Total 
889 
 
206 
201 
200 
132 
120 
26 
4 
 
304 
 
 
153 
151 
 
1193 
74.52 
 
17.27 
16.85 
16.76 
11.06 
10.06 
2.18 
0.34 
 
25.48 
 
 
12.82 
12.66 
 
100.00 
Monetary Loss University of Oxford 
 
St. Catherine’s 
Jesus 
Pembroke 
University College 
St. Peter’s 
Green Templeton 
Lincoln 
Kellogg 
140 Walton Street 
 
Oxford Brookes  
 
Clive Booth 
Warneford 
 
Total 
1026 
 
254 
188 
188 
147 
146 
71 
16 
11 
5 
 
331 
 
187 
144 
 
1357 
75.61 
 
18.72 
13.85 
13.85 
10.83 
10.76 
5.23 
1.18 
0.81 
0.37 
 
24.39 
 
13.78 
10.61 
 
100.00 
Monetary Gain 1 University of Oxford 
 
Worcester 
Hertford 
Trinity 
Oriel 
Mansfield 
Linacre 
 
Oxford Brookes  
 
Clive Booth 
Cheney 
 
940 
 
311 
236 
154 
140 
74 
25 
 
310 
 
162 
128 
 
75.20 
 
24.88 
18.88 
12.32 
11.20 
5.92 
2.00 
 
24.80 
 
14.56 
10.24 
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Total 1250 100.00 
Monetary Gain 2 University of Oxford 
 
St. Edmund 
Merton 
The Queen’s 
St. Hilda’s 
Nuffield 
Wycliffe 
 
Oxford Brookes  
 
Clive Booth 
Cheney 
 
Total 
1044 
 
398 
253 
209 
156 
14 
14 
 
273 
 
168 
105 
 
1317 
79.27 
 
30.22 
19.21 
15.87 
11.85 
1.06 
1.06 
 
20.73 
 
12.76 
7.97 
 
100.00 
Non-monetary 1 University of Oxford 
 
Christ Church 
New College 
Wadham 
Castle Mill 
Exeter 
Brasenose 
St. Cross/Brasenose 
St. Cross 
 
 
Oxford Brookes  
 
Crescent 
Cheney 
 
Total 
947 
 
199 
195 
182 
160 
80 
74 
29 
28 
 
 
315 
 
212 
103 
 
1262 
75.04 
 
15.77 
15.45 
14.42 
12.68 
6.34 
5.86 
2.30 
2.22 
 
 
24.96 
 
16.80 
8.16 
 
100.00 
Non-monetary 2 University of Oxford 
 
St. Anne’s 
Balliol 
St. John’s 
Somerville 
Lady Margaret Hall 
Wolfson 
Kellogg 
 
Oxford Brookes  
 
Clive Booth 
Cheney 
 
Total 
979 
 
216 
192 
167 
164 
162 
72 
6 
 
321 
 
182 
139 
 
1300 
75.31 
 
16.62 
14.77 
12.85 
12.62 
12.46 
5.54 
0.46 
 
24.69 
 
14.00 
10.69 
 
100.00 
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Appendix C: Additional Analyses 
 
Figure C1: Cumulative registration rates by treatment (uncombined) 
 
Notes: Figure C1 shows, on a daily basis between the start of the intervention 
on March 9 and the registration deadline on April 20, the amount of registered 
students in the treated buildings, as a fraction of all students in these buildings 
who had been unregistered on January 2. 
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Table C1: The effects of treatments on registration rates (uncombined) 
Dependent variable = 1 if registered, 
0 if not 
Logistic Regression 
Before  
Intervention 
(Jan 8 – March 8) 
After  
Intervention 
(March 9 – April 20) 
   
Monetary Loss 0.901 1.565** 
 (0.223) (0.286) 
 
Monetary Gain 1 1.037 0.707 
 
 
Monetary Gain 2 
(0.246) 
 
0.935 
(0.251) 
(0.233) 
 
0.706 
(0.216) 
   
Non-Monetary 1 0.869 0.943 
 (0.298) (0.168) 
   
Non-Monetary 2 1.068 1.136 
 (0.228) (0.243) 
   
Brookes Student 0.394*** 0.671*** 
 (0.064) (0.084) 
   
Constant 0.113*** 0.238*** 
 (0.020) (0.039) 
   
Wald-tests (p-values):   
   
Monetary Gain 1 = Monetary Gain 2 
 
0.682 0.996 
 
Non-Monetary 1 = Non-Monetary 2 0.514 0.226 
 
N 8397 7679 
Notes: Reported are odds ratios. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
residence unit are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table 
further includes the p-values from Wald tests of the hypothesis that the 
coeﬃcients diﬀer between the two types of Monetary Gain treatments and the 
two types of the Non-Monetary treatments. 
 
 
Duration analysis 
 
To test the robustness of the results in Table 1, for the post-intervention period we 
apply duration analysis to examine the data underlying Figure 2 by taking into 
account the time it takes an individual to register after having received our postcards. 
Specifically, we use a Cox proportional hazard approach to model the duration until 
an individual registers. Estimated hazard ratios are reported in model (1) in  Table C2. 
In line with the results from the logistic regression, we find a positive and significant 
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effect of the Monetary Loss dummy. The hazard ratio of 1.656 indicates that - for 
those in the Monetary Loss treatment - the probability of registering on a certain date 
(conditional on not having been registered before) is 65.6% larger than in Baseline. 
The corresponding hazard ratios for the Monetary Gain and Non-Monetary dummies, 
in contrast, are not significantly different from 1, indicating no difference in the 
conditional probability of registering relative to Baseline for these two treatments.  
The robustness of the result in Table 2 is also tested using a Cox proportional hazard 
approach (model (2) in Table C2), which models the duration until an individual 
registers within the two post-intervention time periods, before and after the lottery 
deadline has passed. In line with the result from model (1) in Table 2, we find that the 
Monetary Gain dummy is insignificant (with a hazard ratio of 1.264), indicating that 
there are no pronounced differences in the conditional probability of registering 
between Baseline and Monetary Gain in the period where monetary incentives for 
registering are still in place.  Furthermore, in line with the results from model (2) in 
Table 2 we find a significant interaction effect between the Monetary Gain dummy 
and a dummy for the post lottery deadline period. This indicates that the probability 
of registering (conditional on not having been registered before) in Monetary Gain 
relative to Baseline reduces once the deadline for entry into the lottery has passed. 
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Table C2: Duration analysis 
Dependent variable  
Duration to registration 
(1)                                 (2) 
 
After Intervention 
(Mar 9 – Apr 20) 
 
 
   
Monetary Loss 1.656**  
 (0.302)  
   
Monetary Gain 0.782 1.264 
 (0.167) (0.425) 
   
Non-Monetary 1.019  
 
 
Monetary Gain x Post deadline 
(0.165)  
 
0.549** 
(0.147) 
 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
N 7679 3760 
Notes: The table reports  hazard ratios from estimations based on Cox proportional hazard models. 
Note that a ratio greater than 1 implies a positive effect, whereas a ratio smaller than 1 implies a 
negative effect. The dependent variable is the duration until an individual registers (i.e. the time 
between our treatment intervention and the date at which an individual registers). In model (2) only 
data from Monetary Gain and Baseline are included. Robust standard errors clustered at the residence 
unit are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix D: Screenshots of Study II 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
The first two substantive chapters of this dissertation (Chapters 2 and 3) are primarily 
focused on how and why the strength of discrimination varies across contexts. The 
most important results of Chapter 2 were: that lab experiments have found stronger 
discrimination between some types of identity groups than others; and that, in 
particular, minimal group experiments find stronger discrimination than one might 
expect. This finding was the central focus of investigation in Chapter 3. Here, we 
proposed and found support for one possible explanation for the result: that 
discrimination is perceived to be less socially inappropriate in some circumstances 
than in others, and that in those circumstances where it is less socially inappropriate 
people are more willing to engage in discrimination. 
There is certainly scope for more future research on the relationship between 
discrimination and social norms. Field experiments could, for instance, investigate the 
effects on discrimination of nudges designed to reduce the social appropriateness of 
discriminating. There is also scope for more research investigating other possible 
reasons for contextual differences in levels of discrimination – in particular, why lab 
experiments yield relatively high levels of discrimination across minimal groups but 
relatively low levels across ethnic, national or religious groups. As I discuss in the 
first and second chapters, these phenomena may suggest lab experiments face 
difficulties in estimating levels of discrimination that are generalizable to the outside 
world. The external generalizability of lab estimates of discrimination could be 
studied by designing experiments to measure discrimination in both lab and field 
contexts while carefully holding other features of the decision-making context 
constant (see Stoop et al, 2012, and Stoop, 2014, for experiments following this 
approach in other research areas).  
Chapter 4 of the dissertation departs from the topic of discrimination: the main focus 
here is on nudging in public policy. However, it also maintains an emphasis on social 
norms. Both Chapters 2 and 3 provide evidence to support the notion that social 
norms play a role in determining behavioural regularities. The norm-elicitation 
method we use in both cases – that of Krupka and Weber (2013) – is being widely 
adopted by experimental economists and there is, no doubt, scope for future research 
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into the reliability of the method itself, as well as into other methods of measuring 
social norms. In particular, the Krupka-Weber method’s use of monetary incentives to 
encourage coordination on the social norm has received some attention (e.g. Vesely, 
2015) but further research could provide greater clarity on the effect of this design 
feature.  
Chapter 4 provides a case where the context dependence of social norms can be 
exploited to achieve a policy goal. With current interest in social norms high, 
policymakers are increasingly aware of the possibilities offered by nudges harnessing 
the effects of social norms (e.g. Ayres et al, 2012; Behavioural Insights Team, 2011). 
Such social nudging could be implemented across a very wide range of policy 
domains. For instance, governments interested in reducing discrimination may find 
campaigns aimed at strengthening the taboo nature of such behaviour to be effective 
tools. Of course, we should have no presumptions about the preferences of 
policymakers. Indeed, those who wish to see discrimination eliminated may have as 
much reason to fear the potential for policymakers to influence social norms as to be 
thankful for it; it is, for instance, quite plausible that the apparent efforts of current 
prominent politicians around the world to normalise certain forms of discrimination 
could lead to an upsurge in their prevalence.  
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